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Abstract 
As a broad framework, Lazarus and Folkman's (1984) model of coping was used to 
select factors which were considered likely to be related to Denial and reality distortions. 
These factors were used to develop the Coping With Life (CWL) questionnaire, a self- 
report personality trait instrument. The CWL had six factors: Pessimism, Social Support, 
Emotion Control, Esteem Concern, Anger and Self Mastery. Pessimism, Emotion 
Control, Anger and Esteem Concern were the variables expected to be positively 
associated with Denial. Each of the factors demonstrated good internal and test-retest 
reliability. Factors were validated successfully against existing scales: Brief COPE 
(Carver, 1997); STAI form Y2 trait anxiety scale (Speilberger, 1983); Rumination scale 
of the ECQ (Roger & Najarian, 1989). 
Similar patterns of responses to the CWL were found in two groups of individuals that it 
was argued were exhibiting Denial (reality distorting behaviour): Offenders who were 
refusing their guilt and smokers who had low risk perception of their smoking compared 
to other smokers. Both groups were found to be higher in Self Mastery and Lower in 
Esteem Concern. Although the direction of the relationships was unexpected, the 
findings were coherent with the profile of an individual who engages in Denial to defend 
self-image. 
To control for the possibility that these results were not simply due to image 
management or lying, the emotional Stroop paradigm was used to investigate responses 
made to threatening words without opportunity for consciously mediated strategies. 
Higher Self Mastery was again associated with responding consistent with the use of 
Denial, i. e. lower delay in responding to emotional words vs. neutral words 
Overall, CWL was found to be a reliable instrument across different samples, and Self 
Mastery was consistently found to be associated with responding consistent with the use 
of Denial. These studies provide evidence in support of a broad-based approach to 
studying Denial, founded upon stable personality variables associated with its use. 
To Dousan, for waiting and waiting, 
I am sorry for being so late. 
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I CHAPTER ONE 
People tend to have a particular self image, a stable way of viewing themselves, that is 
in the most cases favourable (Baumeister, Dale & Sommer, 1998). How then is this 
image to be preserved when an individual is confronted by information that is opposite 
to, or threatening towards, their self-image? One method is to some extent ignore or 
reject the information itself, so that it is no longer perceived. If it is still perceived then a 
different approach would be to alter it in some way so it is no longer so contrary to the 
self-image. Another way would be less directed at altering the information but more 
directed at strengthening the self-image so that the information was comparatively less 
threatening. Additionally, some or all of these methods could be used at the same time. 
Either way, the threat to self is reduced. 
Many researchers have addressed the way people manipulate information and self-image 
in these ways, under many different headings: Sigmund Freud (1894) and later Anna 
Freud (1936/1966) first talked of Defence Mechanisms (Cramer, 1991); Sackheim and 
Gur (1979) and Paulhus (1984) have used the term Self-Deceptive Enhancement 
(Paulhus & John, 1998); Coping research (e. g. Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989; 
Lazarus, 1999) has addressed the topic, e. g. Cognitive Coping, Positive Reinterpretation. 
And these are just a few of the possible terms. 
Further complicating the matter is that quite rigid ways of defining and distinguishing 
these approaches have been adopted by different authors, e. g. trait vs. process, conscious 
vs. unconscious operation (Parker and Endler, 1996). Finally, the problem of actually 
measuring the action or effects of these self-image protective processes is full of 
confusion and difficulty (e. g. Davidson & MacGregor, 1998). 
This study is an attempt to look at certain aspects of one of the most widely considered 
methods that is hypothesised to accomplish threat reduction, that of Denial. Specifically, 
stable personality measures that may be associated with greater use of Denial will be 
investigated. 
Paulhus, Fridhandler and Hayes' words in the very first line of their 1997 chapter on 
defences are quite telling: "With some trepidation, we tackle the monumental task of 
reviewing the contemporary literature on psychological defense" (p. 543). Taking 
Paulhus, Fridhandler and Hayes' (1997) fears into account, this thesis will not attempt to 
cover all aspects of the very broad and scattered field that researches into the ways in 
which people preserve their self image through threat reducing mechanisms. 
Even within the narrower context of Denial this thesis will not attempt to be 
comprehensive. It will instead attempt to integrate parts of the various different 
approaches to understanding aspects of Denial and Denial-like processes, an approach 
that Norem (1998) suggests is overdue, and labels the "integration of processes within 
individuals" (p. 913). 
Specifically, contributions from the psychoanalytic literature, coping research and 
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cognitive psychology will all be used. Combining diverse elements to tackle the same 
problem has been shown to maximise the validity of the findings of the research, as the 
weaknesses of one approach can be compensated for by the strengths of another 
(Shryane, Westerman, Crawshaw, Hockey and Sauer, 1998) 
This present chapter will present a short review of the historical emergence and 
description of the concept of Denial in traditional psychodynamic terms and coping 
terms. Although certain authors argue strongly for the conceptual separation between 
defences and coping (e. g. Cramer, 1991; 1998) the goal here will be to appreciate their 
similarities rather than get stuck on their differences. The problems in measuring Denial 
will be discussed, and the benefits of adopting an indirect, trait-based approach for 
investigating Denial will be put forward. 
Chapter two will put the trait approach to measuring Denial into practice, by 
constructing a self-report personality instrument designed to measure personality factors 
that may be related to Denial, using Lazarus and Folkman's (1984) model of coping as a 
conceptual framework. The remaining chapters will provide tests of whether the 
personality-based approach has actually been fruitful in identifying factors associated 
with Denial. These will cover less controlled but more ecologically valid tests of the 
approach in identifying Denial in people's daily lives (chapters three and four), and also 
a more controlled but more contrived experimental study (chapter five). Chapter six will 
attempt to reflect on what has been learned. 
1.1 The background of the concept of Denial 
"We also believe, to some degree, in personal immortality; Becker (1973) 
has argued that all are striving and products stem from a single, powerful 
psychological force - the denial of death. " 
(Lazarus, 1983; p. 2) 
The concept of Denial is undoubtedly one of the most controversial concepts in 
Psychology. When considered as an ego defence, Paulhus, Fridhandler and Hayes 
(1997), state that many psychologists are sceptical of the very existence of even the 
notion of defence, of which Denial is one of the cornerstones. On the other hand, 
Plutchik (1995) defends the concept of ego defence as being one of the most important 
contributions of the psychoanalytic tradition. A review by Baumeister, Dale and 
Sommer (1998) found that the existence of Denial, as a process that rejects or distorts 
information, is well supported by evidence from mainstream social psychology. 
Denial has become a hugely popular term both in an extended scientific area -medicine, 
nursing, counselling- and also in everyday life where it is used often as a lay term, but 
there is often little consistency in its usage (Manousos and Williams, 1998). 
All the dispute started with Sigmund Freud and defence mechanisms. 
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"Perhaps Freud's most original contribution to human psychology was 
his inductive postulation that unconscious `defence mechanisms 'protect 
the individual from painful emotions, ideas and drives" 
(Vaillant, 1992; p. 35) 
The concept of psychic defence was introduced by Sigmund Freud in 1894, "as a means 
of preventing painful affects associated with traumas from entering awareness" (Cramer, 
1991; p. 3). Initially Freud considered defence "to be a mental function, one of the 
several faculties of the mind". Through this scope there were no specific defence 
mechanisms. 
Freud assumed that the defensive process emerges during the early stage of mental 
development when young children face danger in the form of helplessness. It was related 
to anxiety, which acted as a trigger for defensive functioning. After Freud's introduction 
of his three structure personality model (id, ego and superego) the concept of defence 
was reconsidered and re-conceptualised as an ego function, to defend the "weak or 
immature ego" (Freud 1915/1957; in Plutchik, 1995, p. 13). At this point Freud started to 
differentiate different varieties of defence mechanisms, although it was his daughter 
Anna Freud (193 6/1966) who first described Denial as a separate defence mechanism, 
directed at warding-off external reality (rather than internal thoughts or feelings, as for 
the other mechanisms; Buckley, 1995). 
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Ego defences were originally seen as "undesirable modes of mental functioning" 
(Plutchik, 1995; p. 17), and indicative of psychopathology. Also, defence mechanisms 
are seen as being hierarchically organised, with Denial seen as a "primitive" or 
"immature" defence (e. g. Vaillant, 1994). 
Although psychoanalytic theory in general has since been heavily criticised and 
modified, Plutchik (1995) defends the concept of ego defence as being one of the most 
important contributions of Freud. 
According to Parker and Endler (1996; p. 9) there emerged a conceptual differentiation 
of the mechanisms by which people sought to deal with anxiety. Defences were viewed 
as "rigid, compelled [and] reality distorting " processes that occurred in the 
subconscious. Much interest started to be paid to conscious ways in which people tried 
to deal with anxiety -'adaptive defences' or coping behaviours that were "flexible, 
purposive [and] reality orientated". The research into conscious strategies for dealing 
with threatening situations is what is now known as coping research. 
(Adding somewhat to the definitional confusion in the area, the term "coping", as well as 
being used to describe a broad field of research into how people deal with stress, is also 
used to describe exclusively those behaviours which are considered "adaptive". 
Therefore, some researchers use the term "coping" to mean only behaviours that results 
in desirable outcomes, e. g. "that person is dealing well with his problems - he is coping". 
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Lazarus (1999) views this approach .. as unhelpful, as 
it confuses attempts to regulate 
anxiety with the outcomes of those attempts, which may be good in certain 
circumstances and bad in others. Here, coping will be viewed in its broadest sense, i. e. 
not just "adaptive" behaviours. ) 
Following on from work such as that by Pearlin and Schooler (1979) a broad distinction 
was made between so called "problem-focused" coping and "emotion-focused" coping. 
Problem focused responses are those that address the external manifestation of the 
source of anxiety. Emotion focused attempts are those that instead focus on reducing the 
internal anxiety and negative affect directly without necessarily changing the external 
situation. 
"Coping can reduce stress reactions, sometimes by actions that change 
the actual relationship between the person and the environment 
(problem focused coping), and sometimes merely by changing the 
meaning of that relationship (emotion focused coping) ". 
(Lazarus, 1999: p. 77). 
The dominant model of coping has come to be that of Lazarus and Folkman (e. g. 1984). 
Their model of coping is characterised by appraisals. Primary appraisal is the process by 
which stimuli from the environment are evaluated as to their level of threat; in essence, 
what relation does the stimulus have for a person's goals, well-being etc? Secondary 
appraisal is the process by which, when a stimulus is identified as threatening, the 
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person's resources for dealing with the threat are taken into account in deciding what 
action can be taken to cope with the situation. 
Primary and secondary appraisal are used together and not necessarily in their titular 
order. A process of reappraisal is ongoing in any threatening situation, with primary and 
secondary appraisals being modified in response to changes in the stimulus, but also to 
changes in the appraisals themselves. If a stimulus is appraised as threatening (primary 
appraisal), and the person's resources are evaluated as being insufficient to deal with the 
threat (secondary appraisal) then stress and anxiety will be the result. 
Although the whole area of coping research emerged from interest in flexible, conscious 
patterns of response to stressors, Lazarus (1999) states that the actual appraisal process 
can be made without awareness of the complex factors involved in the judgement. An 
appraisal can come about in two main contrasting ways, the process of appraising can be 
largely conscious and voluntary and it can also be unconscious, automatic and intuitive. 
(Lazarus, 1999). 
1.2 Is Denial a Defence mechanism or a form of Coping? 
Coping mechanisms, like defence mechanisms, function to protect individuals from the 
emotional consequences of adversity and they both have as a primary function the task 
of dealing with stress (Cramer, 1998; p. 920). From this standpoint, there is a lot in 
common between the defence of Denial and certain emotion-focused coping strategies. 
For instance cognitive coping (Lazarus, 1999) and positive reappraisal (Lazarus and 
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Folkman, 1984) both describe the process of reducing the threat of a problem by re- 
conceptualising it - similar to the function of Denial as reducing threat by altering or 
rejecting information. 
One area in which there used to be a big disagreement regarding defences and coping 
was adaptive utility. Although defences used to be viewed as primitive and maladaptive 
this is no longer the case (Cramer, 1998). Defences have their place-in-day to day 
behaviour and it is accepted that they are part of "normal" functioning. Their usefulness 
is dependent on the situation, however. For instance, using Denial to ignore signs of 
illness is considered maladaptive, as it may lead to delay in seeking medical attention. 
Using Denial to reject the implications of a major emotional upset (e. g. bereavement), 
may allow the individual to function without breakdown, however, and so be considered 
adaptive (unless its use is prolonged; Wheeler and Lord, 1999). 
Regarding coping, although sometimes actual coping responses are labelled as adaptive 
or maladaptive (e. g.. emotion-focused strategies are often labelled as maladaptive) it is 
again recognised that any behaviour may be good or bad for the person depending on the 
situation (Lazarus, 1999; Zeidner & Saklofske, 1996). For instance, problem-focused 
coping (usually considered adaptive) in the face of a situation over which one has no 
control may lead to increased, not decreased distress. Similarly, although relying on 
emotion-focused strategies will not solve an external problem, they will (if effective) 
reduce distress and so have served their purpose. Again, though, too much of their use is 
considered maladaptive. 
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However, following A. Freud's suggestion in relation to just Denial (1936/1966, in 
Plutchik, 1995), Denial and extreme forms of emotion focused coping, while not 
maladaptive per se, are considered to be the most likely of the ways of dealing with 
stress to become maladaptive. This is usually seen as because they both have the same 
effect of removing a person's internal view of reality away from the "objective" external 
reality, and so make more "mature" or problem-focused attempts at coping more 
difficult or unlikely to succeed. 
From the above it seems that both approaches, defences and coping, can plausibly talk 
about Denial in a sensible fashion. No distinction between defence mechanisms and 
coping strategies was seen by Carver, Scheier and Weintraub (1989) in their coping 
styles questionnaire COPE, as Denial was included as one of the scales. However, other 
researchers take a different view. 
Weisman (1989), who researches the role of Denial in the medical context, attempted to 
differentiate Denial from coping, treating them as almost opposites, by stating for 
example that the aim of Denial is `"to turn a problem into a non-problem, so that coping 
is unnecessary" (p. 256). At the same time, he put under a heading of common coping 
strategies "Deny as much as possible", and under a heading of what do good copers do, 
"They find denial is a useful temporary distraction, and avoid self-pity, bitterness, or 
unwarranted optimism or pessimism" (p. 258). Finally to confuse even more -or maybe 
to clarify- Weisman stated that "Good copers have more coping strategies at their 
disposal than denial"; a statement which implies that Denial is a coping strategy 
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although not a good one. (p. 258). 
This lack of consistency is quite widespread. On a more general level Cramer (1998) 
argues that defence mechanisms and coping mechanisms are clearly different things. 
Although defining both as being involved in the management of stress, she states that the 
function of coping is to "solve or manage a problem" (p. 921, p. 924). This seems at first 
glance to refute the existence of emotion-focused coping, which does not address the 
external "problem". However, she also states that coping can operate to "reduce negative 
affect" without necessarily changing the problem situation (p. 924), which is exactly 
what emotion-focused strategies do and somewhat contradicts her earlier point. 
She goes on to state that the defining difference between defence and coping is that of 
intentionality and conscious awareness. She contrasts coping mechanisms and defences 
as the former involving conscious, purposeful effort and the latter as being unconscious 
and without awareness of the purpose for which they are being used. If the goal of a 
defence is to keep threatening information out of conscious awareness then their 
operation must be unconscious, or their very purpose is defeated. 
This apparent necessity has been criticised heavily in the past as "the paradox of 
Denial". Eyesenk and Keane (1995; p. 439) report a particularly strong opinion by Howie 
(1952) on this matter. He was speaking of perceptual defence in general, but the 
comments apply equally well to Denial: 
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"To speak of perceptual defence is to use a mode of discourse which must make any 
precise or even intelligible meaning of perceptual defence impossible, for it is to speak 
of perceptual process as somehow being both a process of knowing and a process of 
avoiding knowing. " (p. 311). 
In short, Denial cannot exist because it would involve the cognitive system having to 
know what not to know. This is not actually a paradox, however, because, as Eyesenk 
and Keane (1995) point out, perception is not a single event but involves various stages 
and processes, some which may "know" of the threat (i. e. unconscious processes), and 
some which may not (i. e. consciousness). 
1 
However, even the rigid distinction between conscious and unconscious experience is 
beginning to be appreciated as a simplistic way of viewing mental activity and 
awareness. For instance Schiffrin (1997) suggests that human behaviour is never either 
wholly conscious or unconscious, but is always accomplished by a mixture of automatic 
(unconscious) and attentive (conscious) processes. It is also useful to appreciate that 
conscious experience is not separate from, but is built upon, unconscious processes, i. e. 
unconscious processes can occur without consciousness, but not vice versa. 
That there is a blurred distinction between conscious and unconscious processes in 
relation to defences and coping is recognised by Cramer (1998), but her resolution is to 
reclassify behaviours from one category to the other. For example, she suggests that 
coping behaviour such as cognitive "habits" that have become somewhat automatic 
should be classified as defences, and that "high level" defences, such as suppression of 
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disturbing thoughts, may involve an element of conscious triggering and therefore 
should be considered as coping mechanisms. 
Lazarus and Folkman (1984) take a similar view. They observe that "The distinction 
between coping and automatized responses is not always clear" (p. 131) but their 
solution is again to try and label behaviours into one of two categories based on their 
status as conscious and requiring effort (coping) or automatic (not coping). 
This is surprising, as Lazarus recognises that the control of action can change from being 
conscious to becoming automatic, the same for coping behaviours as virtually any other 
human behaviour. Behaviours may initially be consciously directed, but with practice 
they can become learned and eventually become automatic in response to environmental 
cues (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984; p. 132; cf. Rasmussen, 1983). 
This struggle to fit all the ways that people deal with stress by distorting information into 
two rigidly defined categories, conscious vs. unconscious (e. g. coping vs. defence) does 
not fit well with current understanding on consciousness and learning as described 
above. In fact, it seems a bit reminiscent of the 19`x' Century biologists who tried to 
categorise fossils of extinct hominids as being either apes or modern humans (Shipman, 
2001, in Palmer, 2001). In that case there was a continuous process, "evolution", that 
provided a better fit to the data than the "man or beast" approach. In the current case, 
theorists are apt to adopt a "defence or coping" approach that struggles to accommodate 
all observations. In the evolution example there certainly was separate "man" and 
"beast", but what explained this, and the in-between hominids too, was evolution. In the 
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current case there certainly is separate "defence" and "coping" but this does not explain 
the hybrid "consciously triggered defence" or "habit coping". Rather, the flexible and 
adaptive way that humans control their behaviour (including cognitions) seems the way 
forward. 
So, it seems possible that when Lazarus (1999) talks of unconscious appraisals that serve 
emotion-focused coping he is talking about similar processes that Cramer (1998) may 
refer to as Denial. Any attempts by the person (note, not necessarily conscious 
"attempts") to deal with a threat are likely to involve an interplay between the initial, 
perhaps defensively moderated appraisal, coupled with consciously willed or moderated 
by attempts to, say, "not think about it". Over time some aspects of these consciously 
directed strategies may become learned and virtually automatic in response to certain 
threats from the environment. 
So, it is suggested here that ways of dealing with undesirable reality by changing or 
distorting information can range from fully conscious attempts to avoid cognitions, 
through partially or semi-conscious cognitive "habits" that suppress or distort 
information, to fully unconscious perceptual processes that the person is unaware of. 
Conscious strategies may become learned and automatised, and processes at different 
levels of awareness can act together or in isolation. This is, of course, a speculative 
viewpoint at present, but it seems that some sort of integration between coping and 
defence is required (Norem, 1998). 
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If there is a blurred distinction between quite how the processes that reject or alter 
information operate, then perhaps it is appropriate to look at higher level issues, such as 
what may motivate the individual to wish to alter / distort incoming information in the 
first place. Important variables in this respect may be environmentally-orientated ones, 
to do with the stressor (i. e. situations that are so threatening that virtually everyone will 
use Denial), or person orientated ones, to do with individual differences (i. e. personality 
traits that are commonly associated with the use of Denial). 
However, as well as the perceived differences between defences and coping in terms of 
their level of operation (unconscious / conscious) the two areas also have different 
traditions in terms of the relative importance they have placed on person vs. 
environmental variables. 
Defence mechanisms have traditionally been assessed as stable, within person 
constructs. An important point made by A. Freud (1936/1966) was that individuals tend 
to habitually use a stable set of defence mechanisms when dealing with stress and 
anxiety, i. e. people tend to have a fairly limited but stable repertoire of defences (Parker 
and Endler, 1996). Gorzynski, Gregory, et-al (1980), for example, found stable patterns 
of defences over a ten-year time span. An example of the trait approach to defences is 
approach is Byrne's (1961) Repression-Sensitisation construct. 
Much coping research (e. g. Lazarus and Folkman, 1984), on the other hand, has tended 
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to emphasise the importance of the particular situation and the transactional nature of the 
coping response - coping as a process. Lazarus and Folkman's (1984) model of coping 
described earlier (p. 8) is based upon an individual's appraisals of the particulars of the 
situation, and so these environmental factors have been assumed to be the most 
important. However, there is much evidence to suggest that coping preferences can be 
stable over time, and these can be associated with stable personality traits. 
Billingley, Waehler & Hardin (1993) measured dispositional optimism and coping 
responses at two times a month apart. They found that emotional coping strategies were 
stable over time, and tended to be associated negatively with optimism. In a study of 
workplace stress Long & Schutz (1995) measured coping responses in a sample of 
women managers. They found stable coping patterns across a one year interval. 
Heim, Augustiny, Schaffner & Valach (1993) assessed the coping styles of a group of 
breast cancer patients at least every six months over a period of up to five years after 
diagnosis. They found that social support, clinically rated Denial and avoidance coping 
were stable over time. 
The trait approach to coping has been much criticised by Lazarus (e. g. 1999). These 
days, rather than attacking the very existence of trait factors in coping, much of his 
criticism has been directed towards how coping is measured. For instance, he states: 
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"... trait measurement promotes a vague response related more to the 
way a person might prefer to cope, influenced in all likelihood by what is 
socially desirable or ideal rather than how that person actually coped" 
(Lazarus, 1999, p. 117). 
However, research by David (1998) looked at coping in response to day-to-day stressors 
using both state and trait methods. In study 1a retrospective approach was taken, asking 
participants how they had coped in general over the last month. In study 2a diary of 
coping behaviours was completed by participants every day for a month. Similar 
patterns of coping styles were found with both methods, i. e. the average of daily state 
measures vs. the retrospective trait measure. 
In a review of coping stability, Hewett and Flett (1996) concluded that coping does seem 
to be to a great degree stable, over both short and long time spans. For example, they 
report work by Billingsley, Waehler and Hardin (1993) that found significant stability in 
Carver, Scheier and Weintraub's (1989) COPE coping styles instrument in a group of 
students over a one month time span. They also report work by Rohde, Lewinsohn, 
Tilson and Seeley (1990) that found good reliability in coping styles over a one-year 
gap 
The evidence presented above suggests that patterns of coping choices can be stable over 
time. (As a side issue, Hewitt and Flett (1996) suggest that this raises the possibility that 
many instruments developed to measure the process of coping and particular coping 
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behaviours are in fact actually measuring, to an extent, personality variables. ) 
Specifically, it seems that emotionally-focused strategies are the ones that are most often 
found to be stable. Of the personality traits, those related to anxiety and emotion seem to 
be the most predictable (Krohne, 1996), i. e. the factors related to Denial and emotion 
coping. 
(Parker and Endler (1996) suggested that it was perhaps the context of early coping 
research, very focused on people's reactions to extreme and life threatening situations, 
that made it appear that personality variables were not as important as situational ones. ) 
To conclude this part, it is argued that there is more in common between viewing Denial 
as a defence mechanism and viewing it as an extreme way of emotional coping than is 
often accepted. From both perspectives they both perform broadly the same function, 
seem both to remove the individual away from "reality" in performing that function, and 
both seem to have stable trait-like elements. 
This presents a way to investigate Denial (both as a defence and as a emotion-focused 
coping strategy), as it may be that its use is associated with certain, stable personality 
characteristics. That will be the goal of this thesis. Before this can be accomplished, 
however, consideration of how Denial can be measured must be taken. 
1.3 Problems in measuring Denial. 
A number of methods have been used to assess Denial. The most common are 
interviews, projective techniques and self-report instruments. 
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There are two important problems when trying to measure Denial. Firstly, the very act of 
measurement may be seen as threatening and so other, non-Denial, defensive processes 
may form part of what is measured. For instance, lying is sometimes confused with 
Denial (Moyer and Levine, 1998). Interviews can be most prone to the problem of 
arousing defensiveness by the interviewee, because the presence of the interviewer can 
be a potent social threat, and although confidentiality can be assured, anonymity cannot 
be reasonably claimed. 
The second problem is, to the extent that Denial operates below conscious experience, 
these aspects may not be available to conscious report. The problem is similar to asking 
someone if they are asleep or not. Scales such as the Denial scale from the COPE 
inventory (Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989)'try to tap respondents' meta-cognitive 
knowledge about their own behaviour, an approach akin to asking someone if they are 
aware that they sleep. Items such as "I pretend that it hasn't really happened" thus 
attempt to tap participants self-knowledge about how they tend to deal with problems. 
However, direct questioning can again provoke other types of defensive responding e. g. 
lying. Also, this approach relies on people being self-aware of their behaviour. 
Projective techniques (e. g. Thematic Apperception Test, Murray, 1943) attempt to tap 
directly into the unconscious by presenting ambiguous stimuli that are not likely to 
provoke defensive reactions. Participants' responses may then reflect characteristic 
defensive processes of which they are not aware. However, these tests fall prey to the 
above problems of having to be administered by a tester in a social situation and often 
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quite subjective scoring. 
A crucial property of any measurement device is that of reliability. Whatever it claims to 
measure, a measurement tool must do so reliably if it is to be of any use whatsoever. A 
brief discussion of the various methods in relation to reliability is given below. 
Interviews have most often been used in clinical settings, such as assessing Denial in 
patients (e. g. Wool, 1986). Interviews are also sometimes supported by rating scales or 
other devices to impose structure on the process (e. g. Hackett and Cassem, 1974). 
Interviews have been viewed as having very good face validity to researchers, because 
the interviewee's posture, tone of voice and other characteristics can be evaluated as well 
as the actual content of what they say. However, it is rarely made explicit how this 
information is used and observer bias can be especially strong in clinical settings (Moyer 
and Levine, 1998). Unstructured interviews in general have been found to have very low 
reliability (e. g. Herriot, 1987). Standardised procedures can help, but even then results 
are not impressive. For instance, Todd and Magarey (1978) used standardised questions, 
the interviews were video-taped, and multiple raters used standardised coding schemes 
to score the interview tapes. Even with these rigorous procedures inter-rater reliability 
was only found to be . 62. 
Projective techniques, such as the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Murray, 1943), 
have been used to investigate Denial (e. g. Cramer, 1991). Lilienfeld, Wood and Garb, 
2001) have criticised these tests because of their lack of standardisation in usage. For 
instance, with the TAT researchers often use only a few of the available cards and do not 
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report which ones. Scoring processes, even using standardised schemes, involve a 
significant amount of observer judgement; however, scoring is rarely carried out under 
'blind' procedures and inter-rater reliability is often also not reported (Lilienfeld, Wood 
and Garb, 2001). However, even using standardised administration and scoring 
procedures they have been found to be inadequate in terms of their psychometric 
properties (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). For instance, Cramer (1991) developed the 
Defense Mechanism Manual, a structured, TAT-based tool which includes the 
evaluation of Denial. The reliability of the Denial measure was as follows: in a sample 
of college students alpha reliability was found to be . 52; in a sample of adolescents, 
three week test-retest reliability was found to be . 26; mean inter-rater reliability for the 
college student sample was found to be . 62. These results are quite poor 
by the standards 
usually applied to psychometric instruments (e. g. Kline, 1993). Especially for a tool 
designed to assess a trait concept like defence, the test-retest reliability is not acceptable. 
Regarding self-report measures of defences including Denial, Davidson and MacGregor 
(1998) performed an extensive review of measures that try to directly assess defences. 
Self report measures with fixed response formats and explicit scoring schemes can avoid 
the subjective bias possible with other methods. They can also be completed in a non- 
social situation. 
Davidson and MacGregor (1998) assessed measures such as the Coping and Defending 
Scale (CDS; Joffe and Naditch, 1977) and the Life Style Index (LSI; Plutchik, 
Kellerman & Conte, 1979) which include Denial scales. They found different 
approaches used in different instruments; the CDS used an odd mix of indirect questions 
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to avoid triggering defensiveness (e. g. "Christ performed miracles such as turning water 
into wine"), combined empirically rather than rationally; The LSI used direct questions, 
somewhat like the COPE approach, that were based on theoretical constructs. 
However, the overall findings were not promising. Virtually all measures had some 
serious inadequacies, such as lack of reliability for the CDS and no estimates of stability 
for the LSI. Other shortcomings were noted, such as the lack of validation evidence 
with other ways of assessing Denial. In short, it was concluded that either the constructs 
that were assessed, or the measurement instruments themselves, were not valid. They 
suggested a more promising approach might be to examine individual differences that 
underlie the use of defences. 
1.4 Moving forward 
Goldberger (1983), in his analysis of the concept of Denial and the mechanisms that 
underlie it states that "denial is a neglected topic for systemic research -a surprising fact 
in view of its seeming popularity. " (p. 84). This situation still holds today, and it is the 
aim of this thesis to address this. 
It has been argued that a broad approach to the problem, covering both consciously 
motivated and unconscious strategies that distort information to reduce threat, would be 
a promising approach to take. 
Lazarus suggests that it would be useful to investigate trait effects by "... grouping 
people 
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together on whatever organising strategies we find them consistently using over time 
and across occasions. " (Lazarus, 1999: p. 110). As was discussed earlier, emotion- 
focused and emotion regulating coping processes and personality traits were found to be 
important in this respect, and these are aspects of coping that share similarities with 
Denial the defence. 
Davidson and MacGregor (1998) suggest that currently available instruments for 
measuring Denial are inadequate, and as Lazarus (1999) above, advocate a trait 
approach. 
The next chapter will use the broad appraisal-based coping framework described earlier 
(Lazarus and Folkman, 1984) to guide the selection of trait concepts that may be 
associated with the use of Denial for inclusion in a questionnaire. 
Specifically, personality factors involved in primary appraisal and the regulation of 
emotion will be included. Also included will be factors such as social support that are 
considered coping resources. Finally, existing tools for the measurement of certain 
Denial / emotion-focused related coping strategies will be included. In this way, 
following the suggestion of Hewitt and Flett (1996) it may also be possible to uncover 
personality factors that may underlie coping styles and their assessment instruments. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO: 
COPING RESOURCES AND PERSONALITY FACTORS 
RELATED TO DENIAL 
Previously we saw how Denial shifted from the extreme end of defence mechanisms to 
become part of daily coping. Using the coping framework described in the previous 
chapter, here it was attempted to investigate the relationship between those factors which 
have been considered important in coping and which have also been hypothesized to be 
related to or involve Denial or similar process that result in a distortion or rejection of 
information. 
This thesis proposes a relationship among certain types of the factors which are vital 
parts of the process of coping and which are expected to be more prominent in the case 
of Denial. These concepts will form the basic structure for the creation of a 
questionnaire that aims to explore the relationship of coping and personality variables in 
relation to Denial in individuals who are considered to be predisposed to Denial and 
Denial-like processes. The concepts are grouped according to their conceptual 
relationship to the model of coping presented earlier; Personality variables, coping 
resources and coping styles, and will be dealt with in order. 
2.1 Emotionally Related Personality Variables 
Stress, emotion, and coping are three concepts that belong together and as Lazarus states 
are "existing in a part-whole relationship... and form a conceptual unit, with emotion 
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being the superordinate concept because it includes stress and coping" (Lazarus, 1999; 
p. 37). At the same time, the reactions of the individual who faces a stressful situation 
can not be predicted if one does not take in consideration the personality traits and 
processes that account for the individual differences that people have in the way that 
they respond to a stressful stimulus (Lazarus, 1999). 
Therefore emotions per se and their intensity and expression as experienced by the 
individual are defining the coping process and are defined by the personality traits that 
are characteristic for the individual. 
2.1.1 Emotional Impulse Strength 
Impulse strength refers to the actual strength of emotion that is felt by the individual, 
that means "the strength of the individual's emotional response tendencies" rather than 
the degree which the felt emotional impulse is actually expressed as overt behaviour 
(Gross and John, 1995, p. 556). Impulse strength is conceptually related to Affect 
Intensity (Larsen & Diener, 1987), both concepts deal with the strength of the 
individual's emotions. 
Emotional reactions are automatic coping responses. They are the first reaction to many 
if not to most of the stressful problems and they form the foundation of coping responses 
(Krohne, 1993). When a situation is perceived as threatening or stress inducing, a wide 
range of negative emotional reactions such as fear and anger are stimulated. These 
reactions naturally affect the whole system and therefore, emotions inevitably become 
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themselves part of the problem as they become themselves targets for coping (Leventhal, 
Suls & Leventhal, 1993). 
Highly emotional individuals may tend to use more emotional focused coping style, 
since they often have to deal with the intensity of their emotions in addition to the 
original stressor. They may have to engage in procedures that would deal first with the 
emotions they are experiencing and their properties in order to facilitate further problem- 
focused coping (Leventhal, Suls & Leventhal, 1993). 
Watson and Pennebaker (1989) have formed a hypothesis that individuals who have the 
tendency to experience strongly their emotional impulses will have greater 
`somatopsychic' stress, because the strength of their emotional impulses strain their 
coping capacity (Gross and John, 1995). 
An individual who experiences his or her emotions strongly, therefore, would be more 
vulnerable in experiencing anxiety and negative affect in relation to the threat he or she 
is encountered with. The fact that a highly emotional person has to deal with both the 
existent threat and the overwhelming emotions that are associated with it, provide good 
reasons for the person to engage in Denial and in effect `save' himself or herself from 
the awareness of both the threat and the excessive emotions that are elicited with it. It is 
also understood that a highly emotional person would demand more resources -since 
they may have to start with an emotion-focused coping to move to problem focused 
coping- but also have less resources available since he or she has to `spread thin' the 
limited resources they have in the first place. 
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Consequently, impulse strength and emotional reactivity would be expected to be 
positively associated with Denial. 
2.1.2 Emotional Expressivity-Emotional Inhibition 
Emotional expressivity refers to the degree with which a person is expressing an 
experienced emotion. It is a term which refers to "the behavioural (e. g. facial, vocal, 
postural) changes associated with the experience of emotion, such as smiling, laughing, 
frowning, storming out of a room, or crying". In other words Emotional Expressivity 
refers to the extent that emotional impulses are manifested behaviourally (Gross and 
John, 1995; p. 555). 
As a term, it stands as the opposite of the term Emotional Inhibition which "refers to 
`bottling up' or inhibiting the expression of experienced emotion (and is thus distinct 
from the hypothesised emotional arousal)" (Roger, de la Banda, Lee and Olason, 
submitted; p. 3). So in effect both terms refer to the two extremes of the same dimension. 
The degree that an individual expresses his or her emotions is positively correlated with 
the actual experience of these emotions (Gross & John, 1995). Emotions are ways of 
communication and people that are highly emotionally expressive by more able to 
communicate their feelings may be more able to make the best of resources available to 
them such as social support (Forbes & Roger, 1999). 
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Also because Emotional expressivity gives the chance to the observer to have a better 
`view' of what is happening to the person who encounters the stressful situation, the 
individual in crisis may get the benefits of feedback from his or her environment. 
Although earlier, the high intensity and reactivity of emotions were considered a drain 
rather than a resource for the person, here, the actual expression of the felt emotion is 
considered a resource which facilitates the person to make the most of his social support, 
therefore emotional expressivity would be expected to be negatively related to Denial 
and Denial-like coping. 
2.1.3 Anger 
Anger is a subjective state of emotional arousal (McDougall, Venables and Roger, 
1991). According to Spielberger, Jacobs, Russell & Crane (1983), anger can be 
conceptualised as an emotional state with different degrees of intensity or an overall 
stable personality trait. 
Anger is based upon the attribution of blame for a certain threat; Smith and Lazarus 
(1993) conceptualise anger as sharing similar primary appraisal components with 
anxiety, i. e. they both arise when the individual's aims or goals are impeded, but anger 
occurs when secondary appraisal processes involve the attribution of blame. 
This, then describes a process of threat perception, which can become defensive in the 
process of preserving one's self-esteem. As we will see later, in order to sustain self- 
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esteem, and its usefulness to the person, it has first to be protected itself. 
Krohne (1996) suggests that dispositional measures of tolerance of emotional arousal 
should be related to attempts at coping in general, and avoidant strategies in particular. 
Conceptualising Denial as an extreme emotion-focused or avoidant strategy, as was 
done in the previous chapter, suggests a possible link between experiences of emotion 
and Denial. Additionally, the extent to which people try to suppress their expression of 
emotion may be similarly related. 
Anger has been found to be positively correlated with the tendency of the individual to 
be preoccupied with emotional upset, (McDougall, Venables & Roger, 1991). Though, 
Janis (1971) had found that rumination of negative expected outcomes can decrease the 
experience of anger, because anticipation of the aversive event has given the chance to 
the person to prepare for it. 
Inhibition of anger as a habitual way of coping is associated with negative effects on 
social support resources. Inhibition of anger has also been found to be associated with 
perceived inadaquacy in self-esteem support (Palfai and Hart, 1997). 
Because as we saw earlier, the experience of anger (emotion) can become itself an 
additional `burden' in the process of coping (Leventhal, Suls & Leventhal, 1993) it is 
considered to be a drain rather than a resource for the individual. At the same time 
though, the actual expression of the felt anger, because it facilitates self-esteem and 
social support, is conceived to be a resource. 
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To recap, High experienced Anger, could be evidence of a characteristic style of self- 
esteem preservation. Though, when Anger that is experienced is expressed, it is 
considered to facilitate the individual's resources and to promote reality testing, 
Expressed Anger therefore, could be negatively related to Denial. 
2.2 Other Personality Variables 
2.2.1 Optimism 
Optimism can be defined as a generalised expectancy of positive outcomes and is very 
conceptually related to Self Efficacy. However, the whole concept of Optimism has 
from the start been seen as a general factor that is relatively stable over time and 
situation. 
"Optimism is a case in which a person is confident not just about one 
aspect of life, but about one's personal fixture more generally, whereas 
pessimism is a broad sense of doubt about one's personal future" 
(Scheier and Carver, 1985). 
Self Efficacy and Optimism differ in how they view the relationship between 
expectancies and behavioural outcomes. In essence, Self Efficacy theory views efficacy 
expectations, the individual's personal belief in their ability to carry out certain 
behaviours, to be most important when deciding whether and what action could or 
should be taken in any particular situation. Optimism, on the other hand, views outcome 
expectancies, the belief in how likely a certain outcome is to occur, as being most 
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important in determining behaviour. 
Therefore Optimism is reinforcement independent - people may view an outcome as 
likely to happen even if they have low efficacy expectations, because outcome 
expectations can be influenced by sources other than self efficacy, e. g. religious beliefs 
(Scheier & Carver, 1985). 
There is often a misunderstanding in between Optimism and Denial. While often 
individuals who are in Denial may appear optimistic, a positive orientation towards life 
could be considered as one more resource for the individual in his or her attempts to 
cope with life stressors. This was shown by Aspinwall & Brunhart (1996); who 
investigated memory for threatening health messages. Participants high in dispositional 
Optimism performed better on a test of recall of the threatening health information 
(specifically, UV radiation exposure) than did pessimists. Optimism has also been linked 
to less hostility and greater social support in the face of a threatening situation, in this 
case cardiac surgery (Scheier, Matthews, Owens, and Magovern, 1989). 
Having generalised beliefs about good outcomes is likely to be a powerful coping 
resource, and so reduce the likelihood of using solely emotion-focused strategies such as 
Denial. 
To recap, optimism is considered to be an internal resource likely to be related to lower 
threat appraisal. As a vital and stable resource, optimism (when not in excess) is not 
likely to be related with Denial. It is important to point out that as optimism-pessimism 
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form a continuum, with realism probably in the middle, the extent to which these 
concepts are actually depicting distortions of reality, will depend on the amount and the 
extent with which they are embodied in the individual. 
2.2.2 Self Esteem 
Another important coping resource is that of Self-esteem. "Self-esteem is the facet of 
one's self-concept which concerns one's global evaluation" (Johnson, Vincent and Ross, 
1997, p. 385). It is the general view of one's self as worthwhile and of primary value 
(Greenberg et al, 1993). 
Self esteem has been found to act as a buffer of anxiety in normal individuals, and this 
reduction of anxiety has been found to reduce the use of defensive distortions e. g. Denial 
of vulnerability and Denial of mortality (Greenberg et al, 1993; Tesser & Cornell, 1991). 
Therefore, self-esteem could be likely to be associated negatively with the use of 
defensiveness in general and Denial specifically. 
However, these findings are contrasted by the work of Taylor & Brown (1988). They 
found that normal individuals (i. e. those without psychopathology; "good" mental 
health) showed greater self enhancing biases in their self evaluations, expectancies for 
the future etc. than did psychologically unhealthy individuals. In the former case high 
self esteem was associated with low defensiveness, but in the latter case "normal" self 
esteem was associated with higher defensiveness than was low self esteem. 
32 
It could be that this apparent contradiction is because of non-equivalent groups; Taylor 
and Brown (1988) compared normals with non-normals for psychopathology, whereas 
Greenberg et al (1993) compared within a normal group. It could also be because of 
differences in the way self-esteem and the threats to it were defined and measured across 
the studies. Another interpretation would see no contradiction between the two studies. 
If it was the self-image of the individual that was at stake, not self-esteem per se, then 
that would mean that individuals very low in self esteem may be motivated to maintain 
their negative self image in the same way that individuals slightly higher in self esteem 
are motivated to maintain a positive self image. Individuals "closer" to their individual 
boundary of self esteem would need to employ higher defensiveness to maintain their 
self image, whereas individuals "farther" from this boundary, i. e. with very high or very 
low self esteem, would not. This view is supported by studies showing that individuals 
actively seek information that confirms the self-concept they hold and reject information 
which threatens how they generally view themselves (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). 
As a buffer of anxiety, [high] Self-esteem naturally could be considered as one of the 
strongest personal resources the individual could rely upon when in need, and it could be 
expected to correlate negatively with Denial. 
Though, it has also been found that threats to self-esteem are causing anxiety (Greenberg 
et al, 1993) which in return through defensive responses, is reduced (Mehlman & 
Snyder, 1985; in Greenberg et al, 1993) 
So, it also seems that because [high] Self-esteem is so vital to the person, it is of great 
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importance, and to be defended in order to be sustained. It seems to be a high- 
maintenance factor, an asset which needs to be protected in order to sustain its status and 
in return to provide the individual with its service. 
Also, although self-esteem appears to be a relatively enduring disposition it has been 
found that ego-threatening manipulations produce a variety of emotional responses and 
significant changes to it (Heatherton, Polivy 1991), so when threatened self-esteem gives 
rise to defensive reactions. 
To recap, the relationship of Self-esteem with Denial is not clear. As an internal 
resource, high self-esteem may facilitate the person to actively cope with stressful 
stimuli. It may empower the person with confidence in his or her abilities and enhance 
the chances for the stressful stimulus to be perceived as challenge rather than as a threat, 
overall buffer anxiety and hence making the onset of Denial unnecessary. 
On the other hand, the demands that high self esteem impose to the person, to be 
protected, maintained and overall defended, may give onset to Denial. This is because 
the person may have to avoid threat to his or her self esteem encounters or reinterpret 
the meaning of threatening issues in such as a way as to guarantee the maintenance of 
the self esteem. 
2.2.3 Hardiness/ Mental toughness 
The construct of hardiness represents the aggregate of beliefs that life is meaningful, 
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controllable, and challenging rather than threatening (Kobasa, 1979; in Wiebe and 
Smith, 1997). Because `hardy' individuals have a sense of commitment in their life and 
a feeling that the tasks that they are involved with are meaningful and significant, they 
tend to be able to handle stress well (Power & Brewin, 1997). That means that 
individuals that encounter a stressful stimulus when they are high in hardiness or `hardy' 
individuals, they will be more likely to appraise the stimulus as a challenge rather than 
as a threat. 
Mental Toughness (Clough & Earle, 2000), is a concept that can be considered a 
synonym of hardiness. It deals with the same notions of challenge, control, commitment 
and confidence. (As a research tool tends to be used in different application areas. ) Here, 
again a person that feels highly in control of the situation and has a strong sense of 
commitment (focus on their goals, c. f. Lazarus and Folkman, 1984) and confidence (self 
belief that they can achieve their targets based on their abilities). They will be more 
likely to perceive the stressor as a challenge or opportunity rather than as a threat 
(Lazarus, 1999). 
Since threat and limited resources are not an issue, the presence of Denial would not be 
expected, and so Hardiness and Mental Toughness are clearly expected to have a 
negative relation to Denial. (Although, many of the arguments for self-esteem would 
perhaps apply here too. ) 
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2.3 Coping Resources 
2.3.1 Social support 
As a psychological resource in the context of coping, Social Support depends on the 
effort of the individual to cultivate social relationships and to draw on them when under 
stress (Lazarus, 1999). This use of social support is considered an emotion-focused 
strategy (Leventhal, Suls & Leventhal, 1993). 
The importance of Social Support as a buffer towards stress is considered so significant 
that it has been given special interest in relation to disease-related stress (Filipp, Klauer 
& Ferring, 1993). In fact, Social Support is conceived as a protective device against 
stress and even as a health-protective resource (Palfai & Hart, 1997). Social Support has 
been found to be very beneficial not only in relation to general health but also to 
facilitating adaptation and promoting adjustment to change (Forbes & Roger, 1999). 
Social Support functions by offering reassurance to the person and hence fostering the 
previously insecure individual to turn to problem-focused coping, and also by being the, 
outlet that the person needs in order to vent his or her emotions (Carver, Scheier and 
Weintraub, 1989). 
This second function of Social Support is considered by some as potentially negative 
because although it provides an outlet for the individual to vent-off emotions and can be 
very functional when helping the person to accommodate a loss and move forward, 
when the focusing on the negative emotions is prolonged it can hinder adjustment 
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(Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989). The negative consequences of Social Support 
have also been reported by Fiore, Becker and Coppel (1983), where they found that 
negative interactions outweigh the positive effects of Social Support in relation to the 
health of the individual (in Forbes & Roger, 1999) 
Although Social Support can be considered an emotion-focused strategy there are times 
when seeking out social support can be for the purpose of obtaining information in order 
to solve the problem the individual is facing (Leventhal, Suls & Leventhal; 1993), in this 
context it is often referred to as instrumental social support and is considered to be 
problem-focused coping (Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989). 
In this thesis Social Support in general is viewed as a vital part of the external resources 
that the individual depends upon in his or her attempts to cope with stressors and as such 
is expected to be negatively associates with Denial. 
Social Support with the feedback that provides the person with, can also enhance the 
reality testing of the individual, minimise reality distortions and promote a more 
objective approach towards the stressful stimulus, i. e. less Denial. 
2.4 Coping styles 
2.4.1 Avoidance coping 
Originally, avoidance coping was identified as a third dimension of coping, together 
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with emotion and problem focused coping. It was conceptualised as the tendency of the 
individual that encountered a stressful situation to seek out other people or engage in 
substitute tasks (Parker & Endler, 1996). 
Cognitive avoidance indicates a group of coping strategies that aim to shield the person 
from stimuli which induce arousal and it is marked by turning away from the threat cues 
(Krohne 1993). Avoidance coping can be seen as an emotion-focused way of coping 
where either the threat stimulus itself or its meanings are avoided by the person, and 
which aims to protect the individual from the threatening cue (Krohne, 1993). The act 
of avoidance can be solely cognitive in nature, where the individual seeks to avoid to 
think about the threatening stimulus (or think about the stimulus in a threatening way). It 
can also contain a behavioural element, whereby the individual seeks to physically avoid 
the threatening stimulus or situation. 
Although (cognitive) avoidance is considered a conscious act, as has been argued earlier 
it can become automatised and unconscious through routine deployment (cf. Erdelyi, 
1990). 
Avoidance or emotion-focused coping may help at maintaining emotional balance, but 
the research evidence on the adaptiveness of avoidance coping are not clear. It may be 
that avoidance coping such as overt efforts to deny may work against rather than in 
favour of the person, while others suggest that avoidance coping may offer to the person 
an opportunity to get away from the stressful situation and what it entails (Zeidner & 
Saklofske, 1996). 
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Avoidance is directly related to Denial, in fact Denial is considered an avoidant defence 
(e. g. Blatt, 1990). Clearly, Denial and avoidance are so interrelated that they are 
expected to be positively related. 
2.4.2 Detachment 
Detachment is a concept that describes the tendency of the individual to cope by feeling 
independent of the event and the emotion associated with it (Roger, Jarvis & Najarian, 
1993). The term "conscious detachment" according to Lazarus refers to the coping 
process which implements the person to perform optimally in any circumstances 
without-interference from threatening or aversive cognitive intrusions (Lazarus, 1999). 
Interestingly, feelings of detachment, based on anecdotal evidence, suggested that the 
concept of detachment did not involve attempts by the individual to avoid stress and 
that also didn't involve Denial (Roger, Jarvis & Najarian, 1993). 
Detachment has been found to correlate negatively with emotional coping (Roger, Jarvis 
& Najarian, 1993) and it would be expected to be negatively associated with Denial too. 
This follows from the above findings which state the non avoidant, non emotional, non 
Denial nature of Detachment. 
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2.5 Questionnaire validation scales 
A number of well-established scales measuring related concepts to those above will be 
used to provide evidence of the validity of the new scale, later in the chapter. The 
dimensions will be discussed briefly here first. 
2.5.1 Anxiety 
Anxiety can be conceived as an unpleasant emotional state or condition, or as a 
relatively stable personality trait (Spielberger, 1983). While state anxiety refers to the 
concept of a transitory emotional state or condition which is characterised by feelings of 
tension and uneasiness that are subjectively and consciously perceived, and activation of 
the autonomic nervous system; trait anxiety is conceptualised as a relatively stable 
proneness to anxiety by the individual. Specifically, Trait anxiety refers to the 
disposition of the individual to perceive a broad range of stimuli and situations as 
threatening or dangerous, and to the tendency of the individual to respond to those kinds 
of threats with state anxiety reactions (Spielberger, 1972). 
As a term it is often used interchangeably with concepts such as apprehension, concern 
or worry, describing an underlying state of unease (Lazarus, 1999). 
Overall it can be described as the emotion which is elicited when the person experiences 
stress facing uncertain, existential threat (Lazarus, 1999). Anxiety can also be viewed as 
the conscious feeling that is produced when an individual's appraisal of threat is greater 
in some way than their belief in their ability to cope (Lazarus, 1999). 
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Eysenck (1992) argues that the main function of anxiety is to alert the individual to 
threats in their environment. More than this, he argues that anxiety serves to increase the 
likelihood that any particular stimulus will be perceived as a threat, rather than being 
perceived as being irrelevant or beneficial. 
The relationship in between anxiety and defence mechanisms is quite complicated. From 
the one hand there is the likelihood that well established defences may prevent the 
appearance of anxiety. Denial's core function as we have seen is to ward-off anxiety. 
This successful elimination or reduction of anxiety can occur in relation to a particular 
threat as a sole incident or it can be an ordinary way with which the individual deals 
with certain stressors. In the latter case, anxiety may not be experienced by the 
individual under circumstances that it would be expected, because the threatening 
meaning has been made benign due to an ego-defensive process, such as Denial. This is 
often referred-to as the `Short-circuiting principle' and is based on the notion that a 
defence can be triggered without anxiety having to play a role, because the decision 
about the threat and the defence against it, has been made earlier in the person's life as a 
result of prior learning. So, the presence of the right cue is enough to elicit it (Lazarus, 
1999). 
On the other hand the use of defences and especially Denial, may actually be responsible 
for the provocation of anxiety. By engaging in Denial and not dealing with the existing 
threat, the individual may ward-off anxiety by not processing the threatening stimulus 
itself or its full meaning, but at the same the person has not actually altered the 
threatening situation. Too often threats that can be avoided and denied for a while have 
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to be faced later. The fact that the individual has not dealt with the threat at its onset may 
have actually augmented its negative effects -a phenomenon too often observed in 
relation to Denial of illness. The process of Denial that helped the person to ward-off 
anxiety previously is now found to be insufficient and therefore presents the person with 
a situation even more threatening, and so results to the provocation of anxiety (Breznitz, 
1983). 
Since the process of coping is a constant exchange of information between the 
encountered stimulus and its demands and the available perceived resources, and since 
the outcome of this exchange defines the evaluation of the stimulus as a threat or a 
challenge, the tendency of an individual to perceive stimuli as threatening; implies a 
general tendency for this individual to perceive his or her resources as less sufficient. 
This is considered to be the profile of the high anxious (trait) individual. As a result of 
this evaluation of insufficient resources and therefore encounter with threat, a high 
anxious individual will be more likely to engage in emotion-focused coping and Denial. 
2.5.2 Rumination 
Rumination is marked by continuous conscious awareness about an unpleasant event and 
its associations. It implies a sense of uncontrolled repetition of thinking, which is beyond 
the ordinary thinking about a problem or a situation that the individual engages until he 
or she reaches a decision or completion point (Horowitz, 1983). This tendency of the 
individual to be preoccupied with emotional upset applies to both past and future events 
(Roger, de la Banda, Lee and Olason, 2000; submitted). 
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Rumination is overall characterised by attention to the threatening event (opposite to 
avoidance coping) and is positively associated with neuroticism, and specifically with a 
component of social sensitivity (McDougall, Venables and Roger, 1991, p. 628). 
The process of rumination may generate somatic tension to the person which in turn 
may be attempted to be reduced by the person engaging in emotionally expressive 
behaviour (McDougall, Venables & Roger, 1991). 
In contrast to the above is the view of rumination hold by Janis (1971) where he 
supports that by suppressing anticipatory fear through Denial and avoidance of 
warnings the person interferes with the process of worry which in this case (pre-surgical 
patients) is considered beneficial. Rumination, according to Janis, is a vital stage in the 
process of worry that is related to anticipatory threat. 
Rumination although is not considered a resource for the individual, by being an 
attentional rather than avoidance type of coping is not expected to be positively related 
to Denial and Denial-like coping. 
2.5.3 Coping 
The final validation tool to be used is the Brief COPE (Carver, 1997; see also Carver, 
Scheier and Weintraub, 1989), in its trait form. This instrument measures coping 
behaviours that are expected to be related to the newly developed instrument. As a 
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coping framework was used to select the factors listed above, the predicted relationships 
between Brief COPE and emotion-focused coping / Denial are considered fairly 
obvious, and will be discussed as they arise later in the chapter. 
2.6 METHOD 
So, the goal of this chapter was to investigate the relationship between the factors 
described above, that were all hypothesised to be related to attempts at coping that may 
involve Denial or similar process that result in a distortion or rejection of information. 
2.6.1 Item generation 
This was achieved by combining items from existing scales that measure the constructs 
listed above. This would mean that the items selected would already have been subject 
to rigorous validation and would have demonstrated desirable psychometric properties in 
their parent scales. 
The disadvantage of this approach is that construct validity may suffer when the pre- 
existing scales are focused on concepts that do not map perfectly on to the ones of 
interest, leading to inadequate coverage of the construct domain. Additionally, when 
scales are particularly old, or have been developed and validated in a population very 
different to the one of interest, the items may prove to be written in a linguistic style 
unfamiliar to the target population. The phrasing of items in personality tests has been 
shown to be an important factor in influencing their psychometric properties (Guilford, 
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1959). 
In an effort to minimise these drawbacks, when no acceptable items could be found in 
existing scales some of the items were slightly adapted to better suit the purpose in hand 
(e. g. changing a state measure to a trait measure). When it proved impossible to adapt 
items in a simple fashion new items were generated. This was done by the author, in 
collaboration with a panel of staff members from the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Hull, all of whom had prior experience in scale development. 
The scales that were chosen to represent the concepts described above were as follows: 
2.6.1.1 Emotionally related personality factors 
9 11 items on Emotional Inhibition from the Emotion Control Questionnaire (ECQ; 
Roger & Nesshover, 1986). 
98 items from the Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ; Gross & John, 1995), 
from the Impulse Strength and Positive Expressivity scales. 
" 10 items on Anger Impulse Strength/Emotional Reactivity generated by the author. 
2.6.1.2 Personality factors 
9 The revised Life Orientation scale (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994), is a 
widely used measure of dispositional optimism / pessimism. 5 items were taken from 
this questionnaire. 
97 items from the Social Self Esteem scale of the State Self esteem Scale (SSES; 
Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). 
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" 18 items from the Mental Toughness-18 questionnaire, a sub-set of the full MT-48 
scale (Clough & Earle, 2000). The constructs of this questionnaire, are similar to 
hardiness; challenge, control, commitment and confidence. 
2.6.1.3 Coping Resources 
"8 items on the use of emotional Social Support drawn from the Interpersonal Trust 
Questionnaire (ITQ; Forbes & Roger, 1999). 
"6 items on seeking Instrumental Social Support, generated by the author. 
2.6.1.4 Coping Styles 
" 25 items, 15 on Detachment coping and 10 on Avoidance Coping, from the Coping 
Styles Questionnaire (CSQ; Roger, Jarvis & Najarian, 1993). 
9 items on Denial-like coping, generated by the author. These were mainly Denial- 
like attitudes towards aspects of every day life, such as attitudes to health regime. 
In total, 107 items were selected for inclusion in the CWL instrument. 
As a check on the face validity of the generated or adapted items a draft questionnaire 
was pre-tested on a sample of 10 staff and students from the University of Hull. Two 
items that were found to be ambiguous were reworded and the overall arrangement and 
layout of the questionnaire was slightly adapted to include extra instructions and an 
example item. 
2.6.2 Response formats 
Depending on the content and wording of the items the response scale took one of two 
four-point Likert-type formats. 
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2.6.2.1 Frequency-based response scale 
For items that referred to the frequency of specific behaviours, the participant was asked 
the extent to which he or she used the particular behaviour on the following scale: 
1= almost never, 2= sometimes, 3= often, 4= almost always 
2.6.2.2 Agreement-based response scale 
For items that presented attitudes the participants were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they agreed with the statement on the following scale: 
1= Strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= agree, 4= strongly agree. 
Some items would have fitted either scale format (e. g. "I have strong emotions") and 
these items were distributed between the two scale types to give an approximately equal 
distribution of items across scale type, 55 items for the former and 52 for the latter. The 
frequency-based items formed the first half of the questionnaire, the agreement-based 
items the second. 
The 107 item CWL instrument can be found in Appendix A. 
2.6.3 Questionnaire Distribution Procedure and Sample 
The questionnaire was distributed to an opportunity sample of adults in Hull and at 
various Universities and other locations in the UK (for a full listing refer to Appendix 
B). Participants were initially approached either by e-mail shot, by door-to-door 
canvassing or by canvassing in a public place (e. g. a University Campus). 
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In the initial approach participants were informed as to the purpose of the study, how 
long it would take (about 15 minutes) and that it would be entirely anonymous and 
confidential. To encourage participation the participant was told that if they completed 
and returned the questionnaire a donation of 20p would be made to the NSPCC charity 
on their behalf. If the participant agreed to take part they were given or sent a 
questionnaire along with a cover letter and a reply-paid envelope with which to return 
the questionnaire. The cover letter specified a date for the latest return of the 
questionnaire, which was set to be approximately two weeks after the questionnaire was 
distributed. 
Overall 2000 questionnaires were distributed and 841 were received back within one 
week of their return date, a response rate of 44% . 
2.6.4 Criterion validity sample 
A sub-sample of 500 were given an extended questionnaire, that in addition to the 107 
CWL items contained: 
Brief COPE (Carver, 1997), an abridged version of the widely used COPE coping 
styles inventory. The abridged version was used to reduce the overall time burden of 
the assessment protocol (Anastasi and Urbina, 1996). 
STAI form Y2 trait anxiety scale (Speilberger, 1983). 
" The rumination scale of the ECQ (Roger & Najarian, 1989). 
The extra scales formed part of the same booklet as the CWL, and were inserted at the 
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end to reduce any sensitisation that their completion would have on the CWL. The 
protocol for distribution to the validation sample was identical to the original 
questionnaire, the only difference being that the participants were told that completion of 
the questionnaire would take about 20 minutes as opposed to about 15 for the original. 
500 validation questionnaires were distributed and 269 were received back, a response 
rate of 54%. 
2.6.5 Test-retest reliability sample 
After they had agreed to participate in the study a sub-sample of 200 agreed to form the 
test-retest reliability sample. They were asked if they would mind completing the CWL 
questionnaire for a second time in about eight weeks. It was explained that this would 
mean that their participation would no longer be anonymous, as they would have to 
provide a name and address that the retest questionnaire could be sent to, but that their 
data would remain highly confidential and would only be identified by a code number. 
143 retest questionnaires were received back, a response rate of 72%. 
2.7 RESULTS 
Questionnaires received from participants under the age of 18 and over the age of 70 
were not entered into the analysis. Questionnaires with significant missing data (i. e. no 
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age or sex data, or more than 3 missing items) were excluded from the analysis. This 
left a final first sample of 789; 204 males (mean age 40.27, SD 13.36) and 585 females 
(mean age 37.04, SD 12.90). 
2.7.1 Item analysis 
Standardised (Z) scores for the Standard deviation and skewness of each item were 
computed. Items with significantly lower standard deviation compared to the rest (less 
than -1.96) were excluded from the analysis (items 74,60 and 67). Items which were 
significantly skewed (less than -1.96 or greater than 1.96) were also excluded from the 
analysis (items 46,107,42,65 and 78). 
Correlation matrices of all of the remaining variables were produced to check that each 
variable had substantial correlations with at least a couple of other variables. In 
addition, the Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) was computed for each variable 
and variables with MSAs of less than 0.7 were excluded from further analysis. This 
resulted in the removal of five variables (items 65,74,81,92,107), leaving a final total 
of 97 items in the analysis. 
2.7.2 Factor extraction 
Kline (1994) recommends the use of Principal Axis factoring for factor extraction. 
However, Nunnally (1978) points out that for large matrices principle components or 
other methods such as maximum likelihood tend in practice to produce virtually 
identical results. Both Principal Components and Principle Axis factoring were 
employed on the set of items from the CWL. 
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Both methods extracted 19 factors with eigenvalues greater than one. Cattell (1978) has 
shown, however, that the use of this criterion greatly overestimates the number factors. 
A scree test was carried out to select a more manageable number of factors to rotate. 
Scree tests on both extraction procedures produced a major elbow point at the third 
factor and a minor elbow point at the sixth factor. It was decided to retain both three and 
six factor solutions for rotation. 
2.7.3 Rotation of factors 
Kline (1994) recommends oblique rotational procedures, as in real life factors are likely 
to be correlated. However, he points out that orthogonal procedures can often produce 
simpler and more easily interpretable solutions. It was decided in this case to use both 
oblique and orthogonal rotational methods, namely Direct Oblimin and Varimax, 
respectively. 
So, eight models in all were rotated: 
1. Six factors extracted by Principle Axis factoring, rotated by Direct Oblimin 
2. Six components extracted by Principle Components, rotated by Direct Oblimin 
3. Six factors extracted by Principle Axis factoring, rotated by Varimax 
4. Six components extracted by Principle Components, rotated by Varimax 
5. Three factors extracted by Principle Axis factoring, rotated by Direct Oblimin 
6. Three components extracted by Principle Components, rotated by Direct Oblimin 
7. Three factors extracted by Principle Axis factoring, rotated by Varimax 
8. Three components extracted by Principle Components, rotated by Varimax 
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The aim of any factor analysis is to arrive at a solution with simple structure. Kline 
-. (1994) suggests that this can be operationalised by searching for a solution which 
maximises the hyperplane count. Similar criteria should also hold true for the individual 
items in the analysis; they should each have at least one high loading on one of the 
factors and at least one low loading on at least one other of the factors. 
Each of the eight solutions above was initially inspected to ensure that each item had an 
absolute loading of at least 0.3; any items that did not were dropped. Of the remaining 
items, those that did not have a difference of at least 0.1 between their highest and next 
highest loadings were also dropped. (For details of excluded items see Appendix D. ) 
For the purpose of comparing the solutions two indices were compiled; the number of 
hyperplanes for each matrix (as a percentage); and the number of items that did not have 
at least one low (< . 1) loading. Hyperplane width was set at ± 
0.1 
The statistics for each solution are shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 points clearly towards the six-factor, Varimax-rotated solutions as best 
approaching simple structure. Both the Varimax and Oblimin solutions had low 
numbers of items with no low loadings and the highest proportion of hyperplanes 
overall. These two solutions were then compared to see if they had reproduced similar 
patterns of factors. 
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Table 2.1: Comparison of the simple structure of eight candidate factor analysis 
solutions. 
12345678 
Factors rotated 6 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 
Extraction PA PC PA PC PA PC PA PC 
Rotation 0 0 V V 0 0 V V 
Hyperplanes (%) 29 34 41 40 24 22 25 23 
Items without 11 3 0 3 18 28 22 27 
low loading (n) 
6 =six factors, 3= three factors; PA = Principle Axis factoring, PC = Principle Components; 
0= Direct Oblimin (S = -0.6), V= Varimax 
The pattern of factor loadings was identical for both solutions except for one item in the 
first factor and two items in the third factor. In both cases the solution based upon 
Principle Axis factoring included the items, while the solution based upon Principle 
Components did not. Given the virtually identical nature of the solutions it was decided 
to use solution number three, based upon Principle Axis Factoring and Varimax rotation, 
to compute the scales. The full table of items and factor loadings is shown below in 
Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2: Factor analysis loadings for the CWL 
Factor 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 
105 . 75. -. 13 . 07 . 13 . 09 -. 05 
075 . 71 -. 18 . 05 . 15 . 02 -. 03 
087 --.. 65` -. 02 . 05 . 13 . 15 -. 01 
035 -. 60 . 13 . 03 -. 19 -. 21 . 38 
099 . 57 -. 13 . 06 . 28 . 19 -. 12 
041 . 57 . 01 . 28 . 19 . 19 -. 08 
024 -. 57 . 14 -. 18 -. 13 -. 05 . 29 
106 -. 54 . 14 . 07 -. 14 -. 12 . 28 
039 . 53 . 16 . 26 . 09 . 14 -. 20 
040 . 53 . 09 . 20 . 17 . 34 -. 18 
034 -. 52 . 18 . 07 -. 17 -. 07 . 36 
045 . 
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. 12 . 20 . 30 . 26 -. 08 
057 -. 46 . 09 . 06 -. 15 -. 10 . 26 
030 . 42 . 09 . 12 -. 02 . 12 -. 12 
008 . 40 . 16 . 25 -. 06 . 16 -. 07 
089 -. 32 . 05 . 01 -. 03 -. 17 . 09 
096 . 02 . 82 -. 09 . 01 . 
09 -. 04 
095 . 07 
. 80 -. 14 . 07 . 12 -. 08 
086 -. 07 . 
70 -. 09 -. 03 -. 01 -. 03 
084 . 04 . 66 -. 10 . 12 . 
10 -. 09 
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Table 2.2 Continued: Factor analysis loadings for the CWL 
Factor 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 
013 -. 02 . 66 -. 41 -. 06 . 07 . 07 
088 -. 02 . 65 -. 09 . 04 -. 04 -. 03 
103 . 04 -. 64 . 27 . 03 . 00 . 18 
082 . 
09 
. 
52 -. 12 . 22 . 10 -. 
13 
002 -. 06 . 
41 -. 26 . 07 -. 04 . 12 
015 . 15 -. 35 
. 63 = 
. 12 . 06 . 05 
010 . 12 -. 22 . 55 . 13 -. 13 -. 
02 
001 . 13 -. 43 . 
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. 09 -. 03 . 00 
014 . 02 -. 16 . 53 . 09 -. 
05 . 17 
054 . 19 -. 32 . 46 . 09 . 
09 -. 05 
017 . 26 -. 
24 . 44 . 
23 . 05 -. 10 
016 -. 02 . 29 -. 43 -. 20 . 
21 . 21 
018 -. 04 -. 20 . 42 . 03 -. 19 . 
32 
101 . 23 . 05 . 06 . 
83 
. 09 -. 16 
104 . 15 . 04 . 18 . 
73 . 04 -. 07 
080 . 15 . 01 . 17 . 
65 . 18 -. 09 
097 . 25 . 
09 . 20 . 
65 . 15 -. 
19 
094 . 21 . 05 . 
09 . 63 . 10 -. 06 
090 . 23 -. 03 -. 10 . 
12 71 .: 
F -. 13 
064 . 24 . 02 -. 07 . 
12 . 68 -. 07 
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Table 2.2 Continued: Factor analysis loadings for the CWL 
Factor 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 
044 . 30 . 08 . 12 . 12 . 63 -. 12 
043 
. 24 . 12 . 10 . 14 . 54 -. 04 
071 -. 09 -. 05 . 12 -. 08 -. 53 . 26 
070 -. 13 -. 03 . 14 -. 07 -. 47 . 27 
023 -. 27 -. 05 -. 09 -. 08 -. 14 . 
62 
020 -. 19 -. 16 . 19 -. 01 -. 31 . 53 
032 -. 16 -. 01 . 02 -. 12 -. 07 52 
050 -. 32 -. 08 -. 09 -. 17 -. 24 . 50 
098 -. 20 -. 06 . 08 -. 13 -. 28 . 42 
% variance 11.00 9.50 6.64 6.10 5.90 5.21 
Hyperplanes = 41 % (width =±0.1) 
As well as simple structure the factor solution must be interpretable if it is to be useful. 
The solution presented in Table 2.2 was found to be psychologically meaningful, as 
discussed next. 
2.7.4 Interpretation of the factors 
Factor 1 was labelled Pessimism. It comprised 16 items, the highest loading items being 
105 "I hardly ever expect things to go my way" and 75 "I rarely count on good things 
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happening to me". All of the items reflected a general negative expectancy, an attitude of 
perceiving the threat in a situation. Some items included an element of powerlessness, 
most clearly shown by 39 1 feel overpowered and at the mercy of the situation". 
Factor 2 contained nine items and was called Social Support. The items with high 
loadings on this factor all described a predominantly emotion-focused coping style based 
on seeking out social support. It includes items such as 96 "I like to talk problems over 
to'get them off my chest"' and 86 "I feel better when I have talked to my friends about 
my problems" 
Factor 3 contained eight items, the highest loading being 1 "I keep things to myself and 
don't let others know how bad things are" and 10 "When someone upsets me, I try to 
hide my feelings". It was labelled Emotion Control as all items were concerned with 
inhibiting the expression of emotions to others. All of the items except one were 
explicitly concerned with the hiding of negative emotions. The exception was 17 "I feel 
embarrassed about expressing my feelings", which did not make clear whether it 
referred to positive or negative emotion. 
Factor 4 was labelled Esteem Concern and was characterised by items such as 101 "I'm 
worried about what other people think of me " and 104 "I feel concerned about the 
impression I am making". All of the items related to the perception of threat from the 
social environment, e. g. the potential to be evaluated negatively by others. This factor 
comprised five items in total. 
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Factor 5 was made up of six items, the highest loading being 64 "I have a very short fuse 
when things don't go as planned", and was labeled Anger. This factor describes the 
strength of negative emotions (perhaps more correctly anger alone) rather than their 
expression per se. 
Factor 6 was best described by item 23 "I cope well with any problems that occur", the 
highest loading item. It reflects a positive self belief and positive expectancy in an 
ability to deal with uncertainty and problems. It was made up of five items in all, and 
was labelled Self Mastery. 
A full listing of the items that load on each scale is shown in Appendix C. -Descriptive 
statistics for each of the CWL scales are shown in Table 2.3, which also presents scale 
intercorrelations and reliability alpha coefficients on the diagonal. 
Table 2.3: Coping With Life scale means, standard deviations, inter-correlations and 
reliabilities (a) on the diagonal 
Factor Mean SD F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
F9, Pessimism 2.15 . 45 . 86 
F2, Social Support 2.83 . 52 -. 05 . 88 
F3, Emotion Control 2.35 . 56 . 29** -. 55** . 81 
F4, Esteem Concern 2.74 . 61 . 48** . 
08* . 29** . 87 
F5, Anger 2.28 . 55 . 48** . 13** -. 02 . 35** . 82 
F6, Self Mastery 2.63 . 56 -. 51** -. 11** . 04 -. 32** -. 46** . 76 
N=789, *=p<. 05, **=p<. O1 
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NB. Even though an orthogonal rotation was used (varimax) there are significant factor 
intercorrelations because only the subsets of highest loading items per factor were used 
in scale construction. 
All factors had means between two and three on the four-point scale. Alphas were all 
above 0.8 apart from F6 Self Mastery, which was still an acceptable 0.76. 
Regarding the scale intercorrelations, F1 Pessimism showed moderate correlations with 
all of the other factors bar F2 Social Support. Social Support had a moderate negative 
correlation with F3 Emotion Control but weak correlations with the other factors. Apart 
from Pessimism, Emotion Control correlated moderately with Esteem Concern, but its 
other correlations were effectively zero, including that with Anger. Factor 4 Esteem 
Concern had modest correlations with Anger (positive) and Self Mastery (Negative). 
Self Mastery showed a moderate negative relationship with Anger. 
2.7.5 Concurrent Validity 
Table 2.4 shows the correlations between C`'VL scales and STAI Trait Anxiety scale 
(Speilberger, 1983); the ECQ Ruminate scale (Roger & Najarian, 1989); and relevant 
scales from Brief COPE (Carver, 1997). 
Because of the large number of intercorrelations and the opportunity for type I error that 
this presents, only the correlations with significance levels less than . 01 were considered 
as significant here. 
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Table 2.4: Correlations between Coping with life scales and validation scales 
Coping with Life scales 
fl f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 
Cope self distraction . 30** . 13 . 15* . 14* . 14* -. 17** 
Cope disengagement . 52** -. 05 . 20** . 27** . 36** -. 29** 
Cope denial . 48** . 05 . 
06 . 24** . 21** -. 25** 
Cope positive reinterpretation -. 20** . 31** -. 16** -. 00 -. 10 . 01 
Cope self blame . 62** -. 12 . 32** . 44** . 32** -. 30** 
Cope venting . 21** . 41** -. 22** . 15* . 40** -. 18** 
Cope emotional support -. 02 . 56** -. 29** -. 01 . 11 -. 17** 
Cope instrumental support -. 04 . 65** -. 36** -. 04 . 10 -. 14* 
Cope Active coping -. 07 . 21** . 00 . 01 -. 03 . 09 
STAI . 73** -. 07 . 36** . 56** . 55** -. 54** 
RUMINATE . 53** . 12* . 12* . 43** . 46** -. 29** 
N=269, *=p<. 05, **p<01 
The CWL Pessimism scale had notable positive correlations with Brief COPE Self 
Distraction, Denial, Behavioural Disengagement, Self Blame and Venting. The only 
significant negative correlation was with Positive Reinterpretation. CWL Pessimism also 
correlated significantly with STAI Trait Anxiety and ECQ Ruminate. 
The Social Support scale from CWL showed significant positive correlations with Brief 
COPE Active Coping, Emotional Support, Instrumental Support, Venting and Positive 
Reinterpretation. 
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Factor 3 from CWL, Emotion Control, had a significant positive correlation with STAI 
Trait Anxiety, as well as Brief COPE Self Blame and Behavioural Disengagement. In 
addition, it had significant negative correlations with Brief COPE Emotional Support, 
Instrumental Support, Venting and Positive Reinterpretation. 
Esteem Concern was found to have only positive correlations with the concurrent 
validity scales. These were with Denial, Self Blame and Behavioural Disengagement 
from the Brief COPE, STAI Trait Anxiety and ECQ Ruminate. 
Anger again showed just positive significant intercorrelations; Brief COPE's Denial, 
Behavioural Disengagement, Venting and Self Blame; STAI Trait Anxiety; and ECQ 
Ruminate. 
Finally, Self Mastery was found to correlate significantly with ECQ Ruminate and STAI 
Trait Anxiety, both negatively. Brief COPE scales of Self Distraction, Denial, Emotional 
Support, Behavioural Disengagement, Venting and Self Blame all were found to have 
significant negative correlations with Self Mastery. 
2.7.6 Test-Retest reliability 
The CWL scales were completed for a second time by a sub-sample of 143 of the 
original participants between seven and nine weeks after the original administration. 
Scale reliabilities and test-retest correlations are shown in Table 6. 
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Table 2.5: Retest reliability statistics for the Coping with Life scale 
retest ar test-retest 
Fl . 88 . 83** 
F2 . 88 . 74** 
F3 . 84 . 80** 
F4 . 89 . 85** 
F5 . 85 . 76** 
F6 . 76 . 
69** 
N=143, **=p<. 01 
The scale reliabilities are comparable with those found for the first administration, and 
again were all above 0.7. The test-retest correlations were also all highly significant and 
all above 0.69. 
2.8 DISCUSSION 
Of the solutions that were tried in the analysis of the data, a stable six factors solution' 
was arrived at. The factors were found to have good internal reliability and the factor 
solution was found to be stable over time. 
The first factor, Factor 1, was labelled Pessimism. The highest loading item was 105 "I 
hardly ever expect things to go my way", and was a typical example of the general 
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expectancy (in this case negative) that characterises the concept of Optimism/ 
Pessimism. Indeed, six of the items (including 105) were based on items in the LOT 
(Scheier & Carver 1983). 
Pessimism showed a strong positive correlation with trait anxiety (Speilberger, 1983), as 
would be expected (e. g. Aspinwall & Brunhart, 1996). Individuals high in Pessimism are 
more likely to grade stimuli as threatening, and less likely to feel that they have adequate 
resources to deal with that threat both factors that increase anxiety. 
Pessimism was found to have a moderate positive correlation with Rumination. This in 
line with Carver, Blaney and Scheier (1979), who found Pessimism was significantly 
related to a measure of Rumination based on focusing on negative feelings and their 
associated distress. 
The concept of Optimism / Pessimism has been criticised as merely reflecting the 
underlying effects of variables such as Neuroticism, Anxiety and Self Esteem (e. g. 
Smith, Pope, Rhodewalt & Poulton, 1989). The results found here agree with Scheier, 
Carver and Bridges (1994), who found that Optimism / Pessimism was related to these 
concepts, with correlations in the moderate range between . 50 and . 
60 (as here), but 
were distinct in nature. 
The Pessimism Factor found in this study had a moderate negative correlation with the 
Self Mastery Factor which is what would be expected for scales representing negative 
and positive expectancies respectively. Self Mastery can be seen as being quite 
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conceptually related to Hardiness (Kobasa, 1982), and Kobasa (1979) found that 
Hardiness was correlated positively with Optimism. Indeed, two items in the Pessimism 
scale were drawn from the Mental Toughness questionnaire (Clough & Earle, 2000), 
itself based on the concept of `Hardy personality', which Scheier and Carver (1987) 
suggest is underpinned by the concept of Optimism/Pessimism. For example, item 34 
"However bad things are, I feel they will work out positively in the end" is clearly 
central to the Optimism/Pessimism construct. 
The reason that the items making up Pessimism and Self Mastery did not load onto just 
one factor is perhaps best explained by control. The Pessimism scale includes elements 
of lack of control and powerlessness, whereas Self Mastery suggests a belief in one's 
ability to influence events to produce positive outcomes (cf. Pearlin and Schooler, 1978). 
Overall the structure of the Pessimism factor found here supports the contention of 
Scheier and Carver (1987), that the dimension of Optimism / Pessimism underlies the 
use of a number of different coping styles. As well as providing additional support for 
the link between Pessimism and Hardiness (in this case, through `Mental Toughness'), 
the analysis presented here suggests that Detachment and Avoidance coping are also 
underpinned somewhat by. Pessimism. 
For instance, Items such as 39 "I feel overpowered and at the mercy of the situation" and 
40 "I become miserable or depressed" were originally part of the Detachment scale of 
the CSQ (Roger, Jarvis & Najarian, 1993 ). However, they do fit well with the scale 
here, describing statements of powerlessness, and negative affectivity that characterise 
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the concept of Pessimism (Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994). Another item from the 
CSQ, this time from the Avoidance scale, 8 "I pray that things will just change", actually 
describes a sense of resigning and powerelessness rather than avoidance per se. 
The Pessimism factor showed significant correlations with logically related scales from 
the Brief COPE inventory. Pessimism and the Positive Reinterpretation scale from Brief 
COPE had a weak but significant negative correlation, as was also found by Carver, 
Scheier and Weintraub (1989) for the full COPE (a positive correlation with Optimism 
in their case). The same study by Carver et al found a negative correlation between 
Optimism and Behavioural Disengagement, and Optimism with Venting Emotions. The 
same pattern of results were found here, with the direction of correlation reversed for the 
Pessimism scale (as opposed to their Optimism). In the Carver et al study, a non- 
significant correlation was found between Optimism and Seeking Emotional support, 
which is also what was found here. One notable exception to the pattern of similar 
results was the Positive correlation between Active Coping and Optimism found by 
Carver et al, which was not replicated here. In this study Pessimism had a non- 
significant correlation with Active Coping. This could be because of the focus on actions 
in the Carver et al study (items such as "I take additional action to try to get rid of the 
problem" and "I take direct action to get around the problem") rather than just 
expectancies in the present study. 
Factor 2 was called Social Support. The items with high loadings on this factor all 
described a predominantly emotion-focused coping style based on seeking out social 
support (Krohne, 1993). It includes items such as 96 "I like to talk problems over to 'get 
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them off my chest" and 86 "I feel better when I have talked to my friends about my 
problems". Overall Factor, 2 describes a tendency by the individual to share his or her 
problems and to seek support when in need. Social Support is conceived as a resource 
for the individual when under stress and he or she want to communicate their emotions 
(see Palfai & Kenneth. 1997). 
The Social Support factor that emerged in this study had a negative moderate 
correlation with the Emotion Control Factor, which could be expected since these two 
scales are conceptually opposite. Emotion Control is directly related to the concept of 
Emotional Inhibition which refers to `bottling up' or inhibiting the expression of 
experienced emotion. Roger and Najarian (1997) and Forbes and Roger (1999) found a 
significant negative correlation in between Emotional Inhibition and Social Support. 
Indeed, one of the items that forms the current Social Support factor was drawn 
originally from the Emotion Control Questionnaire (Roger & Najarian, 1989). 
Colby and Emmons' (1997) findings are also supportive to these results, they found a 
positive relation in between openess in emotion and the perception of availability of 
Social Support. 
Correlations of the Social Support Scale were found with different scales of Brief 
COPE. The Focusing on and Venting of Emotions scale (Brief COPE) was also 
positively correlated with the Social Support Scale, a rather self-evident finding (since 
people need other people in order to vent their emotions) which was confirming 
previous results (Carver, Sheier & Weintraub, 1989). 
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The Active Coping Scale (Brief COPE) had a positive correlation with Social Support. 
This was expected since both scales are predominately based on an essence of seeking 
out (rather than passively waiting). Similar correlations were found previously by 
Carver, Sheier & Weintraub (1989). 
The Rumination scale had zero correlation with the Social Support scale, in agreement 
to findings by Forbes and Roger, (1999). 
The third factor was called Emotion Control, and was consisted of eight items describing 
the tendency to inhibit the expression of emotions to others. All of the items except one 
were explicitly concerned with the hiding of negative emotions. Most of the items (five) 
were from the Emotional Inhibition scale of the ECQ (Roger & Najarian, 1989) and they 
clearly indicated the identity of the scale. Two of the items were drawn from the 
Avoidance Coping scale of the CSQ. However, they were describing a tendency of the 
person to keep a brave face and not let others know about the negative events in their life 
(e. g. "I keep things to myself and don't let others know how bad things are"), rather than 
actual avoidance coping. 
As we saw above, the Emotion Control scale as expected was found to have a negative 
correlation with the Social Support scale (Roger & Najarian, 1997; Forbes & Roger, 
1999). Seeking Emotional Support from COPE and Emotion Control were also 
negatively cörrelated. 
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A positive correlation between Emotion Control and the Esteem Concern scale was also 
expected based on the hypothesis that individuals who care a lot about the opinion of the 
others in relation to themselves, would attempt to keep their emotions controlled in order 
to avoid being exposed. This expectation was confirmed with a weak positive 
correlation. The expectation that Emotion Control would correlate negatively with the 
Anger scale was not confirmed, maybe because the Emotion Control scale deals purely 
with withholding expression of negative affect while the Anger scale does not indicate 
clearly if the felt emotions are controlled or expressed. 
The Emotion Control scale was found to have a moderate positive correlation with Trait 
Anxiety. This finding is in contradiction with the results of Bleiker at al (1993) where 
they had found a negative correlation in between Emotion Control and anxiety. 
Finally, a small non-significant positive correlation with the Rumination Scale, 
confirmed previous research findings (Roger & Nesshoever, 1987). 
Factor 4 was labelled Esteem Concern and was characterised by items such as 101 "I'm 
worried about what other people think of me " and 104 "I feel concerned about the 
impression I am making". All of the items were related to the perception of threat from 
the social environment, e. g. the potential to be evaluated negatively by others, and a 
sense of worry related to their self concept. 
The Esteem Concern Scale was expected to correlate positively with the Social Support 
Scale, since the concept of Social Support embodies the notion of Esteem Support, 
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which deals with the effects that the others have on promoting the person's feelings of 
self-esteem and value (Cohen & Wills, 1985) The results of the analysis though, did not 
support the hypothesis. This is may be due to the fact that esteem concerned individuals 
may avoid to open up to others or seek support because they wouldn't like to jeopardise 
their positive profile and expose themselves as stressed or needy. 
As we saw previously the Esteem Concern scale correlated as expected positively with 
the Emotion Control scale. 
A moderate positive correlation was also found as it was expected between Esteem 
Concern and Anger. This finding is in accordance to Lazarus (1999) where he supports 
that although anger is disapproved of by society in general, there are cases when the use 
of anger is considered almost necessary for the preservation of self-esteem and also that 
"Anger depends heavily on the goal of preserving or enhancing self - or social esteem" 
(Lazarus, 1999, p. 217). 
A negative correlation between the Esteem Concern scale and the scale of Self Mastery 
was expected, since high on Esteem Concern individuals could be expected to have 
relatively low confidence and greater need for approval and therefore less belief in 
themselves and their ability to control positive outcomes. This hypothesis was supported 
with a weak negative correlation. 
Because Esteem Concern is essentially a source of anxiety the significant positive 
correlation between Esteem Concern and Trait Anxiety was expected. The core of the 
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Esteem Concern items, dealing with worry, is also consistent with its positive correlation 
with the Rumination scale. As well, Roger and Nesshoever (1987) had also found a 
significant correlation in between Rumination and Social Sensitivity which is very 
similar to Esteem Concern. 
Positive correlations were also found with the Denial, Behavioural Disengagement and 
Self Blame scales of COPE. These are consistent with the underpinning of Esteem 
Concern with Anxiety. 
Factor 5, Anger, was characterised by items such as 90 "I get annoyed easily". Almost 
all of the items were -dealing with the individual's experience of anger, only one was 
referring to the actual expression of it. This factor represents what Gross and John 
(1995) called `Impulse Strength', the actual strength of emotion felt by an individual, 
rather than the expression of that emotion - which is represented here by Factor 3 
Emotion Control. This may explain the lack of relationship with the Emotion Control 
Scale. 
Of the six items of the Anger scale, four were newly created, while the rest were from 
the Detachment scale of the CSQ and were describing irritability and frustration - seen 
in the context of that scale as the opposite of detached coping. It can be seen then, that 
perhaps underlying the ability to take a Detached Coping style is the absence of very 
powerful emotions. 
As it was mentioned above, the Anger scale was found to have a weak positive 
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correlation with the Social Support and a moderate positive correlation with the Esteem 
Concern scale. A hypothesis that the Anger scale would have a negative correlation 
with Self Mastery was confirmed (moderate negative correlation). It was of no surprise 
that a notion based on the individuals' feelings of control over the situation they 
encounter, would correlate negatively with a concept based on anger and its facets. 
A moderate positive correlation in between the Pessimism and Anger scales was also 
found. This relationship confirmed previous research findings where anger had been 
found to correlate moderately negative with the scale of Optimism (Cohen & Hoberman, 
1983). 
In relation to COPE, the Anger Reactivity scale was found to have moderate positive 
correaltions with Behavioural Disengagement, Venting, and Self Blame. The last is in 
accordance to the relationship of anger and attribution of blame (Smith and Lazarus, 
1993). 
Anger, as also expected was found to correlate moderately positively with both Trait 
Anxiety and Rumination. The repetition of negative thoughts that the concept of 
Rumination describes can help the existing anger to sustain itself or give onset to it, by 
the constant rethinking of painful affect or threatening thoughts. This positive relation in 
between Anger and Rumination is also supported by McDougal, Vanables & Roger 
(1991) 
Factor 6 was labelled Self Mastery as It reflects the positive self belief and positive 
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expectancy in an ability to deal with and control uncertainty and problems, related to 
Pearlin and Schooler's (1978) formulation. As we saw earlier, The Self Mastery scale as 
expected was found to be negatively correlated with the scale of Pessimism and Esteem 
Concern. 
The Self Mastery Scale was found to be negatively correlated with appropriate scales 
from the Brief Cope (Self-Distraction, Denial, Behavioural Disengagement, Self-Blame, 
Seeking Emotional Support and the Venting). These negative correlations fit with the 
general notion of self-sufficiency and perception of control that Self Mastery represents. 
2.9 CONCLUSIONS 
A six factor self-report questionnaire was developed based on concepts that have proven 
to be important in coping, and that were hypothesised to be related to Denial processes. 
The six scales were found to be internally consistent and stable over time. They were 
also found to have sensible relationships among themselves and with other conceptually 
related and well validated questionnaires. 
The factors showed clear conceptual and empirical relationships. Pessimism and Self 
Mastery were found to be similar concepts that differed in their direction and their 
relationship to perceived control. Pessimism, probably via its link with Anxiety, seemed 
to underpin to a greater or lesser extent the other CWL scales with the exception of 
Social Support. 
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Social Support and Emotion Control were found to be very related to one another 
(almost opposites). They seemed to be distinguished primarily by their relationship with 
threat perception from the social environment - Emotion Control was linked to greater 
threat perception as characterised by its relationships with Esteem Concern and 
Pessimism (both moderately positive correlations), whereas Social Support showed no 
relationship with those variables. 
Anger was found to be independent of Emotion Control, but as expected was related to 
threats to self esteem from external sources (Pessimism and Esteem Concern). 
The factor structure revealed here helped clarify certain relationships that were not clear 
from the previous literature, and lent support to the contention of Hewitt and Flett (1996) 
that personality traits may underlie some coping assessment instruments. Specifically, it 
appeared that Avoidance Coping (Roger, 1995) and Emotional Coping (Roger, Jarvis 
and Najarian, 1993) may actually measure certain factors associated with Pessimism and 
Trait Anxiety. 
The next chapters will provide the crucial tests of the central hypothesis, however, that 
this questionnaire, theoretically derived from a model of coping, will measure trait 
factors related to the use of Denial. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE: 
PERSONALITY CORRELATES OF DENIAL IN OFFENDERS 
Although everybody may use Denial at one point in life and beside the fact that there 
may be individuals who use Denial more, or more often than others, there are specific 
areas, categories of people, where the use of Denial seems to be extremely prevalent. It 
seems that for some symptoms, illnesses, or behaviours, Denial is often the common 
way that people engage in order to deal with their particular stressor. 
Categories of such include people who suffer from breast cancer, cardiovascular 
diseases, eating disorders, AIDS, alcoholism (or other addictions such as smoking) and 
also people who commit crimes that are viewed as the most unacceptable by society, e. g. 
child sexual abusers and other sex offenders. 
It is the hypothetical Denial of sex offenders and their admission of guilt in relation to 
their offence, that will be attempted to be addressed in this chapter. A Denial that 
although may vary in type and levels of depth, seems to be a very powerful common 
characteristic of the offenders of sexual crimes committed against both children and 
adults. (Crighton, 1995; Gocke, 1991) 
Although a big body of the literature of sex offence and Denial is devoted to the area of 
child sexual abuse, and as a form of distorting thinking has received particular attention 
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by those who work with sex abusers (Briggs, Doyle, Gooch and Kennington, 1998), 
Denial is considered a usual point of view regarding sex offences in general (Lanyon 
and Lutz, 1984). Specifically, Grossman and Cavanaugh (1990) state that 
"There is a general consensus among clinicians who evaluate and treat male patients 
accused of sex offences that these patients frequently deny any deviant sexual acts or 
desires" 
(Grossman and Cavanaugh, 1990, p. 742) 
Interestingly, while the majority of the relevant literature has focused on levels of Denial 
in sex offenders (Stewart, 1996) there are not many studies that have actually compared 
levels of Denial between sex offenders and other offenders. The overriding assumption 
in the literature seems to be that sex offenders are more prone to use denial in relation to 
their offence than other offenders. 
This is based on the literature that shows the extreme use of Denial in sex offenders. 
Research in the area shows that as many as two-thirds of imprisoned sex offenders deny 
their offences (Marshall, 1994). The fact that such a substantial proportion of sex 
offenders deny the allegations against them and respond defensively, constitutes a major 
issue in both forensic and clinical setting (Birgisson, 1996). 
This Denial of allegations that the sex offender insists upon, are not as in the case of 
lying motivated by fear of consequences, but by fear of overwhelming emotion and a 
need to maintain a favourable image about ones self (Chaffin, 1997). Sex offenders who 
deny, have often core beliefs about themselves that they are incompatible with their 
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abusive behaviour, for example they may consider themselves as non violent so they 
could be unable to accept that they have committed a violent crime such as rape 
(Crighton, 1995). This may explain also the fact, that although admission by the sex 
offender of his offences would raise the possibilities for reduction of penalties and 
increase the chances for obtaining treatment (Baldwin & Roys, 1998), so many sex 
offenders insist on denying. 
This significance of Denial in the area of sex offence is so prominent that the assessment 
of many sex offenders as untreatable depends on the levels of Denial and minimisation 
which are present at the time of their evaluation (Winn, 1996). 
Theoretical models which are based on extensive empirical work suggest a strong link 
between Denial and sex offence. Conceptually, Denial is seen, together with 
minimisation, as self-protective processes which maintain the sex offenders' ability of 
distorting their level of responsibility (Winn, 1996). Engaging in Denial the sex offender 
avoids to acknowledge the details and ramifications of his abusive behaviour and the 
internal discomfort that the awareness of his offensive behaviour would cause (Briggs, 
Doyle, Gooch & Kennington, 1998). 
There are undoubtedly pragmatic reasons on why sex offenders deny their offensive 
behaviour (Baldwin & Roys, 1998). Threats of imprisoning, stigmatisation, humiliation, 
isolation, loss of professional and social status, naturally, can be so immense, that for the 
sex offender to deny the existence of either the act itself -complete Denial- or aspects of 
it, can be considered as an adaptive way for dealing with the threat and the anxiety that 
it produces (Fumiss, 1995). So, Denial can be conceptualised as an adaptive functional 
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process, aimed at protecting the individual (sex-offender) and his family (Baldwin, 
1997). 
Levels or areas of Denial that the sex offender uses in order to refute responsibility for 
the abusive act have been identified by many clinicians and researcher in the area. 
Concrete data which denote various levels of Denial are regularly obtained through 
verbalised statements of offenders which participate in therapy (Veach, 1997). 
Although there are some differences among the various classifications, the general idea 
is more or less the same. In brief, the major levels that Denial is identified are, Denial of 
the abuse as an act that ever took place (complete or total Denial), its planning, its 
severity, its awareness, its abusive nature, its harmful effects, its responsibility, its guilt 
and Denial of Denial (Fumiss, 1995; Salter, 1988; Veach 1997; Winn, 1996). 
Conceptually, sex offence can be conceived as having more than one link with Denial. 
As a particular type of expressed behaviour, sex offence can be related to avoidance of 
reality under the syndrome of secrecy and addiction. This may explain the maintenance 
of the Denial by the sex offender even in those cases where they have pleaded guilty in 
court. Sex offence is often perceived as a form of addictive behaviour and as such it is 
understood not as primarily a pleasurable experience but mostly as a tension relief 
behaviour which serves reality avoidance and supports coping mechanisms. Specifically, 
in relation to weakness of ego-strength which is often theoretically linked with the use of 
Denial, there is the suggestion that the same mechanism of avoidance of reality that 
initiated the-abusive behaviour in the first place, maintains the Denial of the 
responsibility of the act afterwards (Furniss, 1995). 
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The belief system that ratifies the behaviour of the sex offender produces in the first 
place a cognitive distortion, in continuation the sex offender constructs complex Denial 
mechanisms which are instrumental and vital to his refusal in accepting responsibility 
for his actions. If the sex offender continues without accepting responsibility for his 
behaviour then he will not accept responsibility for change either and so no change in 
the behaviour will occur (Dominelli, 1991). The above theoretical constructions may 
offer a plausible explanation on why although the reconviction rates of sex offenders is 
no greater than that for other types of crime in the short term, the long-term risk of 
reconviction remains high (Soothill, 1986, in Roger & Masters, 1997) 
The general profile of sex offenders as based on numerous studies, includes concepts 
such as low self esteem, inefficacy in social relationships and overall inadequacy in 
social skills, lack of confidence, increased anxiety and anger (Finkelhor, 1986; Roger & 
Masters, 1997). In other words, concepts which as discussed previously imply a low 
sense of external and internal resources for the individual and therefore a tendency 
towards emotional-focused coping in the form of defensiveness. Research on sex 
offenders which compared sex offenders who deny their offences with sex offenders 
who admit them, have shown that `deniers' tend to exaggerate less than 'admitters', in 
relation to their problems (Baldwin & Roys, 1998) and the description of their 
psychological functioning and adaptation. Also, `Deniers' showed more defensiveness 
(Grossman & Cavanaugh, 1990), were more likely to minimise anxiety and personality 
disorders (Haywood, Grossman & Hardy, 1993) and present themselves as emotionally 
stable, in comparison to admitters (Birgisson, 1996). 
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However, although a number of studies in the area have explored demographic and other 
variables and beside the fact that there are theories which propose explanations in 
relation to the motives that are associated with Denial, there is little empirical work on 
personality factors which are related to the Denial of the sex offender (Baldwin & Roys, 
1998). 
The present study focused on evaluating coping and personality aspects that are 
associated with Denial in a population of prisoners consisting of sex offenders and 
offenders of other crimes but of similar seriousness, as denoted by the prison sentence to 
be served by the offender. A sample of sex offenders seems to be a very appropriate 
place to look for elevated use of Denial, and CWL seem a very appropriate tool with 
which to search for relevant individual differences associated with this Denial. 
The first hypothesis was, that those considered to be predisposed to engage in Denial 
(sex offenders) would present a different pattern of coping and personality variables as 
evaluated by the CWL, in comparison to the non sex offenders. So, sex offenders would 
be expected to score lower on Social Support and Self Mastery and higher in variables 
such as Anger and Esteem Concern and Pessimism when compared with the non sex 
offenders. 
This study focused also on differences in the claim of guilt or innocence of the offence 
in both the sex offenders and the non sex offenders sample. In other words it compared 
coping and personality factors in `deniers' and `admitters'. The hypothesis in this case 
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was that `deniers' would be like the sex offenders, and score lower in variables such as 
Social Support and Self Mastery, and higher in variables such as Pessimism, Esteem 
Concern. 
3.1 METHOD 
3.1.1 Participants 
The 131 male participants were prisoners at HMP Wolds. They were divided in two 
groups, sex offenders (N=48) and non-sex offenders (N=83). Sex offences, for the 
purpose of this study, included rape, attempted rape, indecent assault and child 
molestation. The non-sex offenders were selected on the basis of their crimes being 
serious enough to warrant similar lengths of sentences, and included murder, attempted 
murder, manslaughter, serious assaults and serious drug offences. 
The sex offenders and non-sex offenders were segregated within the prison, sex 
offenders occupying one block and non-sex offenders occupying two separate blocks. 
The matching of the participants on the length of their sentence was initially done on the 
basis of prison records. These showed a mean sentence of 7.68 years for the group of 
non-sex offenders (SD = 4.52 years), and a mean of 6.76 years for the sex offenders (SD 
= 3.16 years). The difference between the groups in terms of sentence was not 
significant (t[111] = 1.31, p> . 05, using a correction for unequal variances between the 
groups). 
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3.1.2 Materials 
The Coping With Life (CWL) questionnaire and an additional set of questions, relevant 
to the status of participants as prisoners, were used. 
The ten additional questions were related to the status of the participants as prisoners, 
and included questions about the length of their sentence, the number of years they had 
still to serve, any disciplinary trouble they had been involved in while in prison, and 
whether they considered themselves as innocent or guilty of the crime for which they 
had been convicted. 
3.1.3 Procedure 
The CWL questionnaires were distributed in A4 envelopes that included a cover letter 
which was explaining the nature of the questionnaire, guaranteed the anonymity of it, 
and offering debreifing by the researcher and/or advice from the prison doctor together 
with the CWL57 with the additional questions attached and a blank return envelope. 
The distribution procedure of the questionnaires was designed to reduce the likelihood 
of the respondents giving significantly biased desirable self reports in completing the 
measures, what Edwards (1970) referred to as `impression management'. A number of 
precautions were taken to minimise this, in line with the suggestions of Anastasi and 
Urbina (1997) and the procedures of Weinberger and Schwartz (1982). 
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Distribution was done by the prison wardens but in the presence of the researcher, so 
that the nature of the study and its independence from the prison authorities could be 
explained. Envelopes were given directly to the individual participants, sex offenders 
and non sex offenders who had been selected based on the matching of their sentence 
length. Participants were asked to read the cover letter and, if they wished, to fill out the 
questionnaire and return it in the blank envelope enclosed to the researcher later in the 
day. Participation was encouraged by the offer of a voucher for a snack from the prison 
canteen (a chocolate bar) if they returned the questionnaire. The researcher remained in 
the wing to allow the participants to ask questions about the study. 
It was considered essential to guarantee the anonymity of the participants' responses, 
especially given the nature of some of the extra questions relating to their guilt and 
innocence, and so it was stressed that the participants should not put their names on the 
questionnaires. Additionally, as stated above, the participants were asked to return their 
completed questionnaire directly to the researcher, so that the fear that their 
questionnaire could be identified by a member of staff would be reduced. (Not all 
questionnaires distributed were returned direct to the researcher on the same day; a 
minority were returned at a later date. ) 
The participants were given as long as they liked to complete the questionnaire. They 
were free to complete it at the place of their preference, but were encourage to find 
somewhere where they would be assured of reasonable privacy. This was always 
possible, as prisoners had individual cells. 
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When the participants asked questions related to the nature of the questionnaire the 
researcher avoided completely any reference to denial or sex offence and concentrated 
on the coping nature of the questions. 
Even though the two offender groups were housed in separate wings of the prison it was 
necessary to code the questionnaires as to which group they were distributed to, to avoid 
any potential mix up. The questionnaires distributed to each group were thus identical 
except for one missing full stop from the last page, and this information was used to 
assure which group each questionnaire came from. 
3.2 RESULTS 
In total, 125 questionnaires were distributed and 107 were returned, giving a response 
rate of 86%. From those returned a small number (9), mostly from the sex offenders 
group, had significant obscenities or other evidence of not taking the study seriously, 
and were not used in the analysis. Of the remainder, 15 questionnaires had more than 
five items of missing data, or had not completed the question as to whether they 
considered themselves guilty or not (and so would not be able to be used in the analysis) 
and these were not included in the analysis also. 
Of the remaining 83 questionnaires, 31 were from sex offenders and 52 from non sex 
offenders. The average age of the sex offenders was 53.06 years (SD = 20.64) and the 
average age of the non-sex offenders was 34.80 years (SD = 8.27). 
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The matching of the two groups in terms of their sentences was initially done on the 
basis of prison records of the participants selected to be offered a questionnaire. 
However, because the returned questionnaires were completely anonymous it was not 
known from this data alone what the actual composition of the sample of returned 
questionnaires consisted of. It was thought desirable to check the length of sentence 
reported on the questionnaires between the groups. The average sentence for the sex 
offenders group was found to be 6.38 years (SD = 3.16), the average sentence of the 
non-sex offenders group was 7.81 years (SD = 4.52). The difference between the groups 
were not significant, neither were these self reported sentences significantly different to 
the sentences according to the prison records. 
The next thing to check was the "guilt" status of the two groups. By this it is meant the 
extent to which the two groups reported that they were innocent of the crime for which 
they were found guilty. Seventy-three percent of the non-sex offenders group reported 
that they perceived themselves to be guilty of their crime. Only 39% of the sex offenders 
group reported that they were guilty of their crime. This difference was highly 
significant (x2 [1] = 9.58, p <. 01). 
Home office statistics (Mattinson, 1998) for the year 1996 show that 84,900 convictions 
were made leading to a prison sentence. In the same year 3,368 convictions were 
quashed, just less than 4% of the total number of convictions. As a very rough estimate 
these figures would suggest that only a very few people in our sample (about 3) would 
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be expected to have unsafe convictions that would be later reversed on appeal. 
Finally, the CWL questionnaire was developed in a sample of the general adult 
population which can not be considered representative of the sample of prisoners in this 
study. This does not present a problem for comparisons between the participants' mean 
scores on the various CWL scales as they will not be compared to norm groups, only 
within the prison sample itself. However, it was felt necessary to check that the internal 
consistency and reliability of the CWL scales were adequate in this sample. 
Alphas for the scales were as follows: Pessimism =. 80; Social Coping =. 89; Emotion 
Control = . 82; Esteem Concern = . 79; Anger = . 75; 
Self Mastery = . 81. 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below show descriptive statistics for the CWL scales broken down 
by sex offender and guilt status respectively. 
There appeared to be no striking differences between the two offender groups' mean 
scores, virtually all mean scores falling between 2 and 3 on the 1 to 4 CWL response. 
There was perhaps a slight tendency for the standard deviations in the sex offenders 
group to be higher than those in the other group. 
As for the breakdown by guilt acceptance, there appeared no striking differences 
between the CWL scale scores for those who consider themselves innocent compared to 
those who report accepting their conviction. 
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Table 3.1 Coping With Life scale means and standard deviations for sex offenders and 
non-sex offenders 
Sex offenders 
(n = 31) 
Mean SD 
Non-sex offenders 
(n = 52) 
Mean SD 
Pessimism 2.44 . 80 2.27 . 40 
Social Support 2.35 . 73 2.32 . 61 
Emotion Control 2.74 . 77 2.77 . 61 
Esteem Concern 2.49 . 75 2.43 . 63 
Anger 1.99 . 56 2.13 . 55 
Self Mastery 2.74 . 78 2.89 . 
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Table 3.2 Coping With Life scale means and standard deviations for those prisoners 
considering themselves guilty and those considering themselves innocent. 
Consider themselves Consider themselves 
guilty innocent 
(n = 40) (n = 43) 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Pessimism 2.38 . 68 2.26 . 42 
Social Support 2.44 
. 
61 2.16 . 70 
Emotion Control 2.67 . 61 2.88 . 74 
Esteem Concern 2.60 . 60 2.22 . 71 
Anger 2.11 . 55 2.04 . 57 
Self Mastery 2.72 . 64 3.00 . 76 
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Because the two Sex offender status groups differed significantly in terms of age, before 
carrying out analyses of the CWL scores across offender groups the effect of Age on the 
CWL scores was checked. Pearson correlations between Age and each of the 6 CLW 
scales produced no significant relationships, and so it was decided that it was not 
necessary to control for age in the analyses. 
The CWL scale scores were thus subjected to a 2-way Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
(MANOVA). Offender Status (sex or non-sex offender) was the first Independent 
Variable (IV) and Guilt Status (guilty or innocent) was the second, both variables having 
two levels. The 6 CWL scales were used as Dependent Variables (DV). 
The results of the overall multivariate analysis showed no significant effect of Offender 
Status (F[6,74]=1.33, p >. 05) but a highly significant effect of Guilt Status 
(F[6,74]=3.10, p <. 01). Subsequent univariate analyses on the separate CWL scales 
showed significant differences between the two Guilt groups on 3 of the CWL scales. 
Social Coping was found to be lower for those who believed themselves to be innocent 
(F[1,79]= 4.16, p <. 05). Esteem Concern was also lower for the innocent group 
(F[1,79]= 7.43, p <. 01). Finally, Self Mastery was higher for the innocent group 
(F[1,79]= 4.80, p <. 05). 
No significant interactions between Sex Offender Status and Guilt Status were found. 
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3.3 DISCUSSION 
This study attempted to explore the relationship between relevant trait personality 
variables as measured by CWL, and the predisposition to use Denial. Status as a sex 
offender was assumed to be a good indicator of a likelihood to use Denial, and so 
differences were expected between sex offenders and other offenders in their scores on 
the CWL scales. In addition, whether or not offenders admitted or denied their guilt was 
expected to be indicative of the use of Denial in relation to status as a convicted 
prisoner, and so similarly likely to be related to differences in CWL variables. 
The first step was to check that the newly developed CWL questionnaire was adequate 
to perform the comparison. Although the questionnaire was found to be a reliable and 
valid measure of particular trait personality and coping-related variables in a general 
adult sample, the groups measured here were substantially different, in age and sex 
profiles at the very least. However, it was found that all 6 of the scales had good 
reliability even in the new sample, and this provided a solid foundation on which to test 
the particular hypotheses of interest. 
The hypothesis that sex offenders would display a pattern of low internal and external 
resources based on the general idea of their profile as described earlier -socially 
inadequate, low in self-esteem and confidence, high in anxiety and anger- was not 
supported. 
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While this was at first look surprising, there are a number of explanations that may 
account for it. A possible but unoriginal reason is that this study did not look at a big 
enough sample to detect any small differences that may have existed between the 
groups. 
A more interesting explanation is that although levels of Denial may be high in the sex 
offenders group, they may just not be any higher than that found in serious offenders of 
non-sex crimes. Although there is supportive clinical evidence and well constructed 
theories on why sex offenders are expected to engage in high levels of Denial, we can 
not really claim with certainty that the levels of Denial in sex offenders are in fact higher 
from the levels of Denial in non sex offenders. As it was mentioned in the introduction, 
there are not many studies that have directly compared levels of Denial between sex 
offenders and other offenders. In this absence it is not known for sure that the reason that 
high levels of Denial are found in sex offenders is not just because sex offences are 
serious crimes, and people who commit serious crimes, sex offences or otherwise, may 
use Denial a lot. 
A contributory factor towards this may also be that the profile of sex offenders that led 
us to believe that certain characteristics are likely to be important in Denial was not 
based on a good comparison. In general studies on sex offenders, where the overall 
description about their profile is mainly coming from, and where comparison groups 
have been used, these groups may not be really be considered to have been adequate for 
the comparison. For example, comparing sex offenders to police officers (Filkenhor, 
1986). 
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The second hypothesis, relating differences between those who admit their guilt 
compared to those who state that they are innocent even after conviction, was partially 
supported. Although there are many levels of Denial, a refusal to admit guilt of some 
sort in the face of powerful evidence to the contrary is exactly what we would expect 
from someone engaging in a distortion of reality to minimise their psychological 
distress. Those who stated that they were innocent were found to be lower in the CWL 
scales of Social Coping and Esteem Concern, and higher on Self Mastery. 
Two of these scales were related to social factors (Social Support and Esteem Concern). 
Social Support, as it has been described previously, is considered a resource for the 
individual, an important buffer against stress as it provides the opportunity for the 
individual to express their emotions and to communicate his or her problems when 
under stress (Cohen & Wills, 1985). It involves opening up and implies sharing personal 
matters. 
The fact that those who denied their offence responded significantly lower in Social 
Support than those who admitted it can be explained in more than one way. For 
example, it is possible that the offender who claims and believes that he is not guilty 
may avoid seeking Social Support because he considers himself so different (innocent) 
from the rest of the prisoners that he does not want to be associated with them. 
Another factor is that there has been found a general tendency of the `deniers' to present 
themselves as emotionally stable individuals (Birgisson, 1996), and this may dissuade 
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them from sharing their emotions and problems when under stress. 
The Esteem Concern variable was also found to be lower in the group of prisoners who 
claimed that they were innocent. Esteem Concern measures the extent to which 
respondents report that they worry about what others may think about them. It can thus 
be thought of conceptually as a source of threat to self esteem. It was found to have 
moderate positive correlations with Trait Anxiety and Rumination from the original 
CWL validation. 
This result would also be in accordance to the general tendency of those claiming to be 
innocent to perceive themselves as "different". If an individual's perception was that they 
were innocent while everyone else was guilty, then to minimise the threat to their esteem 
from the negative evaluations of others, they could adjust their level of concern for what 
others thought of them downward. This would be an emotion-focused way of dealing 
with the anxiety associated with being negatively evaluated by others. Research has 
shown those who deny their offences have been found to minimise their anxiety 
(Haywood, Grossman & Hardy, 1993) and this is a mechanism that would do exactly 
that, given the appraisal-based model of coping adopted in this thesis. 
The final CWL scale that showed a significant difference between admitters and deniers 
was Self Mastery. The finding that those denying their guilt were actually higher on the 
measure of Self Mastery than were the group accepting their guilt was somewhat 
surprising. As related in the introduction the use of Denial was expected to be related 
negatively with Self Mastery, as Self Mastery is seen as a coping resource that would 
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function as a buffer against anxiety and reduce the need for Denial. Here, it seems to be 
a factor positively related to Denial. 
This finding though is consistent with previous research that has shown that those sex 
offenders who deny their offences tend to exaggerate less about their problems in 
comparison to those who admit their offences, to the degree that they deny everyday 
problems that typically are considered common in the general population (Baldwin and 
Roys, 1998). This perception of having few problems is what we would expect if people 
perceived themselves as generally being in control and having positive expectancies in 
being able to deal with threats. In effect, high Self Mastery may be seen to reduce threat 
appraisals, since the perception of the magnitude of a problem depends on how able the 
person feels to deal with it. 
Interestingly, in the original development of the CWL Self Mastery was found to 
correlate negatively with both Social Support and Esteem Concern. This negative 
correlation is consistent with the findings here, and with the idea that the Self Mastery 
factor does not only entail a general sense of control, self belief and positive expectancy, 
but also a sense of self sufficiency that is so strong that the person does not feel the need 
to rely on others for social support, or feel threatened by the evaluations of others. 
Although these results seem explicable within a general model of coping, it is necessary 
to consider what they mean in the context of defining a difference between those who 
admit and those who deny their offence. 
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Firstly, regarding the interpretation of admitting or denying an offence, refusing to admit 
guilt even when in prison is also exactly what would be expected from a person who is 
actually innocent. While this cannot be categorically ruled-out in the present study, it 
seems very unlikely that the sample of offenders used in the present study contained 
over 50% of innocent people, as was claimed. Home Office figures from 1996 
(Mattinson, 1998), showed a snapshot of the entire population of prisoners in England 
and Wales, and found a successful appeal rate of only 4% of convictions. While the 
criminal justice system is certainly not perfect, the process for accusing, convicting and 
imprisoning people is designed to be conservative, and to be more biased to let the 
potentially guilty free rather than imprison the potentially innocent. Although this goes 
spectacularly wrong on occasion (e. g. "the Birmingham six") the rate of occurrence of 
this is quite rare. In particular, sex crimes such as rape and child molestation are seen as 
being particularly difficult crimes in which to secure a conviction in the first place, a sad 
situation but one which in this context is likely to mean that fewer innocent people may 
be expected to be convicted than is the average. 
If we assume that it is highly likely that the majority of those who denied their guilt were 
actually guilty, another possibility must be considered, that the prisoners who responded 
that they believed themselves to be innocent of their crime did not actually believe this, 
but merely reported it to give a good impression, i. e. `impression management' as 
Edwards (1970) termed it. A number of precautions were taken to minimise this, in line 
with the suggestions of Anastasi and Urbina (1997) and Weinberger and Schwartz 
(1982). Indeed, in some respects the procedures used here were even more stringent than 
the Weinberger and Schwartz (1982) methods, e. g. participants were not required to sign 
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a consent form in the present study, they only had to give verbal consent. 
The fact of the study's anonymity was made very relevant and observable to the 
participants. The participants were all assured of anonymity personally by the 
researcher, and no names were required to be put on the questionnaire. It was made clear 
that the research was being conducted independently from the Prison and the Criminal 
Justice System, and this was reinforced by the majority of the questionnaires being 
returned direct to the researcher, rather than being handed direct to Prison staff (and 
even then in a sealed envelope). It was also made clear that the research was not forming 
part of, or informing in any way, any clinical assessment or evaluation of the prisoners 
by the prison. Therefore there was no obvious external goal that would motivate the 
prisoners to alter their responses, i. e. no prospect of better treatment, or indeed 
punishment, to be gained from how they completed the questionnaire. As well as 
anonymity from the prison authorities and the researcher, the participants were 
encouraged to fill out the questionnaires individually in their own cells, to maximise 
their anonymity from other prisoners, perhaps a more important consideration. 
The fact that in this study the questionnaires were first anonymous and second not used 
for some clinical assessment that may have had an effect on the offenders' prison life in 
some way, make a strong case in supporting that the responses of the prisoners were 
probably more honest than might be expected. Research on recidivism shows that 
confidentiality (in this case anonymity can be seen as equivalent) has a great effect, as 
probably would be expected, on the admission of re-offence by non-incarcerated 
individuals. According to Finkelhor re-offence rates based on self reports were found at 
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3% when the individual could be identified and at 21 % when confidentiality was 
promised to the offender, demonstrating that when confidentiality is guaranteed a large 
number of reports that otherwise would be withheld can be obtained (Finkelhor, 1986). 
So, there is much indirect evidence to suggest that the likelihood of these results being 
purely the result of impression management was low. 
There are additional arguments in favour of this conclusion based on the actual pattern 
of results obtained here. For instance, regarding reports of sentence length, there was 
found to be very good correspondence between objective and subjectively reported 
measures of length of sentence, another factor that could be seen as vulnerable to 
impression management if so desired. 
Additional evidence against an impression management explanation comes from the 
close agreement between the present results and work by Paulhus and Reid (1991). They 
carried out a detailed empirical investigation into the various structural models that seek 
to explain the phenomenon of socially desirable responding. 
They found a general consensus in the literature that distinguished between `impression 
management' and `self deception'. Impression management is the tendency to give a 
favourable impression to others, even though this impression isn't a sincere reflection of 
self perceptions. Self deception, on the other hand, is the tendency to give favourably 
biased, but this time honestly held, self descriptions. They refined this standpoint to 
incorporate `enhancement', the tendency for and individual to exaggerate their positive 
attributes, from `denial', the tendency to minimise negative ones. 
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Image management was found to be characterised by indifference to the `enhancement' 
and `denial' dimension - the two were highly correlated, so that people who consciously 
decide to present themselves favourably will assess which is the most socially desirable 
response on a questionnaire and pick that one, regardless of whether it enhances 
favourable characteristics or refutes negative ones. 
This is not what was found in this study. Some CWL scales with clear social desirability 
directions, e. g. Pessimism and Anger, did not show any significant difference between 
the two Guilt Status groups. The Social Support scale, which does not have a very clear 
social desirability direction, did show differences between the groups. This is not the 
pattern of results that would be expected if those who refuted their guilt were merely 
impression managing. 
Rather, Paulhus and Reid (1991) found that the tell-tale sign of `self deception', as 
opposed to `image management', was the endorsement of what they called 'self- 
deception enhancement' (SDE) items. These items were characterised as positive 
expectancies implying "an exaggerated sense of control and confidence in one's thinking 
powers - almost a cognitive narcissism" (Paulhus and Reid, 1991; p. 315). Self- 
Deception Enhancement was found to be virtually identical in character to the Self 
Mastery scale from the CWL. Both imply the enhancement of positive qualities and both 
show expectancies of good outcomes that are perceived to be under internal control. 
SDE was found to be indicative of honestly held but distorted beliefs, and Self Mastery 
was found to be higher in those who did not admit that they were guilty. 
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When incarcerated in prison the prospects for control over significant aspects of an 
individual's life seem highly limited, and so high beliefs in control expectancies would 
appear to be perhaps further evidence of distortion of reality. 
Further than this conceptual agreement, there were found to be similarities in the 
relationships of SDE and Self Mastery with other individual difference variables. 
Paulhus and Reid (1991) found that SDE was correlated negatively with social anxiety. 
Social anxiety is essentially what the CWL Esteem Concern scale measures, and Esteem 
Concern was found to be lower in those who did not admit to being guilty also. Self 
Deceptive Enhancement was found also to be related negatively with empathetic 
distress, a measure of an individual's tendency to share the negative affect of others. In 
the present study Social Support was found to be lower in the `denial of guilt' group, and 
the Social Support factor is clearly underpinned by the idea of sharing negative affect, 
i. e. `a problem shared.... '. 
Paulhus and Reid (1991) explain SDE in terms of its relationship with self esteem. They 
found that SDE correlated positively with self esteem, and suggested that SDE could 
serve to distort everyday events to build up (or support? ) self esteem. In this they follow 
the approach detailed by Greenberg, Pyszczynski Solomon, Pinel, Simon and Jordan 
(1993), who argue for the buffering effect of self esteem on anxiety. However, 
Greenberg et al's (1993) finding was that although experimentally manipulated self 
esteem was negatively related to anxiety, it was also negatively related to defensive 
distortions of mortality-vulnerability. 
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These distortions would be vulnerable to the existence of powerful contrary evidence, 
i. e. being in prison having been found guilty of a crime, and having very little control of 
much of day to day life. Ways of minimising this evidence would be to not talk to 
people (low Social Support) and to not worry that people might view you negatively 
(low Esteem Concern). 
Taking the results concerning sex offenders in relation to the results for those denying 
their guilt offers a tentative explanation for the findings in the literature regarding the 
prevalence of the use of Denial by sex offenders. It may not be the status as a sex 
offender that is the crucial factor related to the use of Denial, but the fact that the 
individual refuses to admit their guilt. The confusion arises because the two are not 
independent; sex offenders are much less likely to admit their guilt than non sex 
offenders. This is hardly surprising when it is considered that sex crimes are one of the 
most reviled forms of behaviour in society. 
The lack of extensive literature in comparing Denial in sex offenders to that of other 
offenders may have led to the assumption that it is the status as sex offence which is the 
causal factor in Denial when it may not be. It could be that Denial it self `empowers' the 
person to engage in such an unaccepted behaviour as it `keeps' all the consequences of 
this appalling act way from the understanding of the person. 
To recap the major findings, it was found that about half of the respondents reported 
that they believed that they were innocent of the crime for which they were in prison 
for. This level of belief in innocence was highly unlikely to be objectively true, and so 
was likely to be the result of some kind of distortion for most of the prisoners who 
claimed it. 
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This distortion could have been the product of conscious impression management, but 
the precautions taken to reduce this style of responding, and the actual pattern of results 
obtained, suggested that this was unlikely. 
Rather, this ability to reject very powerful evidence that is contrary to the self-image is 
seen as evidence of Denial or Denial-like processes. 
After this research was completed, a very interesting chapter from a book on working 
with sex offenders in prisons (Spencer, 1999) was discovered. This contained a letter 
from a sex offender who was in prison, and who wanted to encourage other prisoners to 
join a rehabilitation programme that he had found very helpful. An extensive section 
from it is reproduced below, as it is quite remarkable the similarity between the 
impression one gets when reading it and the findings from this chapter. 
"When I first came to prison in March 1992 1 didn't care about anyone 
but myself. I thought I had been hard done by and why should I be 
punished this way. The selfishness and contempt I showed towards 
prisoners, warders, my family and most importantly my victim was way 
out of line. For years before and after I offended I portrayed myself as a 
hardman and unhurtable. To put it mildly, I was the best thing since 
sliced bread. I couldn't have been more tivrong.... 
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I thought I was better than the next person ... 
I went around the prison 
with blinkers on, hiding the fill extent of my offence from myself and the 
others around me. " 
(Spencer, 1999; p. 189). 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: 
PERSONALITY FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH DENIAL OF 
RISK IN SMOKERS 
In the previous chapter the CWL was administered to a prison sample and it was found 
that those who were holding a distorted view in relation to their guilt shared a particular 
pattern of responses, being found lower in Esteem Concern and Social Support and 
higher in Self Mastery in comparison to those prisoners who had accepted their guilt. 
However, a defining factor of the previous sample was that they had been found guilty 
of a serious crime, and indeed were incarcerated at the time of the research, not factors 
that are shared by the majority of the population. Therefore, it was considered essential 
to administer the CWL to a sample more near to the norm for a general population and 
find out if the response patterns that have been found in the previous study would be 
replicated in this one. 
Previously the sample of sex offenders had been originally assumed to be predisposed to 
distorting reality, in this study smokers were identified as a sample that is generally 
considered to have a distorted view of otherwise well accepted information - i. e. the 
risks associated with smoking. 
As reported by Lee (1989), the major cause of disease and illness in developed countries 
is considered to be cigarette smoking. Although for years now there are plenty of 
warnings and health messages that inform people about the extremely negative effects of 
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smoking, too many people are continuing to smoke. This smoking behaviour can not be 
justified due to lack of information not only because of the availability of health 
warnings related to smoking but also because nowadays the majority of smokers claim 
that they are well aware about the risks that are attached to their smoking behaviour 
(Gibbons, Eggleston & Benthin, 1997). 
Smoking today has surpassed the status of being seen as simply a bad habit and has 
become a distinctive category in a social context. Smokers are not only getting 
bombarded by negative information about their unhealthy habit but they are also treated 
differently in a wider context. Indeed, smoking is probably one of the very few legal 
habits that are not only prohibited in a huge number of places but that also, entail 
penalties for the individual if he or she refuse to comply with. For instance, mass 
transportation such as buses and airlines now almost uniformly ban smoking. If a 
smoker applies for a mortgage to buy a house he or she will be treated less favourably if 
they admit to smoking. Many workplaces now ban smoking in buildings, forcing 
smokers to brave the elements to partake of their habit. So even if a smoker refutes the 
negative health related information connected with their smoking, it is very difficult in 
societies such as this one to ignore the negative view that society at large has of 
smoking, and by association, of smokers. 
The smoker therefore has to deal with the negative information about smoking and his or 
her habit of smoking at the same time, a situation that may not be very comfortable for 
the individual since it brings up a state of inconsistency between acquired knowledge 
and exhibited behaviour. 
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According to consistency theories there is an overall agreement that the subjective 
experience of inconsistency produces to the person an aversive state and that in return 
the person will be motivated to prevent or reduce the inconsistency (Robins & John; in 
Hogan, Johnson & Briggs, 1997). Specifically, it has been suggested that this conflicting 
situation in between a strong habitual behaviour and the abundance of available 
information to the individual, may produce cognitive dissonance to the smoker (Lee, 
1989; Stahlberg & Frey in Hewstone, Stroebe, Codol, Stephenson, 1988; Gibbons, 
Eggleston & Benthin, 1997). Cognitive dissonance is unpleasant and motivates the 
person to reduce dissonance by either adding new cognitions or changing existing ones 
(Festinger, 1957; in Gibbons, Eggleston & Benthin, 1997) and he suggested that 
smokers may reduce their dissonance by changing their knowledge about their behaviour 
(Gibbons, Eggleston & Benthin, 1997). 
Cognitive dissonance can get reduced for the smoker by him or her denying or 
minimising the risks that smoking entails. Many studies (e. g. Lee, 1989; Gibbons, 
Eggleston & Benthin, 1997; Weinstein, 1998) have found that smokers tend to 
underestimate the health risks of smoking compared to non-smokers. 
One way for these processes to operate is if the person can avoid the appraisal of the 
potential threat as an actual threat by changing the state of his or her vulnerability to it. 
If the individual is unrealistically optimistic about a situation then he or she will not 
have to feel threatened at the presence of the threat because he or she wouldn't consider 
it applying to them. The person, in this case the smoker, may deny his or her 
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vulnerability by denying the personal relevance of the threat (Lee, 1989). Even where 
studies have found that smokers have similar or even elevated estimates of the risks of 
smoking compared to non-smoking (see Weinstein, 1998) they may still resist that the 
risks are personally relevant. Smokers have a tendency to conclude that they have less 
chances than other smokers to suffer health effects from their smoking. The risk of 
smoking can get minimised by the smoker in many ways, e. g. estimating the number of 
years that are needed for negative health effects to be produced as being more than the 
years that he or she smokes (Weinstein, 1998). 
The extent to which smokers minimise their personal risk in relation to the negative 
health effects of smoking is such, that although they may consider their susceptibility to 
smoking related diseases as higher than that of a non-smoker, they still believe that their 
chances of getting lung cancer or even smoker's cough is about "average" (Hahn & 
Renner, 1998). Specifically Weinstein (1998) summarising the findings of numerous 
relevant studies writes, "Smokers claim that their risk of smoking-related illnesses is 
"slightly less than", or "equal to", or only "slightly greater than" that of the "average 
person. " Their actual risk of lung cancer may be more then ten times the risk of non- 
smokers, but, at most, they say that their own risk is "a bit higher" than the average. " 
Even further, he states that even though research shows without doubt that smokers may 
acknowledge that their risk for various health problems is higher than that of the non 
smokers, a large body of findings indicates that smokers tend to conclude that they are 
less likely to suffer health effects relative to other smokers. 
This level of negative information and therefore risk may be able to be sustained by the 
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smoker as a piece of information or even acquired knowledge because he or she may 
perceive himself or herself as personally immune to the threat (Lee, 1989) hence, they 
do not have to experience negative affect because in their view there is no inconsistency 
between their knowledge and their behaviour. 
So, these low risk appraisals of smokers can be conceived as illusional beliefs which are 
conceptualised as ego-protective unrealistically positive evaluations over aspects of the 
individual's environment (Wiebe & Black, 1997). Positive beliefs can be conceived as 
systems that may be developed in order to regulate the negative affect that awareness of 
one's risky behaviour would otherwise produce. Once positive beliefs are developed, 
various processes will facilitate their maintenance and the buffering of stress, such as 
avoidance of contradictory evidence to their optimistic beliefs, comparison of oneself 
with a created social group which is seen as unrealistically high in risk, selective 
attention and biased processing of information which is risk relevant. Positive illusions 
have also been found to be associated with illusions of invulnerability (Wiebe & Black, 
1997). 
This perceived invulnerability that the individual has in relation to personal risk or harm 
is known as `unrealistic optimism' or `optimistic bias' (Hahn & Renner, 1998; Vollrath, 
Kroch & Cassano, 1999) and it can be conceived as being the result of Denial 
(Neubauer, 1989). As such, `Unrealistic optimism' is obviously different from 
dispositional optimism which is defined as a generalised expectation that positive things 
will occur (Scheier and Carver, 1985,1992) and which is characterised by the 
individual's attempts to reduce discrepancies between goals and current situations by 
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problem solving and active coping rather than engaging in passive coping strategies such 
as avoidance (Wiebe & Smith, 1997). 
Denial, unrealistic optimism, optimistic bias, positive illusions, self-deception are all in 
effect ways to describe the process of reality distortion, and they are all in the service of 
stress reduction or stress buffering, in general they are means that regulate negative 
affect. They achieve this regulation or buffering by keeping the threat (or reality of the 
threat) outside of the person's awareness and at the same time they are maintained 
through avoidance, selective attention and biased processing of the threatening 
information. Overall, Denial, positive illusions, self-deception, unrealistic optimism, 
optimistic bias are facilitating the individual to deal with the stressor, but in passive 
rather than active ways of coping. 
Smoking is generally perceived as a risky kind of behaviour - together with unprotected 
sex, fast driving, excessive drinking etc- and individuals who start it may have in general 
a distorted perception of risks. Perceived vulnerability has been found to be linked with 
various health related behaviours and is considered to be directly related to the decision 
of a person to engage in almost all the health promoting or health harming behaviours 
(Gibbons, Eggleston & Benthin, 1997). 
In fact, perception of health risks have been found to relate negatively to the intention of 
adolescents to start smoking (Gibbons, Eggleston & Benthin, 1997) and longitudinal 
research has shown that teenagers who begin to smoke decrease their ratings of how 
crucial issues of safety are to them when they decide to take up smoking (Weinstein, 
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1998). Moreover, it is possible that individuals who begin to smoke may believe that 
they are less at risk than others, in other words there may be pre-existing differences in 
perceived susceptibility of risk in those individuals who become smokers (Lee, 1989). 
However, there is strong evidence to suggest that even if there are pre-existing 
differences between those who begin to smoke and those who do not, smokers' risk 
perceptions vary over time in response to changes in smoking behaviour. Gibbons, 
Eggleston and Benthin, (1997) found that their participants' perceptions of the risks of 
smoking varied in response to their overt behaviour. Perceptions of the risks of smoking 
were measured for a group of smokers during and after attending sessions to help them 
quit smoking. Risk perceptions of the smokers who relapsed and began smoking 
dropped significantly, but only after they had started smoking again. No changes in 
attitudes were found leading up to quitting, so it was not the case that changes in 
attitudes provoked the changes in behaviour. Rather, their risk perceptions changed in 
response to their starting smoking again. "The decline in risk perception is apparently 
evidence of a dissonance reduction process" (Gibbons, Eggleston and Benthin, 1997; 
p. 194). 
Based on the widely accepted notion that smokers exhibit reality distortions in relation 
to the 
otherwise well recognised risks, or threat, of smoking, the present study aimed at 
exploring the relationships among personality variables as described in CWL and 
attitudes to smoking and perception of risks associated with it. 
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It was expected that smokers would exhibit lower perceptions of the risks associated 
with smoking compared to non-smokers. It was thought that smokers would show a 
pattern of responses more similar to that found indicative of Denial in the previous 
Chapter than would the non-smokers. It was also thought that participants with lower 
perceptions of risk would be the ones most likely to be engaging in reality distortion, 
and so similarly exhibit patterns of responses on the CWL matching those of the 
prisoners who denied their guilt in the previous studies. 
4.1 METHOD 
4.1.1 Participants 
One hundred and four participants participated in this study. Of the participants, 54 were 
female with a mean age of 21.19 years (SD = 3.87 years) and 50 were male with a mean 
age of 21.68 years (SD = 2.80 years). All were students at the University of Hull and 
were recruited by quota sampling on the University campus. The quota was used to 
ensure a roughly even split between men and women and smokers and non-smokers. Of 
the 104 participants 50 had never smoked and 54 were either current or ex-smokers. Of 
the never smokers 27 were female and 23 male. Of the current or ex-smokers 27 were 
female and 27 were male. 
4.1.2 Materials 
Two separate questionnaire measures were employed. The CWL questionnaire was 
used, with slight adaptation to the front sheet. Instead of asking for just the age and sex 
of the participant additional questions asked for the self-rated smoking status of the 
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participant and the-number of cigarettes they smoked per day on average. Possible 
categories for the smoking status question were 1) never smoked; 2) ex-smoker; 3) light 
smoker; 4) moderate smoker, and; 5) heavy smoker. 
In addition to the CWL, an "Attitudes towards Smoking" questionnaire, based upon 
Rindfleisch and Crockett's (1999) instrument, was used. This seeks to assess 
participants' perceptions of risk associated with smoking across a number of dimensions 
as shown below (and including an example item in parentheses): 
" Health risks (e. g. "getting lung cancer") 
9 Addiction risks (e. g. "wanting to, but not being able to quit") 
9 Financial risks (e. g. "spending a lot of money on cigarettes") 
" Social risk (e. g. "making a bad impression when dating someone who doesn't 
smoke") 
" Time risks (e. g. "wasting a large portion of the day smoking") 
In addition to these scales the instrument also has two other measures: the participants' 
beliefs about the benefits of smoking, such as helping to relax; and participants' general 
attitude to risk taking. 
Finally, at the end of the smoking questionnaire were three questions asking the 
participant to estimate how many cigarettes a person would have to smoke to be 
considered a light smoker, a moderate smoker and a heavy smoker. 
Before going on to describe the study procedure, various factors will be discussed that 
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are relevant to the complex problem of measuring risk perceptions. 
The questionnaire assessed participants' risk perceptions using a variant on the "risk 
stereotype" (Weinstein, 1980) or "victim prototype" (Gibbons, Gerrard, Lando & 
McGovern, 1991) procedure. This procedure is used to reduce the social desirability bias 
found when collecting personal risk estimates with direct questioning (Fisher, 1993). It 
involves presenting the participant with a short description of a hypothetical person 
designed to be easily identified-with by the participant. The participant is then asked to 
give responses relating to the presented hypothetical person rather than to him- or 
herself, or non-specified "others" . 
Regarding eliciting actual risk estimates, using a 'technological' model the risk 
associated with some activity is measured using two constructs, the desirability of the 
consequences of an activity and the probability that those consequences will occur. 
Numerical estimates are given for these two factors and then they are multiplied to give 
an estimation of risk (e. g. Ricci, Sagan and Whipple, 1984). This model of'actual' risk 
does not, however, seem to be how people arrive at their opinions of risk in everyday 
life. Other factors such as the familiarity and perceived controllability of the activity 
play a more significant part (Slovic, 1987). However, in this study we were not seeking 
to compare different activities, but different people's perceptions of risk for the same 
activity, and so factors such as familiarity were controlled for. Three factors were seen 
as very relevant, though. 
The first was the 'intensity' of the risk activity. In relation to smoking this usually 
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corresponds to the amount of smoking, i. e. number of cigarettes smoked. The risk 
stereotype in this study was presented as smoking 20 cigarettes a day, and it was 
important to control for how the different groups of participants viewed this. For 
example, a non-smoker may consider this quite high, but a smoker may consider this 
fairly average. To check on this participants were asked to give estimates of how many 
cigarettes smoked per day corresponded to the qualitative categories of light, moderate 
and heavy smoking. 
The second factor was consideration on how people combine their estimates of 
probability and desirability. Bettman (1975) found that eliciting separate ratings for 
desirability and probability and then multiplying them to arrive at the risk estimate often 
misrepresents people's risk ratings, as not all people subjectively combine these elements 
in the same way. In this study, following the method of Stone and Gronhaug (1993), a 
more "participant orientated" approach was taken. Here participants were presented with 
a definition of risk, but were then allowed to assess for themselves the relative roles of 
probability and desirability in arriving at their single estimate of risk. This sacrifices 
knowledge about "where" the risk estimate comes from in return for a more valid 
indicator of how that person perceives "their" risk. 
The third consideration was regarding what form the participants' risk estimates should 
take. In a comprehensive review of risk perceptions in smoking Weinstein (1989) found 
that asking participants to evaluate or generate numerical estimates, such as 
probabilities-, percentages or odds, generated highly variable indicators that very likely 
did not represent the respondents' actual beliefs. This was true even for 'numerate' 
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samples of college graduates. In this study verbal estimates of risk were therefore used. 
Ratings here were given on a four point Likert scale, ranging from 1 "very small risk" to 
4 "very large risk". 
4.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were initially approached by asking them if they were, or ever had been, a 
cigarette smoker. If they fitted the outstanding quota they were asked if they would be 
able to spare 15 minutes to take part in a survey on 'coping with life' and attitudes to 
smoking. Participants who agreed were taken to a quiet room and given the CWL 
questionnaire to complete. After they had finished the CWL it was taken from them and 
they were given the "Attitudes towards Smoking" questionnaire to complete. 
As mentioned above, the "Attitudes towards Smoking" questionnaire utilised a format 
designed to reduce social desirability bias, by presenting a hypothetical person for the 
respondent to give responses in relation to. Two versions of the questionnaire were 
prepared, to give better-fitting stereotypes to male and female participants. Male 
participants were given the version where the prototype was called "John", female 
participants were given a version where the prototype was called "Jane". In all other 
respects the two versions of the questionnaire were identical. The male version was as 
follows: 
"John is a 20 year old undergraduate. He has been smoking 20 cigarettes per day for the 
past two years. John says that he plans to quit smoking 'sometime' but does not know 
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exactly when. He is not currently experiencing any health problems. " 
The participant was then asked to rate each statement that followed as to the level of 
risk that each one represented for John. Risk was described as "the likelihood that the 
statement will turn out to be true combined with how bad you think the situation would 
be for John if it did occur". 
Finally, the participant completed the questions asking them how many cigarettes 
smoked per day they considered constituted a light, moderate and heavy smoker. 
Importantly for the smokers, they did not have the CWL questionnaire at this point and 
so could not refer back to it to check how they had described themselves in relation to 
the number of cigarettes they had reported smoking per day. 
4.2 RESULTS 
Of the 104 participants 6 were ex-smokers. This was felt to constitute too small a group 
to meaningfully analyse separately, and problematic to combine with either the never 
smokers or current smokers. It was decided to remove these participants from the data, 
leaving 50 never smokers and 48 current smokers. 
Estimates of what smokers and non-smokers considered to constitute light, moderate 
and heavy smoking was compared. The raw data are presented in Table 4.1. A2 
(Smoking Status) x3 (Estimate category) ANOVA was performed. Smoking Status, 
either never or 
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current smoker, was a between participants variable and Estimate Category, with the 
estimates for light, moderate and heavy smoking, was a within participants variable. 
The covariances between levels of Estimate Category were found to be unequal, so the 
Greenhouse and Geisser (1959) correction was applied to the degrees of freedom values 
reported here and used to test for significance (as appropriate). 
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics of never smokers' and current smokers' estimates of 
amount smoked by hypothetical light, moderate and heavy smokers. 
Estimate Category 
Light smoking 
Moderate smoking 
Smoker status 
Never Smoker (n=50) 
Mean SD 
5.00 2.79 
11.94 6.03 
Current Smoker. (n=48) 
Mean SD 
5.61 2.53 
13.50 4.69 
Heavy smoking 22.36 11.55 23.57 9.98 
There was a significant main effect of Estimate Category (F[1,108]=269.47, p <. 01). 
Comparisons between the levels revealed that estimates for the light smoker category 
were significantly lower than those for a moderate smoker (F[1,94]=339.47, p <. 01), 
and the moderate smoker category had significantly lower estimates than the heavy 
smoker category (F[1,94]=187.63., p <. 01). 
The main effect for Smoker Status was not found to be significant, nor the interaction 
between Smoker Status and Estimate Category. 
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The reliability of the various scales were checked before proceeding to the various 
analyses of the questionnaire scales data. The various scales that make up the two 
questionnaires are shown below, with alpha coefficients in parentheses: 
CWL: Pessimism (. 86); Social Support (. 68); Emotion Control (. 81); Esteem Concern 
(. 88); Anger (. 82); Mastery (. 81). 
Smoking Attitudes: Health Risks (. 83); Addiction Risks (. 49); Financial Risks (. 76) ; 
Social Risks (. 67); Time Risks (. 72); Smoking Benefits (. 76); Risk Acceptability (. 73). 
The reliability of the Smoking Attitudes Addiction Risk scale was below . 50, and 
considered too low to be included in further analysis. 
The differences between the never smokers and current smokers in terms of their 
estimates of smoking risks and attitudes was evaluated next. Smoking Status was used as 
the independent variable and average scores on the 6 remaining scales from the 
"Attitudes Towards Smoking" questionnaire were used as the dependent variables in a 
MANOVA. Data for the scales by groups can be seen in Table 4.2. 
There was found to be an overall significant difference between the pattern of scores for 
the never smokers compared to the current smokers (F[6,91]=12.44, p <. 01). 
Subsequent univariate tests on each scale individually showed significant differences for 
two of the smoking risk scales: Health Risks (F[1,96]=5.05, p <. 05) and Social Risks 
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(F[1,96]=5.61, p <_. 05). For both scales current smokers scored significantly lower than 
never smokers. 
Table 4.2. Smoking Risk Perception, Smoking Benefits and Risk Acceptability scores by 
Smoking Status 
Smoking Attitudes Smoker status 
Never smoker (n = 50) Current Smoker (n = 48) 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Health Risks 3.24 . 61 2.93 . 74 
Social Risks 2.71 . 53 2.42 . 67 
Financial Risks 2.88 . 43 2.82 . 60 
Time Risks 2.04 . 63 1.99 . 76 
Benefits of Smoking 2.09 . 45 2.72 . 36 
Risk Acceptability 2.13 . 50 2.58 . 
45 
There was also a significant difference between Smoking Status groups for scores on the 
Smoking Benefits scale (F[1,96]=59.34, p <. 01). As might be expected the current 
smokers rated the benefits of smoking much higher than the never smokers. The last 
significant difference between the groups was on the Risk Acceptability scale 
(F[1,96]=22.05, p <. 01). The current smokers scored higher than the never smokers in 
terms of risk acceptability. 
To ensure that the differences between the groups in terms of their perceptions of Heath 
Risks and Social Risks were not just the result of the differences between the Smoking 
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Status groups in terms of their Risk Acceptability, a further MANOVA analysis was 
conducted. Smoking status was again the independent variable, but this time Risk 
Acceptability was included, as a covariate. This would statistically control for the 
differences in Risk Acceptability between the Smoking Status groups, and so show the 
true relationship between Smoking Status and Risk measures. The two Risk measures 
found to be significantly different in the previous analysis, Health Risks and Social 
Risks, were included as dependent variables in this analysis. 
The results replicated those from the previous analysis. There was still an overall 
significant difference between the never smokers and current smokers (F[2,94]= 4.25, p 
<. 05). Subsequent univariate tests on each individual Risk scale showed significant 
differences for both of the smoking risk measures. For Health Risks, current smokers 
scored significantly lower than never smokers (F[1,95]= 5.98, p <. 05), and for Social 
Risks current smokers also scored significantly lower than never smokers 
(F[1,95]=5.34, p <. 05). 
The differences in CWL scale scores between the Smoker Status groups were assessed 
next. The 6 CWL scales were used as dependent variables in a MANOVA. As for the 
preceding analysis Smoking Status was used as a between participants independent 
variable. Another between participants independent variable, Risk Category, was also 
included. This was because significant differences between never smokers and current 
smokers were found for Health Risk and Social Risk, and so it was desired to investigate 
these direct measures of risk perception in the analysis. Because Health Risk and Social 
Risk were significantly correlated (r= . 49, p< . 
01) for simplicity it was decided to 
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combine participants' mean score on these two variables as a composite index of their 
risk perception. A median split was then carried out, giving a new variable called Risk 
Category with two levels, low risk and high risk. Low risk represented those who rated 
the Health and Social Risks of smoking as lower than the high risk group. 
So to summarise, a MANOVA was performed. Smoking Status (with two levels, never 
smoker and current smoker) was the first independent variable. Risk Category (with two 
levels, high risk and low risk) was the second independent variable. The 6 CWL scales 
were used as the dependent variables. 
The results of the analysis showed that there were no significant overall multivariate 
effects for either Smoking Status, Risk Status or the interaction. This indicated that 
neither Smoking Status, Risk Category nor the combination of the two was related to 
the pattern of responses to the CWL. Therefore, no step-down univariate tests were 
carried out. 
It was decided to perform the above analysis separately for the current smokers and 
never smokers. Although the above analysis does effectively exactly this in the 
interaction term there were reasons to believe that the way that the Risk Category 
variable was computed may have been inappropriate. 
The Risk Category variable was computed using the overall distribution of risk 
perception scores across current and never smokers. As has been demonstrated earlier, 
however, the risk perceptions of the Smoker Status groups were different. So, for the 
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following analysis the Risk Category variable was computed separately for each 
Smoking Status group. The median of the composite Health and Social Risks variable 
was 2.96 for the never smokers and 2.65 for the for the current smoker group. These 
values were used to divide low Risk Category from high Risk Category participants 
separately for the two Smoking Status groups, and so hopefully give more appropriate 
estimates of risk perceptions for the two groups 
This gave, for the current smokers group, 27 participants in the low Risk Category and 
21 in the high Risk Category. A MANOVA was carried out on just the current smokers, 
with the new Risk Category variable as the between participants independent variable 
and the 6 CWL scales as dependent variables. 
Table 4.3. CWL scales scores by Risk Category (for just the current smokers) 
CWL scales Risk Category 
Low Risk (n = 27) High Risk (n = 21) 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Pessimism 1.96 . 37 2.13 . 41 
Social Support 2.77 . 86 2.87 . 53 
Emotion Control 2.40 . 59 2.38 . 50 
Esteem Concern 2.50 . 61 3.02 . 61 
Anger 2.30 . 
40 2.44 . 52 
Self Mastery 2.76 . 49 2.31 . 51 
Table 4.3 shows the CWL scales broken down by Risk Category for just the current 
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smokers. Results showed the multivariate main effect of Risk Category to approach but 
not quite reach significance (F[6,41]=1.89, p <. 10). Because of this nearly significant 
trend it was decided as appropriate to carry out separate univariate tests on the separate 
CWL scales. These showed significant differences for the Esteem Concern scale 
(F[1,46]=8.63, p <. O1) and the Self Mastery scale (F[1,46]=5.01, p <. 05). For the 
Esteem Concern scale those in the low Risk Category group had lower scores, and for 
the Mastery scale the low Risk Category group had higher scores. 
The above analysis was carried out again but this time for just the never smokers group 
(with Risk Category computed based upon just the never smokers scores). There was 
found to be no overall multivariate significant effect, signifying no difference in the 
pattern of CWL scores by never smoker Risk Category. 
4.3 DISCUSSION 
The present study aimed to explore the relationships between perceptions of smoking 
risks and trait personality variables as they have been defined by CWL, for both current 
smokers and people who have never smoked. Being a smoker in a society that heavily 
disapproves of smoking was considered to be a likely threat to provoke cognitive 
dissonance and result in reality distortions such as positive illusions and Denial of risk. 
Any systematic biasing of risk perceptions by the smokers compared to the never 
smokers was considered to be evidence of distortion or rejection of the very widely 
available information on the risks associated with smoking. Further than this, it was 
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supposed that any systematic factors that distinguished groups of smokers who 
perceived the risks of smoking to be less than that perceived by other smokers would be 
even more evidence of distortion and Denial of risk. However, before these results could 
be interpreted some account of the differing perceptions of what actually constituted 
smoking had to be taken. 
Firstly, it was found that both current smokers and never smokers were not significantly 
different in the actual numbers of cigarettes smoked per day that they thought 
corresponded to their subjective rating of "amount" of smoking, e. g. what actually 
constitutes "heavy " smoker? This was important because it suggested that both never 
and current smokers will have perceived the risk stereotype similarly. For instance, if the 
never smokers on average thought that 10 cigarettes per day constituted heavy smoking, 
they will have viewed the presented risk stereotype (who smoked 20 cigarettes per day) 
as being a very heavy smoker indeed. The current smokers, on the other hand, may have 
thought that 20 cigarettes per day constituted moderate smoking, and therefore will have 
seen the stereotype as a moderate smoker. In that situation, the risk perception scales 
will have been measuring different things for the different groups = the risk for a very 
heavy smoker for one group (likely to be seen as higher), and the risks for a moderate 
smoker for the other group (likely to be seen as lower). However, it was found that there 
was effectively no differences in perceptions of this kind between the current and never 
smokers, as so their risk perceptions can be meaningfully compared. 
The results of the present study then went on to confirm the findings of previous 
research (Lee, 1989; Gibbons, Eggleston & Benthin, 1997; Weinstein, 1998; Hahn & 
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Renner, 1997), that subjective health risks related to smoking are being perceived as 
lower by smokers in comparison to non smokers. Social risks were also found to be 
lower in the smokers group, while no significant differences were found between the 
two groups in time and financial risks. 
The present findings are also in accordance to previous research where ex-smokers had 
been found to have higher perceptions of health and social risks in relation to smoking 
compared to current smokers (Copeland, Brandon & Quinn, 1995). This finding 
confirms the view that supports that when the person has given up a particular risky 
activity such as smoking, he or she does not have to compromise anymore his or her 
perceptions of risk that are related to this in order to reduce his or her cognitive 
dissonance. 
Perceptions of health risks are a type of risk that one safely can claim that are known to 
both smokers and non smokers (Gibbons, Eggleston & Benthin, 1997). In fact, one can 
even claim that smokers are more exposed to the health risks of smoking since both 
advertisements aimed at smokers and cigarette packets themselves have prominent 
health warning on them. 
These perceptions of health risks were found lower in the smokers group and this 
supports the tenet that smokers may attempt to reduce their cognitive dissonance by 
minimising the risks that are associated with smoking (Lee, 1989). 
The lower ratings of smokers in relation to social risks may again be interpreted as an 
attempt by them to reduce their cognitive dissonance, since social restrictions, penalties 
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and different treatment of smokers in a wide range of social aspects, are situations that 
one can safely assume that smokers have to face in a daily basis. 
This study didn't find any differences between smokers and non smokers in relation to 
time and financial risk. The former can be understood if we take in consideration the fact 
that time may be less of an issue in a sample of young university students, who have a 
comparatively flexible life style, than for people with more constraints on their activities 
(e. g. job, family). 
In respect to financial risks the current study didn't confirm previous research on similar 
sample (Rindfleish & Crockett, 1999) where the perception of financial risks have been 
found to be higher in smokers compared to non smokers. This may be because of the 
similarity of the current smoker group and never smoker group in terms of their 
perceptions of how many cigarettes per day smokers actually smoke. The major factor in 
influencing how much money is spent on smoking is the actual amount smoked, and 
because the two groups had such similar perceptions of this it is perhaps no surprise that 
both groups gave similar estimates for the financial risks of smoking. 
Smokers compared to non smokers were found to rate higher the benefits that are 
associated with smoking. This finding was not surprising since on the one hand non 
smokers have never experienced any benefits from smoking (since they never smoked), 
and on the other hand presumably smokers not only enjoy their habit, and therefore find 
it to an extent beneficial, but also may tend to focus on its benefits in order to justify or 
counteract the many negatives that smoking entails. 
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Smokers compared to non smokers were also found to have a higher Risk Acceptability 
scores. This finding is in accordance to previous research such as Rindfleisch and 
Crockett (1999) who state that most relevant studies have found evidence that smoking 
behaviour and risk acceptability are positive related and, summarising the findings of a 
number of studies, confirm that "both risk acceptability measures and assessment of 
smoking-related behaviours suggest that smokers have a higher tolerance for risk than 
non smokers do. " (p. 163). However, as the analysis of covariance showed, the difference 
in Risk Acceptability between the two smoker groups was not the defining factor in 
explaining their differences in Risk Perceptions. Even after statistically controlling for 
the effects of Risk Acceptability (effectively equalising the groups in terms of their Risk 
Acceptability scores) current smokers still rated as lower their perceptions. of the Health 
and Social Risks of smoking compared to the never smokers. 
In relation to CWL no significant differences were found between the two smoker status 
groups. This may look initially surprising since the smokers may have been expected to 
manifest personality differences that distinguished them from never smokers. In fact, the 
two groups did show a personality difference, that in relation to Risk Acceptability (as 
shown in the previous literature), but just not on any of the personality scales as 
measured by the CWL. On reflection this is not perhaps surprising, as the CWL in 
general was designed to look for personality correlates of Denial, and this study in 
particular was designed to look for correlates of Denial in relation to smoking. The never 
smokers presumably did not need to use reality distortion in relation to smoking, as they 
do not smoke and therefore it is not a terribly big personal threat for them. 
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More reasonably, differences in CWL scales were observed amongst the group of 
participants for whom smoking did represent a personal threat, and that are presumably 
in a situation conducive to dissonance - the current smokers. When the appropriate 
measure of Risk was used (i. e. computed from the range of current smokers' scores), 
those current smokers who perceived their smoking related risks as lower had 
significantly lower Esteem Concern and significantly higher Self Mastery than those 
current smokers who perceived a higher (more realistic? ) level of risk. 
The lower levels of the variable of Esteem Concern describe an individual who does not 
particularly care about the opinion that other people have for him or her and who does 
not rely on others' approval. For the individual to perceive the risk as low while he or 
she is indulging in a habit that is highly. disapproved, it may be necessary to reduce the 
importance of social approval. In this way the stress and anxiety that could naturally be 
produced every time that the smoker would be disapproved, criticised or discriminated 
against because of his or her habit, would be buffered since the others' opinion about 
them -and presumably their habit- would considered to be of no great importance. To 
use coping terminology, holding lower Esteem Concern would serve to reduce the level 
of threat at the Primary Appraisal stage. 
As we saw previously, Esteem Concern is clearly an aspect of self-esteem and self- 
esteem itself is very related to cognitive dissonance. According to Steele (1988), 
cognitive dissonance asserts a threat to self-esteem which in return prompts a response 
that serves to protect the ego, either reduction of cognitive dissonance or self affirmation 
(Steele, 1988; in Gibbons, Eggleston & Benthin, 1997). The relationship between self- 
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esteem and cognitive dissonance reduction is not clear; initially it was suggested that the 
higher the person's self-esteem the less the efforts for rationalisation and the less the 
responsiveness to the threat to their self image (Steele, 1988). Further research though, 
suggests that the opposite is more likely the case. In fact, Gibbons, Eggleston & Benthin, 
(1997), summarising the findings of a number of studies, state that "when the 
inconsistency between attitude and behaviour is attributable to the latter's being clearly 
inappropriate or unwise and therefore threatens self-esteem, low self-esteem persons 
appear to be less likely, and high self-esteem people more likely, to respond in a 
defensive manner" (p. 191) and they further suggest that change in risk perception may 
assist to protect the self-esteem. 
This viewpoint is supported by Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Pinel, Simon and 
Jordan (1993). They suggest that the stress buffering that the person is trying to achieve 
is conceived as consisting of the interaction between a cultural view that provides a set 
of approved values by which the person can be evaluated, and by self-esteem which is 
achieved through the person's perception of living up to the approved values which are 
derived from the approach that he or she holds and supports. When these two clash the 
person, in order to keep his or her self-esteem protected and therefore protect themselves 
from stress, may have to disregard others' opinions. 
Also consistent with this view is the finding of higher Self Mastery in those who 
perceived the risks of smoking as lower. Self Mastery can be seen as a form of self 
affirmation that serves to protect the ego (Steele, 1988), in this case as protection against 
the dissonance of being a smoker when smoking is a threat to health, and as with Esteem 
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Concern, being a smoker in a in a smoker-hostile society. 
The findings from this and the previous chapter show similarity to those by Farwell and 
Wohlwend-Lloyd (1998), who investigated self-enhancement in relation to dispositional 
narcissism. Non-clinical, dispositional narcissism involves feelings of superiority, 
illusions of control and self-sufficiency. The similarity between narcissism and Self 
Mastery can be seen by comparing that with some items from the CWL Self Mastery 
scale: "In situations where others get very upset I can usually be relaxed" and "I cope 
well with any problems that occur". These suggest perceptions of superiority over others 
and exaggerated beliefs in control - especially over the threats that confronted the 
prisoners and smokers. Farwell and Wohlwend-Lloyd (1998) suggested that narcissism 
was in part defined by exactly these sort of social comparisons, where those higher in 
narcissism see themselves as superior to others. Low scorers on the Esteem Concern 
scale are those who are untroubled by the thought of social comparisons, thus fitting this 
definition. 
As in the studies presented here, Farwell and Wohlwend-Lloyd (1998) found that 
narcissism was related to self-enhancement. Following the format of Taylor and Brown 
(1988), they viewed self enhancement as involving "unrealistic, positive views of the 
self, exaggerated perceptions of personal control, and unrealistic optimism" (Farwell & 
Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998: p. 66). 
The one CWL factor that was not replicated here was the lower Social Support scores 
found in the prisoners who denied their guilt. No such result was found in the sample of 
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low risk perception smokers. This could be explained by differences in access to social 
support between the two samples. It was thought that access to social support may have 
been limited for the prisoners. As well as the isolation and stigma of being labelled as a 
sex offender, those who denied their guilt were further likely to be ostracised by both 
other prisoners who did not deny their guilt and the prison authorities. This range and 
level of disapproval is unlikely to be found by a smoker in their social sphere (who at the 
very least has other smokers to turn to). For these reasons it is not thought surprising that 
the differences in CWL Social Support found in the prison sample was not replicated 
here. 
To conclude, the present study for the most part replicated the findings of the previous 
prison study. In relation to a threat (guilt, smoking risk) those low in Esteem Concern 
and high in Self Mastery tended to minimise the threat. That this is evidence of the 
action of Denial follows from the very obvious nature of the reality of the threat in each 
instance. Against this interpretation is the possibility that the pattern of responses to the 
CWL were merely the result of a conscious strategy of image management rather than 
the result of honestly held perceptions based upon distortion of information. This 
possibility will be tested in the next chapter. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: 
PERCEPTUAL PROCESSES IN DENIAL 
So far the CWL tool has been used to uncover a relatively stable pattern of individual 
differences that have been associated with bias in the way that individuals perceive 
themselves in relation to apparent threats. 
In Chapter Four those prisoners who did not admit their guilt were found to be higher in. 
Self Mastery and lower in Esteem Concern and Social Support than those prisoners who 
admitted their guilt. A similar pattern of results was found for those smokers who had 
low perceptions of the risks of smoking. In this seemingly very different context, the 
smokers with low perceptions of the risks of smoking were found to rate their Self 
Mastery as higher, and Esteem Concern as lower, than those smokers who had higher 
perceptions of the risks of smoking. In both cases the results were interpreted as being 
suggestive of a defensive reaction to defend self image in the face of threatening 
information - the denial of guilt status and the denial of smoking risk respectively. 
Implicit in this viewpoint is the belief that the participants were not just 'image 
managing', i. e. consciously manipulating their responses from what they themselves 
perceived to be the truth, but genuinely held these beliefs. Supporting evidence for this 
view was found in the participants' overall pattern of responses, which suggested a 'self 
deceptive - enhancement' bias rather than an 'image management' strategy (Paulhus and 
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Reid, 1993). However, it was thought necessary to test this claim more stringently, and 
that will be the focus of this chapter. 
The key to Denial, i. e. methods of rejecting, distorting, ignoring etc. threatening 
information, is that the individual must remain, at least in part, consciously unaware of 
the information to be Denied if it is to be useful as a strategy in reducing anxiety 
(Lazarus, 1999). How then to measure the sub-conscious processes of Denial without 
interference from conscious and potentially 'image-managing' processes? 
There has been considerable interest in the past over the use of projective tests such as 
the Rorchach Ink-Blot test (Rorchach, 1921/1942) and the Thematic Apperception Test 
(Murray, 1943) in investigating Denial (e. g. see Cramer, 1991). These tests are designed 
to reveal the unconscious aspects of personality (and defeat conscious image 
manipulation) by presenting ambiguous stimuli that are not likely to provoke defensive 
reactions. There is considerable debate about whether they do indeed provide a'window 
on the unconscious', but underlying these issues are more basic issues regarding 
reliability and validity. Even using standardised administration and scoring procedures 
they have been found to be seriously inadequate in terms of their psychometric 
properties (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997; Lilienfeld, Wood and Garb, 2001). For this reason 
they were not considered adequate for the purposes of this study. 
Ben-Zur and Breznitz (1997) point out that the previously thought of "paradox" of denial 
offers insight into a potentially promising way to investigate the sub-conscious processes 
involved in Denial. 
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As discussed in previous chapters, the so-called "paradox" of Denial involves the fact 
that the individual must be able to identify a stimulus as threatening so that Denial can 
operate, and so how can the threat of the stimulus be perceived and also ignored'etc. by 
the cognition system both at the same time? The resolution of the paradox lies in the 
appreciation that cognitive function is hierarchically organised and modular, not singular 
and undifferentiated. 
Weinberger (1990) cites MacLean (1975) and LeDoux (1986) in concluding that 
"processes which encode the adaptive value or significance of stimuli occur in 
subcortical regions outside of conscious awareness" (p. 340). Weinberger (1990) also 
advances the view that the emotional / limbic system specialises, in part, in coming to a 
rapid appreciation of the emotional relevance and therefore the likely physiological 
demands of a situation (e. g. fight, flight). For example, it is a common experience that 
when confronted unexpectedly with a very loud noise, the sympathetic system has 
initiated a dramatic increase in heart rate almost before conscious awareness of the event 
occurs. 
This process of rapid, non-conscious evaluation of the emotional content of stimuli 
seems a very good place indeed to search for evidence of processing bias that may 
underlie or at least contribute to Denial. Ben-Zur and Breznitz (1997) suggest that if an 
individual uses Denial towards a stimulus, then the processing of that stimulus must in 
some way be "incomplete, biased, and shallow" (p. 232). If that is the case then these 
processing biases should be detectable, given an adequate experimental paradigm. 
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Adequate in this sense means able to determine the rapid perceptual and attentional 
process that occur in response to threatening vs. non-threatening stimuli. 
One paradigm that has been used quite extensively to study these sorts of processes is 
the emotional Stroop paradigm. 
Beginning with Stroop (1935), it has been found by many researchers that participants' 
ability to rapidly name the ink colour that various word and word-like stimuli were 
presented in was very much affected by the semantic content of those stimuli. 
Specifically, the ink colour of non-word stimuli (e. g. rows of Os or Xs) can be named 
much more quickly than the ink colour of a colour word (e. g. RED) presented in an 
incongruent colour (e. g. the word RED presented in green ink). This effect was further 
illustrated by showing that colour words presented in a congruent colour (e. g. the word 
RED presented in red ink) could be named even faster than non-words (Dyer, 1973; 
MacCleod, 1992). 
The Stroop effect is typically attributed to the automatic attention-getting processes that 
come about through practice. Most people are very much more practised at extracting 
the semantic meaning of words, i. e. reading them, than they are at naming the ink 
colour, and so the task of identifying the word is much more "automatic" than the task of 
naming the colour. Part of what is meant by saying that the process is "automatic" is that 
it is generated mechanically in response to the stimulus, and not necessarily mediated by 
conscious control. So, when the stimulus is an incongruently-coloured colour-word, and 
the task is to name the ink colour, the automatically generated response to the actual 
132 
meaning of the word interferes with the desired response, i. e. the ink colour (Cohen, 
Dunbar and McClelland, - 1990; MacCleod, 1992). 
The emotional Stoop paradigm emerged from the traditional Stroop following research 
that showed that, as well as colour words, delay was observed in colour naming words 
with negative emotional impact compared to emotionally neutral words. For instance, 
Williams & Broadbent (1986) showed that a group of participants who had attempted 
suicide took longer to colour-name suicide relevant words than they did neutral words. 
Similar results were found by Watts, McKenna, Sharrock & Trezise (1986), this time in 
colour-naming spider related words for a group of spider-phobics. Although the majority 
of work on the emotional Stroop has been conducted in clinical populations the effect 
has also been observed in non-clinical groups. For example Giles and Cairns (1989) 
found delay with violence-related words for English students living in Northern Ireland; 
Freeman and Beck (2000), in a study on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) found 
delayed colour naming with their control group (as well as their PTSD group) in 
response to general threat words; MacLeod and Rutherford (1992) demonstrated delay in 
colour naming threat words (e. g. fail) for students tested before an examination. The size 
of the interference effect is usually a lot smaller with non-clinical samples, compared to 
clinical samples, however (Williams, Mathews and MacLeod, 1996). 
Emotional Stroop interference has been explained in relation to the influence of anxiety. 
The effects of anxiety are well demonstrated using other cognition research 
methodologies; for example Mathews, May, Mogg and Eysenck (1990) reported that 
patients with general anxiety disorder were much more distracted by threatening non- 
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target words than were non-anxious controls when trying to detect target words amongst 
distractors. Eysenck (1992) concluded that normal participants high in trait anxiety were 
more easily distractible by non-task relevant stimuli than were those low in trait anxiety. 
Eysenck and Keane (1995) concluded that anxiety seems to function as an attention- 
getting mechanism biased towards threatening stimuli. When the threatening stimuli are 
not relevant to the task being completed (as in the emotional stroop) then performance 
suffers. 
Williams, Matthews and MacLeod (1996), in an extensive review on the emotional 
stroop literature, found this same pattern of results in research using the emotional 
Stroop. That is, the tendency for distraction, or in this case delay in responding to 
emotional words, to be increased in situations where anxiety is higher (state anxiety), 
and in those participants with higher general levels of anxiety (trait anxiety). 
These emotional Stroop processes have been found to be operating at a level below 
conscious awareness. For example, MacLeod and Rutherford (1992) tested students 
before an examination on an emotional stroop task with relevant threat words (e. g. 
stupid) vs. neutral words (e. g. uncommon). The words were only presented for 20 ms, 
and the participants only managed to perform at chance levels on subsequent word 
recognition tests that showed that they had not consciously perceived the semantic 
content of the words. However, students high in trait anxiety showed significant delay in 
colour naming the threat words in comparison to the neutral words. No such delay was 
found for students low in trait anxiety. 
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Williams, Matthews and MacLeod (1996) used Cohen, Dunbar and McClelland's (1990) 
model of Stroop interference to explain how anxiety acts to produce delay in the 
emotional Stroop. In the context of their parallel distributed processing model they 
proposed that input processing units that have become associated with emotionally 
threatening stimuli (such as threat words in the emotional Stroop) have a higher resting 
level of activation than do processing units that are associated with non-threatening 
stimuli (e. g. the neutral words). For any given level of input, the units that have a higher 
resting level of activation will have a higher level of output than units with lower resting 
levels, and so will produce more of a bias on attention. In the context of the emotional 
Stroop this will bias attention towards aspects of a stimulus that are perceived as 
threatening (the word meaning, its emotional significance, etc. ) and away from other 
aspects of the stimulus (i. e. the ink colour). In simple terms, the greater the level of 
anxiety that is produced in association with the threat word, the greater should be the 
interference and therefore the greater the delay in responding to threat words compared 
to the neutral words. 
However, this simple way of modelling just the affects of anxiety was not found to be 
sufficient to explain all of the emotional Stroop findings. Mathews and Sebastian (1993) 
tested snake avoidant participants and control participants on snake related words and 
neutral words in a 'snake' Stroop experiment. They found a significant delay for snake 
words with the snake avoidant participants but no effect for the control participants, as 
expected. However, another task had the participants perform the snake Stroop, but this 
time in the same room as a big snake. In addition, the participants had been told that 
after the Stroop experiment they would perform a test to see how close they would 
135 
voluntarily move the jar containing the snake towards them. Under these circumstances, 
where snake related anxiety was presumably at much higher levels than when there was 
no snake present, no delay at all was found for the snake avoidant participants on the 
snake vs neutral words. This in effect meant that the emotional stroop delay effect had 
been abolished in circumstances when it might be expected, with an "anxiety" 
hypothesis, to be most evident, because anxiety would be expected to be very high 
indeed for participants with snake phobia to be in a room with a snake that they thought 
they would be expected to go near to. 
A similar finding was produced by Amir, McNally, Riemann, Burns, Lorenz and Mullen 
(1996). They found that in an emotional Stroop experiment high anxious participants 
(with social phobia) were slower at colour-naming threat words compared to neutral 
words. However, they found that when the participants were put into a highly stressful 
situation (before delivering a speech), the delay in colour naming the threat words 
disappeared for the social phobics. Again, this result is exactly the opposite of what 
would be expected if only the effects of anxiety were playing a part. 
The explanation that Williams, Mathews and MacLeod (1996) propose for these sort of 
results is that the interference due to the high resting activation levels of the threat- 
related units can be "overridden" by the action of task-demand units. In effect, the 
participant can apply more effort directed at the task, and so overcome the interference. 
In support of this view they suggest that the performance of high anxious participants 
tends to be faster at the emotional Stroop task overall than that of low anxious 
participants. This, they suggest, is evidence of the greater effort being applied to the 
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task-based goals by the highly threatened participants. 
Ben-Zur and Breznitz (1997), however, suggested that reduction in the delay in colour 
naming threat words in emotional Stroop tasks may be evidence of Denial. They make 
the argument that good performance on the emotional Stroop task, i. e. lack of a delay on 
emotional words, must be based on the ability of participants to reject the threat 
information present in the stimulus. If this were actually the action of Denial, then the 
threatening stimulus would have to be attended-to at some level by the cognitive system, 
to be first recognised as threatening, before being either suppressed or rejected or 
otherwise shielded from the conscious response selection stage of the emotional Stroop 
task. This would then explain the results where emotional Stroop interference is 
abolished when under high stress (as for the snake- and social-phobic participants 
above) - very rapid perceptual processes that shield the participant from the effects of 
the threatening stimulus, and so allow performance on emotional words just as good as 
performance on neutral words. To use the parallel distributed processing model 
terminology, the threat-relevant input units could be subject to processes that reduce 
their resting level of activation, or reduce the spread of activation from them by 
weakening their connection strengths to other units, i. e. "inhibition" of the threat effects. 
If this was the state of affairs in the emotional Stroop then it would be expected that the 
overall performance on the emotional Stroop task would be slower when delay is low, if 
reduced delay (less interference) is brought about by an inhibitory process (Denial). This 
is opposite to the predictions of Williams, Matthews and MacLeod (1996) hypothesis. 
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So, this study will measure the delay in responding to threat words in an emotional 
Stroop experiment. The operation of a quick, perceptual Denial process would be 
expected to manifest itself as lower levels of delay in responding to emotional words as 
compared to neutral words. If this is because of "inhibition" then those participants who 
exhibit this delay should have slower responding overall. If this is the result of extra task 
effort (Williams, Matthews and MacLeod, 1996) then quicker responding should result 
for those participants lower in delay. 
In terms of CWL variables it would be expected that participants high on Self Mastery 
and low on Esteem Concern, i. e. those factors that were found constantly associated with 
distortion in previous chapters, may be the ones to exhibit these perceptual defences. 
Additionally, the emotional Stroop delay effect has been found to be associated with 
Anxiety in previous studies, as discussed above. In this case it is expected that the CWL 
Pessimism scale may be related to delay, because the Pessimism scale is highly 
correlated with measures of Trait Anxiety. 
Although the situations investigated in the previous chapters were quite different to the 
lower threat, more contrived situation of an emotional Stroop experiment, it is thought 
that the ability to hold views that may contradict much available contrary evidence (the 
tendency towards Denial) may be supported by fairly basic perceptual processes, and 
these will be tested here. 
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5.1 METHOD 
5.1.1 Participants 
Forty seven participants took part in this study. All were undergraduate students at the 
University of Hull, and were recruited on an opportunity basis around the University 
campus. Ten were male (mean age 21.20 years, standard deviation 3.88), the remaining 
37 were female (mean age 19.70, standard deviation 0.66). All participants were paid £5 
for their participation. 
5.1.2 Materials 
Three psychometric instruments were utilised for this study. First was the Coping With 
Life (CWL) scale, as used in previous chapters. Secondly was the Trait Anxiety Form 
Y2 of the Speilberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI(T); Spielberger, 1983), again 
as used in Chapter 3. Finally, a thirteen item short form (scale 3) of the Marlowe- 
Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960), as developed by Ballard 
(1992), was used in this study. This scale will be referred to as the Marlowe-Crowne 
Short Form (MCSF). Loo and Thorpe (2000) found that it had better psychometric 
properties than the full Marlowe-Crowne scale and it was considered that its use would 
be advantageous because of the shorter administration time. 
These final two questionnaires, the STAI(T) and MCSF were included to take into 
account the effects of what have been labelled the "Repressive" style (e. g. Weinberger, 
1990). First identified by Weinberger, Schwartz and Davidson (1979), they described 
participants who they labelled as "Repressors". These participants are thought to be 
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highly defensive against recognising negative affect in themselves, and report that they 
almost never consciously feel negative affect even though various measures show them 
to be highly anxious. Specifically, Repressors score low on self-rated measures of Trait 
Anxiety but are observed (via various psychophysiological and task measures) to be at 
least as anxious as those who rate themselves as high on Trait Anxiety. These 
Repressors also score high on the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scalev - indeed 
it is the combination of low Trait Anxiety scores and high Marlowe-Crowne scores that 
has been found to be the 'signature' of the Repressive style. Because the emotional 
Stroop effect has been explained in terms of anxiety it was thought important to control 
for this Repressive style (i. e. participants who 'actually' were anxious but did not report 
being so). 
A computer-based experiment based on the Stroop and emotional Stroop paradigms was 
used. The experiment was presented using a Pentium 3 PC computer running Windows 
98, on a 15" monitor set to 800 x 600 screen resolution, using the SuperLab Pro v2.0 
experimental design software. 
There were five categories of stimuli used. All stimuli were presented in 32 font size. 
1. Non-tivords: There were 3 non word items; 000,00000 and 0000. In 
correspondence with previous Stroop literature these were selected because of their 
low semantic content. Strings of 3,4 and 5 Os were used to correspond to the 
character lengths of the colour words (described next). Each of the stimuli were 
presented in each of the colours red, green and blue (from the standard Windows 
256-colour palette). Each of the six unique combinations were presented 5 times, 
140 
giving 30 presentations of the non-word stimuli in all. 
2. Congruent colour lvords: There were 3 words in this category; red, green and blue. 
Each word was presented in its own colour, and each was presented 10 times, giving 
30 congruent word presentations in all. 
3. Incongruent colour words: These were the same words as for 2. above, but this time 
presented in the two non-congruent colours. The words (3) by colours (2) 
combinations were presented 5 times each, giving 30 incongruent word 
presentations. 
4. Neutral words: The following 10 words were used; pen, note, pile, desk, gate, clock, 
thumb, folded, carpet, starch. Each word was presented 3 times (once in each colour) 
giving 30 presentations in all. 
5. Emotional tivords: The following 10 words were used; war, stab, pain, fail, debt, 
crash, death, lonely, cancer, scream. Each word was presented 3 times (once in each 
colour) giving 30 presentations in all. 
The neutral and emotional words were taken from previous studies into the emotional 
Stroop (Dawkins and Furnham, 1989; Freeman and Beck, 2000; Watts, McKenna, 
Sharrock and Trezise, 1986; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). The neutral and emotional 
words were matched in terms of character length, syllable length and frequency in the 
English language. The particular emotional words were selected on the basis of their 
likely relevance to the young student sample (e. g. fail, debt, lonely), relevance to high 
profile news stories at the time (e. g. crash, stab), or just generally threatening (e. g. 
cancer, war)- 
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In addition to the test items above there was a set of practice items identical to set 1., 
except that they consisted of rows of Xs. 
The inter-stimulus interval between items was 1 second. The order of presentation of 
items was random, i. e. not blocked into categories. 
Responses were given on a key pad that the participant operated with their dominant 
hand. The three response keys, one for each colour, were labelled with a coloured patch 
that matched the colour as presented on screen. 
5.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were initially briefed and their consent to take part obtained. They then 
completed the CWL, STAI(T) and MCSF (in that order) in a quiet room. They were then 
taken to a small computer lab where they completed the Stroop experiment singly or in 
groups of two. The Stroop experiment consisted of a period of practice. where the 
practice items were presented and the participant could get used-to responding using the 
key pad. Participants were told to always press the key that corresponded to the colour 
of the stimulus, not the word or symbol. They were also told to respond as quickly as 
they could, but without making mistakes. In the practice period the correct key press was 
required before the next stimulus was presented. 
When the practice period was over the participants were told that they were about to 
begin the timed trials, and that any response, not just the correct one, would now lead to 
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the next stimulus. They were reminded to respond as quickly as they could, but without 
making mistakes. When they were ready they pressed the space bar. After they had 
finished they were de-briefed. The whole procedure took no more than 30 minutes for 
any participant. 
5.2 RESULTS 
One participant had significant missing data from their CWL questionnaire and so their 
data were removed from further analysis. This left 46 participants for all of the analyses 
reported below. Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations are shown for the CWL 
scales in Table 5.1 below. 
Table 5.1: Means, Standard deviations, intercorrelations and alpha reliabilities (on 
diagonal) for Coping With Life scales. 
Scale Mean SD F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
Fl, Pessimism 2.09 . 39 . 80 
F2, Social Support 3.04 . 57 -. 21 . 88 
F3, Emotion Control 2.19 . 56 . 12 -. 61** . 81 
F4, Esteem Concern 2.89 . 53 . 21 . 30* -. 
02 . 72 
F5, Anger 2.48 . 54 . 25 . 21 -. 37* . 18 . 79 
F6, Self Mastery 2.37 . 51 -. 53** -. 07 . 10 -. 43** -. 50**. . 75 
N=46; *°p<. 05, **=p<. O1; alpha reliabilities are shown on the diagonal 
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All reliabilities were above . 70. All scale means were found to be between 
(approximately) 2 and 3 on the 4 point scale. As in previous samples the Pessimism 
scale was found to correlate significantly negatively with the Self Mastery scale. The 
Social Support scale had a significant negative relationship with the Emotion Control 
Scale. Self Mastery was significantly negatively related to Esteem Concern and Anger. 
Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the STAI(T) Trait Anxiety scale and the 
Marlowe-Crowne Short Form (MCSF) Defensiveness scale. Also shown is the 
correlation between the scales and the alpha reliabilities on the diagonal. Additionally, 
correlations between the CWL scales and the STAI(T) and MCSF are shown to the right. 
The mean score for the STAI(T) was approximately 44 (the minimum possible was 20, 
the maximum 80). The STAI(T) also had a good reliability. The mean for the MCSF was 
just under 10 (out of a maximum possible 13). The reliability of the MCSDS was 
somewhat lower than the other measures (. 62) but was considered acceptable. 
Table 5.2: Means and Standard deviations for STAI(T) and MCSDS, and correlation 
between STAI(T) and MCSDS (alpha reliability on diagonal), and correlations between 
the CLW and the STAI(T) and MCSF. 
Scale Mean SD intercorrelations I correlations with CWL scales 
STAI(T) MCSF I Fl F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
STAI(T) 43.56 9.07 . 89 
MCSF 9.42 1.30 -. 35* . 
62 
71** . 00 . 11 . 39** . 28 -. 58** 
-. 17 . 15 -. 
03 
. 
02 -. 27 . 
37* 
N=46; * =p < . 
05, **=p<. 01; Alpha reliabilities for the STAI(T) and MCSF are shown on the 
diagonal. CWL scales are labelled as follows: FI = Pessimism, F2 = Social Support, F3 = Emotion Control, 
F4 = Esteem Concern, F5 = Anger, F6 = Self Mastery. 
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As found previously Trait Anxiety (STAI(T)) was strongly correlated with Pessimism 
(positive) and moderately correlated with Self Mastery (Negative). Trait Anxiety was 
also correlated positively with Esteem Concern. The MCSF Defensiveness scale did not 
have any correlations significant at the . 01 
level. It did, however, show a moderate 
negative correlation with STAI(T) and a positive correlation with Self Mastery. 
The data from the Stroop experiment will now be presented. Before aggregation into 
mean scores the data from each participant's Stroop trials were checked for a speed 
accuracy trade off. No significant differences were found between correct and incorrect 
reaction times. The aggregated data are presented in Table 5.3. Errors were at or below 
5% for all word categories, which corresponds to previous Stroop experiments and was 
considered acceptable. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. Word category was the independent 
variable, with five levels; nonwords; congruent words; incongruent words; neutral 
words, and; emotional words. Reaction time was the dependent variable. (There were 
found to be significant differences between the covariances of the different levels of the 
independent variable, and so the correction suggested by Greenhouse and Geisser (1959) 
was applied to the degrees of freedom reported here. ) 
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Table 5.3: Means and standard deviations for the Stroop experiment, showing error (%) 
and reaction time (ms) by word category. 
Word Category 
nonwords congruent incongruent neutral emotional 
Errors (%) mean . 01 . 03 . 04 . 02 . 02 
SD . 03 . 04 . 05 . 02 . 03 
RT (ms) mean 638.68 599.80 755.10 604.23 622.85 
SD 197.75 139.90 223.18 143.27 136.04 
N=46 
There was an overall significant effect of Word Category (F[2,111]= 24.18, p <. 01). 
Within-participant contrasts revealed that the traditional Stroop effect had been 
successfully replicated. Incongruent words took longer to respond-to than non-words 
(F[1,45]= 44.95, p <. 01), and congruent words were quicker to respond to than non 
words (F[1,45]= 4.42, p <. 05). However, despite the average delay of 18.62 ms (SD = 
83.11) in responding to emotional words compared to neutral words, this effect was not 
quite significant (F[1,45]= 2.31 ,p> . 
05). 
However, the standard deviation of the Delay variable indicated that there was much 
variation around this mean- value. Therefore, the individual differences that were 
associated with variation in delay in responding to emotional words versus neutral words 
were investigated next. Multiple regression was thought the most appropriate approach 
for this because it would maximise statistical power and therefore reduce the problems 
of only having 47 participants. 
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As is the tradition in the emotional Stroop literature a measure corresponding to the 
delay in responding to emotional vs. neutral words was computed. This measure would 
be used here as the dependent variable in the regression analyses. This new variable, 
called Delay, was simply the response time for emotional words minus the response time 
for neutral words. Positive values of the Delay variable therefore reflected a delay in 
responding to emotional words, negative values reflected quicker responding to 
emotional words. 
Another variable was computed to take into account effects of Repressive style, as 
discussed in the Method section. This was done by creating a new variable named 
Repressor. Median splits for participants' MCSF and STAI(T) scores were taken. Those 
participants who scored below the median on the STAI(T) but above the median on the 
MCSF were given a1 on the Repressor variable. All other participants were given a 0. 
Ten participants were categorised as Repressors using this method. 
With multiple regression it is considered essential to not "overfit" the regression model 
to the data. Many 'rules of thumb' have been advanced as to how to avoid this. Howell 
(1997) presents the commonly cited rule that the ratio of participants to predictor 
variables in a multiple regression should not fall below 10 to 1. Including the Repressor 
variable in the regression to control for its effects would then allow a maximum of 3 
additional CWL variables to be tested with the 47 participants. To test the predictions 
made at the end of the Introduction to this chapter these 3 variables would be Esteem 
Concern, Self Mastery and Pessimism. 
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So, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed. Delay was the dependent 
variable. Repressor was the first entered variable. The CWL variables were entered next, 
in the order Pessimism, Self Mastery and Esteem Concern. This allowed the effects of 
Self Mastery and Esteem concern on Delay to be assessed with the effects of Repressor 
status and Pessimism evaluated beforehand and controlled for. 
Table 5.4: Hierarchical Multiple regression predicting delay in responding to emotional 
words with Repressor status, Pessimism, Self Mastery and Esteem Concern. 
Overall model Change in model 
model R R2 ' df Fp ERZ OF Ap 
1. . 14 . 02 1,44 . 82 > . 05 . 
02 . 82 > . 05 
2. . 23 . 05 2,43 1.18 > . 05 . 
03 1.54 > . 05 
3. . 43 . 18 3,42 3.14 < . 05 . 13 
6.73 <. 01 
4 . 43 . 18 4,41 2.30 <. 10 . 
00 . 00 > . 05 
N=46. 
Variables in each model: 1. Repressor; 2. Repressor, Pessimism; 3. Repressor, Pessimism, Self 
Mastery; 4. Repressor, Pessimism, Self Mastery, Esteem Concern 
The first and second stages of the hierarchical regression introduced Repressor and 
Pessimism respectively. Neither of these models were significantly good predictors of 
Delay. At stage 3 Self Mastery was added and the R2 value jumped from 5% of the 
variance accounted for by the model to 18%. This was a highly significant change in the 
model (F[3,42]=6.73, p <. 01) and overall the model at stage 3 was found to be a 
significantly good predictor of Delay (F[3,42]=3.14, p< . 01). 
The addition of Esteem 
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Concern at stage 4 accounted for almost no additional variance and the overall model 
was consequently a worse, and non-significant, predictor of Delay. 
Table 5.5 shows the contributions of the individual variables at stage 3- the only model 
that was found to be a significantly good predictor of the delay in responding to 
emotional words vs. neutral words. 
Table 5.5: Contribution of individual variables included in model 3 from Table 5.4 
(Repressor status, Pessimism, Self Mastery) in predicting delay in responding to 
emotional words. 
Variable ßtp 
Repressor . 13 . 88 >. 05 
Pessimism -. 40 2.39 <. 05 
Self Mastery -. 43 2.60 <. 05 
Repressor was not found to contribute significantly to the prediction of the model. Both 
Pessimism and Self Mastery, however, were found to be significant predictors of Delay. 
This was surprising, as the individual correlations between Delay and Pessimism (-. 22, 
p> . 05) and Delay and 
Self Mastery (-. 18, p> . 05) are both weak and non-significant, 
and the addition of Pessimism at stage 2 (see Table 5.5) did not produce a significant 
change in the model. It therefore seemed that the effects of Pessimism and Self Mastery 
in predicting Delay were important, but only when taken together. 
Inspection of the beta coefficients showed that the magnitude of the effects of both 
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Pessimism and Self Mastery were comparable. Both were related negatively with delay, 
indicating that a high Pessimism score coupled with a high Self Mastery score was 
predictive of lower Delay. 
Because of the unexpected importance of Pessimism in combination with Self Mastery 
in predicting Delay scores, it was decided to test the extent to which the effects of 
Pessimism were accounted for because of its high correlation with Trait Anxiety. 
Another multiple regression analysis was run with Delay as the dependent variable. The 
non-significant variables from the first analysis (Repressor, Esteem Concern) were not 
included in this analysis. The first variable to be input was STAI(T), followed by 
Pessimism then Self Mastery. 
Table 5.6: Hierarchical Multiple regression predicting delay in responding to emotional 
words with Trait Anxiety, Pessimism and Self Mastery. 
Overall model Change in model 
model RR2 df Fp OR2 AF Ap 
1. . 18 . 03 1,44 1.45 > . 05 . 03 1.45 > . 05 
2. . 22 . 05 2,43 1.12 > . 05 . 02 . 79 > . 05 
3. . 44 . 19 3,42 3.35 <. 05 . 14 7.47 <. O1 
N=46. 
Variables in each model: 1. STAI(T); 2. STAI(T), Pessimism; 3. STAI(T), Pessimism, Self 
Mastery 
At stage 1, Trait Anxiety on its own was not a good predictor of Delay. The addition of 
Pessimism did not improve the model significantly, probably because of the high 
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correlation between State Anxiety and Pessimism (r = . 71, p< . 01). As before, the only 
significant improvement in the model came with the addition of Self Mastery at the third 
stage. Overall, the final model with all three variables included was the only significant 
model. The contribution of the individual variables in this model is shown below in 
Table 5.7 
Table 5.7: Contribution of individual variables included in model 3 from Table 5.7 
(Trait Anxiety, Pessimism, Self Mastery) in predicting delay in responding to emotional 
words. 
Variable ptp 
STAI(T) -. 24 1.14 >. 05 
Pessimism -. 31 1.52 >. 05 
Self Mastery -. 48 2.73 <. 01 
As before, Self Mastery was the only significant individual predictor of Delay. Neither 
Trait Anxiety (STAI(T)) nor Pessimism were found to be significant individual 
predictors of Delay. This was probably because their high intercorrelation - their 
contribution to the model was shared between the two of them in this model, leaving 
neither as significant individual predictors. However, of the two Pessimism had the 
higher beta coefficient, showing that its contribution to the model was higher than that of 
Trait Anxiety. 
Finally, the overall speed of responding was investigated. For ease of presentation 
participants were divided categorically on the two best predictors found in the regression 
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analyses: Pessimism and Self Mastery. By taking median splits of both variables four 
categories were produced. Table 5.8 shows the overall Speed of response (the mean of 
responses to emotional and neutral words) broken down by Pessimism Category (low, 
high) and Self Mastery Category (low, high). 
Table 5.8: Speed of responding in the emotional Stroop (ms) by Pessimism Category 
and Self Mastery Category 
Pessimism, Self Mastery Category N Mean SD 
Low Pessimism, low Self Mastery 
Low Pessimism, high Self Mastery 
9 537.04 
12 596.09 
89.48 
119.33 
High Pessimism low Self Mastery 16 632.63 138.66 
High Pessimism high Self Mastery 9 679.38 154.22 
Although a one way analysis of variance did not reveal a significant difference between 
the groups overall (F[3,42]= 2.03, p> . 05) 
it can be seen that the high Pessimism, high 
Self Mastery group, the combination that was found to be associated with least Delay in 
responding to the emotional Stroop words from the regression analyses, actually had the 
slowest overall responding in the experiment. A planned contrast comparing the high 
Pessimism, high Self Mastery group with the average of the other groups also just failed 
to reach significance (t[42]° 1.88, p< . 10). 
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5.3 DISCUSSION 
Once again the CWL scales were found to be reliable. As a further basic condition that 
had to be satisfied before confident interpretation of the other results could start, the well 
known Stroop effect was replicated in the this experiment. 
Although there was an average delay of 18.62 ms in responding to emotional words 
compared to neutral words this effect was not significant. This level of delay is, 
however, almost exactly the same as the average delay found in studies comparable to 
this one, as reviewed by Williams, Mathews and MacLeod (1996). They found six 
studies that used consciously presented, randomly ordered threat vs. neutral words, on a 
computer, with non-clinical participants (as here), and the average delay was 20.59 ms. 
Given that the level of delay measured here was virtually identical it could be that if the 
experiment were repeated with more participants then the effect would become 
significant. It could also be that the chosen threat words in this study just did not reflect 
the current concerns of the participants to a great extent, i. e. they were not threatening 
enough. However, the words were all selected from previous studies on the emotional 
Stroop, and most had proven ability to generate delay in previous studies, and so this 
seems less likely. 
The major finding of this study was that participants' delay could be predicted by their 
combination of CWL Pessimism and Self Mastery scores. High Pessimism and high Self 
Mastery were found to be significantly related with reduced delay. Reduced delay 
153 
indicates an ability by the participant to not let the semantic content of the emotional 
Stroop stimuli interfere with their performance of the colour naming task. Participants 
will not have been able to change their responses by conscious strategies because, with 
responses made in about half a second, there simply was not time. They will also not 
have been able to bias their attention or gaze away from the stimuli because successful 
completion of the task required that the stimuli were attended to. Evidence of an 
attentional avoidance strategy would have shown up as a marked increases in errors for 
the emotional words and this was not seen. Therefore the results are taken as evidence of 
rapid perceptual processes that manage the processing of threat information -a candidate 
mechanism by which, at least in part, Denial may operate. 
Two hypotheses were offered as to how this process might work. Williams, Matthews 
and MacLeod (1996) argued that increased cognitive effort towards the task underlies 
the reduction in interference, and this would be expected to be accompanied by faster 
overall responding in those with reduced delay. On the other hand, following from Ben- 
Zur and Breznitz (1997), it was hypothesised that some kind of inhibition may have been 
reducing the threat relevant response, and this would be expected to lead to slower 
overall responding for those with less delay. As it turned out the high Pessimism, high 
Self Mastery participants, i. e. those with the lowest delay, were the slowest at colour 
naming in the experiment, but the effect just failed to reach significance. Therefore, it 
must be admitted that this experiment has failed to distinguish between the two 
competing hypotheses. A replication of this experiment with a larger sample size would 
be desirable to try and provide a definitive answer. Similar improvement could be 
achieved with the same amount of experimental effort, though, if the participants were 
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pre-screened for Pessimism and Mastery scores, and only those participants scoring in 
the top or bottom 25% were selected for participation. 
Moving on from the competing explanations as to precisely what mechanisms allow 
participants to reduce delay, this experiment provides further evidence of the importance 
of Self Mastery in the process of Denial. As for the prisoners denying their guilt and 
smokers denying the risks of smoking, Self Mastery was found to be related here to the 
ability to reject or suppress threatening information. 
Self Mastery alone did not account for the reduction in delay, but in connection with 
Pessimism. The effect of Pessimism was found to be mostly, though not wholly, 
attributable to its underlying relationship with Trait Anxiety. Another effect related to 
anxiety was Repressive style. This effect of Pessimism / Trait Anxiety was not 
attributable to Repressive style, however, as Repressive style was taken into account in 
the data analysis. 
The fact that high Pessimism / high anxiety was found to be a necessary precondition for 
this Self Mastery effect to operate was perhaps a result of the somewhat contrived 
experimental setting. In the previous chapters the participants faced real and very 
relevant threats to their self image. In this experimental setting the threats were modest 
at best, and therefore were perhaps only triggered for the participants who were very 
threat sensitive, i. e. high in Pessimism / Trait Anxiety. 
Esteem Concern had been found important for Denial in the previous Chapters, but was 
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not a good predictor of reduced delay here. This could be because of the nature of the 
threat words used in this experiment, which were not social threat words. The Esteem 
Concern scale contains items such as "I'm worried about what other people think about 
me" and the previous two studies used threats with very significant social self esteem 
aspects. It would be interesting to replicate this study using social threat words to see if 
CWL Esteem Concern would predict delay in this setting. 
To summarise, this chapter sought to address the possibility that the results from the 
previous chapters, which showed CWL Self Mastery and Esteem Concern to be related 
to Denial-like responding, were just impression management and not actually the 
product of sub-conscious defensive processes. It was found that high Self Mastery was 
predictive of reduced delay in responding to threat words for those participants high in 
Pessimism / Trait Anxiety. This effect could not plausibly have been the result of 
conscious strategies, and so the implication is clear - that Self Mastery could be a stable 
factor, measurable by self report personality inventory, that is correlated with the use of 
Denial type defensive strategies. 
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6 CHAPTER SIX: 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This thesis started with the purpose of throwing some light on an area which is as 
significant and fascinating as it is messy and misunderstood, the area of Denial. Seeking 
to comprehend what Denial, and in general reality distortions, are, is a difficult task 
because the more one tries to cover the topic the more contradictions and confusions one 
comes across. 
From the original psychoanalytic writing of Anna Freud to the later writings of coping 
theorists, it seemed clear that people have a repertoire of specific defences or ways of 
coping that they use in order to deal with their threats (Parker & Endler, 1996). This 
repertoire comprises mechanisms that operate with different levels of awareness and 
intention. Indeed, processes originally conscious and attentional can become highly 
practised until they are unconscious and automatic (Lazarus, 1984; Rasmussen, 1986). 
To a certain extent trying to overcome the usual problems over definitions and 
measurement it was decided that Denial could be approached indirectly by means of 
personality and coping variables. 
Based on principle ideas of coping, it was hypothesised that a person tends to engage in 
Denial in order to deal with various stressors of his or her life when he or she does not 
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feel `equipped' with the internal and external resources that one needs when facing a 
stressful stimulus. 
Therefore, it was assumed that some personality traits and coping resources might be 
associated with the use of Denial and reality distortions more regularly than others. 
Concepts such as avoidance coping and pessimism were assumed to be related to 
increased use of Denial, while on other hand optimism and high self esteem were 
expected to be negatively related to it. 
The outcome of this exercise, which included the creation and validation of a 
questionnaire (CWL) based on the above ideas, was a set of mainly personality variables 
that were thought to underlie Denial. Specifically, the six factors which resulted from the 
factor analysis of the CWL were, Pessimism, Social Support, Emotion Control, Esteem 
Concern, Anger and Self Mastery. What in effect was uncovered was mostly personality 
factors rather than coping behaviours, supporting the contention of Hewitt and Flett 
(1996), that at least some of the coping styles questionnaires used as input to the factor 
analysis are in fact somewhat measuring personality variables. 
Predisposition to Denial and other reality distortions was expected to be positively 
related to Pessimism, Emotion Control, Anger and Esteem Concern and negatively 
related to Social Support and Self Mastery. These hypotheses were mainly based on the 
general expectation that greater need for anxiety reduction and therefore processes such 
as Denial, and therefore predisposition to it, would be associated with factors that were 
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likely to lead to increased primary appraisals of threat (rather than challenge), and likely 
secondary appraisals that result in higher anxiety because of perceived deficiencies in 
resources. Using psychodynamic terms, these factors were thought to be associated with 
an ego that needs protection from the painful aspects of reality. 
Having developed a tool to investigate these traits hypothesised as important in Denial 
the study went on to test these hypotheses in situations conceived of as being highly 
predisposed to producing Denial and reality distortions. These were the areas of sex- 
offence and smoking. The former was chosen because both theoretical and extensive 
clinical work support that not only Denial but various layers or levels of Denial are 
commonly found in sex offenders in relation to their offences (Crighton, 1995; Gocke, 
1991). In the latter case it is generally accepted that smokers experience high levels of 
cognitive dissonance in relation to their smoking and that in their attempt to reduce it 
often result in Denial and other reality distortions (Lee, 1989). 
The results of these studies revealed mostly consistent findings, although not quite as 
anticipated. For the offenders, it was not sex offender status per se that was found to be 
important, but rather the fact of refusing to admit being guilty when the overwhelming 
evidence suggested the opposite. For the smokers the important factor was not smoking 
status per se, but having a lower perception of the social and health risks compared to 
other smokers. 
For both of the above groups a consistent patterns of responses to two of the CWL scales 
were found, but again in somewhat an unexpected direction. It was found that the 
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variables that were associated with these two predisposed to Denial groups, were Esteem 
Concern (negative, although it was expected to be positive) and Self Mastery (positive, 
although it was expected to be negative). These findings did not support the initial 
hypothesis, that those predisposed to Denial would be low in coping resources. One 
prediction was borne out, as it was found that those offenders who denied their guilt 
were low on Social Support, but this finding was not replicated in the smokers group. 
Broadly, the findings were describing the individual predisposed to Denial as somebody 
who perceived himself or herself as in control of the stressful situation, confident that 
they could cope with most of life's hassles better than the average person, and also as 
someone who did not need the approval of others and overall did not depend on others' 
opinions for reassurance. 
This discrepancy may be explained if we were to assume that what we initially 
hypothesised to be related to Denial i. e. perceived low resources, was more related to the 
state that a person, not a predisposed user of Denial, was finding himself or herself to be 
in when encountered with a serious threat; in other words before he or she engaged in 
Denial as a result of a threatening incident. This could be contrasted with what we 
measured here, Denial as a regular way for dealing with threats. This regular way of 
dealing with threats could be called `trait-Denial'. This 'trait-Denial' may then be 
associated with (at least the appearance of) high resources: high Self Mastery and low 
Esteem Concern. This would be because the regular use of Denial may have empowered 
the person with a general feeling of control and a self-belief that he or she is able to deal 
with whatever life throws at him or her, because there are fewer unsolvable threats in 
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his or her life (because the threats are reduced to fit the self-image). 
As described, this `trait-Denial' seems similar to "Egoistic Bias" (Paulhus & John, 1994, 
1998), where self worth is exaggerated in relation to social and intellectual status. Trait- 
Denial' also seems similar to Narcissism (e. g. Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998), 
which is associated with feelings of superiority, self-admiration and self-sufficiency. For 
example, Jackson, Ervin & Hodge (1992) found that narcissism was positively related to 
self-esteem and negatively related to social anxiety which is analogous to high Self 
Mastery and low Esteem Concern (as found here). 
One could speculate then that predisposition to the use of Denial is characterised by 
narcissistic and self-deceptive enhancements. In the studies above the results were 
interpreted as suggesting a defensive reaction by the individual in order to defend his or 
her self image in the face of threatening information - which corresponds to Denial in 
relation to guilt status and smoking risk in the first two studies, respectively. 
According to this view, it was understood that the participants were not just 'image 
managing' or lying, but that they were reporting honestly held beliefs. Supporting 
evidence for this view was found in the participants' overall pattern of responses, similar 
to Self-Deceptive Enhancement rather than image management (Paulhus and Reid, 
1993). 
However, itýwas considered necessary to test this assertion further under stricter 
conditions, where it could be ascertained that those participants identified as predisposed 
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to Denial would not be able to consciously manipulate their responses, neither by image 
management nor pure lying. 
To achieve this measurement of Denial without contamination from potentially 
confounding conscious strategies, it was decided to test Ben-Zur and Breznitz's (1997) 
suggestion that the processing of a threatening stimulus which is denied must be in some 
ways "incomplete, biased, and shallow" (p. 232). 
Ben-Zur and Breznitz (1997) suggested that the perceptual, rapid, non-conscious biases 
that occur in relation to a threatening stimulus can be adequately measured by the 
Emotional Stroop Paradigm. Delay has been found in responding to the colour of threat 
words compared to neutral words, and so an ability to overcome this delay could be 
interpreted as evidence of a rapid, pre-conscious Denial process. 
It was found that higher Self Mastery, in the presence of higher Pessimism / Trait 
Anxiety, was associated with lower delay in responding to emotional words vs neutral 
words. This ability to not be distracted by the emotional content of the stimuli was 
interpreted as evidence for Denial, fitting the pattern found in the previous two studies of 
Denial being related to higher Self Mastery. 
The fact that in this study Pessimism / Trait Anxiety was combined with Self Mastery 
for the group that was assumed to be predisposed to Denial, may be explained if we take 
in consideration the rather contrived experimental situation. Previously those who were 
assumed predisposed to Denial were distorting reality in relation to very potent and real 
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threats they were currently experiencing, either of their offending or smoking. In the 
emotional Stroop paradigm, where there was no such threat. However, the disposition of 
the person to perceive stimuli as threatening, as anxious individuals tend to do 
(Mathews, 1993), may have led to the emotional stimuli having more potency for the 
high Anxious participants. However, this characteristic on its own was not enough to 
abolish delay. Of the individuals who were high anxious, it was those with higher Self 
Mastery, as found in the previous two studies, that were showing evidence of Denial. 
It is considered of particular interest that Self Mastery was not associated positively with 
optimism, verifying in effect the opinion that optimism and Denial are very different 
concepts (Aspinwall & Brunhart, 1996). On the other hand the positive correlation of 
Self Mastery and the negative correlation of Esteem Concern with Denial, suggests that 
an inflated self-esteem could be indicative of Denial, and supports previous research 
which has found that self-esteem needs defending in order to sustain itself (Mehlman & 
Snyder, 1985; in Greenberg et al, 1993). 
The findings from the three studies are encouraging towards the approach of 
investigating Denial via personality variables. The consistency with which Self Mastery 
was found suggests that future research should attempt to address factors related to 
similar aspects of personality such as self-esteem, narcissism, self-enhancement and 
others (Paulhus and Reid, 1991). This would help clarify exactly which personality 
variables are most potent in being able to explain the pre-attentive bias that was found in 
the current study. 
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Particularly in relation to the emotional Stroop paradigm, future research should include 
larger numbers of participants or perhaps pre-selection of individuals who score in the 
top and bottom 25% of anxiety / Pessimism and Self Mastery. A particularly useful 
strand of further study would involve the use of psycho-physiological variables in an 
emotional Stroop paradigm. Some control over repressive style was possible in the 
emotional Stroop experiment reported here (i. e. the use of the repressive 'signature' of 
low self-reported anxiety but high Marlowe-Crowne score; Weinberger, 1990), but 
greater sensitivity would be provided by measures such as heart-rate and galvanic skin 
response. This would be especially important given the small nature of the effects 
observed in these experiments, of the order of milliseconds. 
In summary, it seems that many of the approaches taken in this study have shown 
tentative promise. Personality variables have been shown to be associated with a 
tendency to Deny aspects of external and threatening reality. This has been demonstrated 
in relation to processes that presumably involve a mix of conscious and unconscious 
processes, such as reflecting on one's actions and status as an offender or as a smoker, 
and also in relation to quick, perceptual process that do not have time to be consciously 
moderated. 
As quoted by Somerfield and McCrae, "What people do in response to stress, 
consciously and unconsciously is to a substantial degree determined by who they are - 
by their enduring dispositions" (2000). This thesis provides support for this contention. 
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Appendix A 
The original 107-item CWL questionnaire 
THE 
UNIVERSITY 
OF HULL 
with life co yin 
This questionnaire is about how we see ourselves and others in 
relation to how we deal with the ups and downs in life. It is your age: 
completely anonymous, but please complete the box on the 
right so we can make sure that we are getting answers from a your sex: 
balance of different people. 
How to comýlefe lk peerfioadnia 
Although people react in different ways to different situations, we all tend to have a typical 
way of dealing with life's ups and downs. On the following pages are a number of statements 
that people have used to describe what they do in various situations. Please read each 
statement and circle the appropriate number to the right of the statement to indicate typically 
how much you do what the statement describes. 
Here is an example statement: 
almost some- almost 
never times often always 
I worry about things well before they actually 12j 3) 4 
happen 
The number 3 has been circled to indicate that, typically, this person often worries about 
things well before they actually happen. 
Sometimes you might feel that no answer is right for you, but please try to think of the 
alternative that is most like you. 
Now please turn over the page to start, and do remember - there are no correct or incorrect 
responses, only what is most appropriate for you. 
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almost some- almost 
never times often always 
1. I keep things to myself and don't let others know 1 2 3 4 
how bad things are 
2. When I face a new problem I seek advice from 1 2 3 4 
someone who knows how to deal with it 
3. I sit tight and hope the problem goes away 1 2 3 4 
4. I daydream about things getting better in future 1 2 3 4 
5. If I'm pleasantly surprised, I show immediately 1 2 3 4 
how pleased I am 
6. I trust in fate - that things will somehow work out 1 2 3 4 
for the best 
7. I try to forget that the whole thing has happened 1 2 3 4 
8. I pray that things will just change 1 2 3 4 
s. I talk about the problem as little as possible 1 2 3 4 
10. When someone upsets me, I try to hide my 1 2 3 4 
feelings 
ii. People find it difficult to tell whether I'm excited 1 2 3 4 
about something or not 
12. I find it difficult to comfort people who are upset 1 2 3 4 
13. When something upsets me I prefer to talk to 1 2 3 4 
someone about it than to bottle it up 
14. If I receive bad news in front of others I try to 1 2 3 4 
hide how I feel 
15. I pretend there's nothing the matter, even if 1 2 3 4 
people ask 
16. If I get angry or upset I say how I feel 1 2 3 4 
17. I feel embarrassed about expressing my feelings 1 2 3 4 
18. I manage to remain outwardly calm, even though 1 2 3 4 
I may be churned up inside 
19. I can't help showing how I feel, even when it isn't 1 2 3 4 
appropriate to do so 
20. Even under a lot of pressure I remain calm 1 2 3 4 
21. I worry about things well before they actually 1 2 3 4 
happen 
22. I find it hard to summon enthusiasm for the tasks 1 2 3 4 
Ihavetodo 
23. 1 cope well with any problems that occur 1 2 3 4 
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almost some- almost 
never times often always 
24. I feel that I am a worthwhile person 1 2 3 4 
25. "I just don't know where to begin" is a feeling I 1 2 3 4 
have when presented with several things to do at 
once 
26. I speak my mind when I have something to say 1 2 3 4 
27. When I make mistakes I let it worry me for days 1 2 3 4 
after 
28. In discussions, I tend to back-down even when I 1 2 3 4 
feel strongly about something 
29. I generally feel in control 1 2 3 4, 
30. I wish life was more predictable 1 2 3 4 
31. When I am feeling tired I find it difficult to get 1 2 3 4 
going 
32. I am able to react quickly when something 1 2 3 4 
unexpected happens 
33. If I have a query I feel confident to ask for help 1 2 3 4 
34. However bad things are, I feel they will work out 1 2 3 4 
positively in the end. 
35. I look on the bright side of life 1 2 3 4 
36. I find it hard to relax 1 2 3 4 
37. I find it difficult to make a mental effort when I 1 2 3 4 
am tired 
38. If I feel somebody is wrong, I am not afraid to 1 2 3 4 
argue with them 
39. I feel overpowered and at the mercy of the 1 2 3 4 
situation 
40. I become miserable or depressed 1 2 3 4 
41. I feel that I am lonely and isolated 1 2 3 4 
42. I feel helpless - there's nothing I can do about it 1 2 3 4 
43. I take my frustration out on the people closest to 1 2 3 4 
me 
44. Ibecome irritable or angry 1 2 3 4 
45. I criticise or blame myself 1 2 3 4 
46. I think or talk about the problem as if it did not 1 2 3 4 
belong to me 
47. I see the situation for what it actually is and 1 2 3 4 
nothing more 
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48. I do not see the problem or situation as a threat 
49. I resolve the issue by not becoming identified 
with it 
50. I feel completely clear-headed about the problem 
51. I try to keep a sense of humour - laugh at myself 
or the situation 
52. I believe that time will somehow sort things out 
53. I decide it's useless to get upset and just get on 
with things 
54. I am reluctant to ask people for assistance 
55. If I feel stuck in a situation I seek help from 
people who have experienced similar kinds of 
problems 
almost some- almost 
never times often always 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
For the following questions please indicate how much you agree or disagree with 
each statement by circling the appropriate number. 
56. I seldom show how I feel about things 
57. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best 
58. The world is full of resources that I look for 
when I need help 
59. I am sometimes unable to hide my feelings, 
even though I would like to 
60. It's important to get enough exercise 
61. I experience my emotions very strongly 
62. Small things in life make me very happy 
63. I get excited with things that leave others 
indifferent 
64. I have a very short fuse when things don't go 
as planned 
65. The dangers of unprotected sex are overstated 
by the media 
66.1 like everyone I know 
strongly strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
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strongly strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
67. When I'm happy my feelings show 1 2 3 4 
68. 1 get worried with things which don't bother 1 2 3 4 
others so much 
69. I get excited easily 1 2 3 4 
70. I don't get annoyed even at times when 1 2 3 4 
everybody around me seems to 
71. Very few things in life can make me angry 1 2 3 4 
72. Whenever I feel positive emotions, people can 1 2 3 4 
easily see exactly what I'm feeling 
73. I'm an emotionally expressive person 1 2 3 4 
74. Most people have sex before marriage 1 2 3 4 
75. I rarely count on good things happening to me 1 2 3 4 
76. When I get bad news it seems to affect me less 1 2 3 4 
than other people 
77. It's been ages since the last time I felt 1 2 3 4 
miserable 
78. It is important to have somebody who I can 1 2 3 4 
talk things over with. 
79. I have strong emotions 1 2 3 4 
80. I am worried about looking foolish 1 2 3 4 
81. Buying insurance is a waste of money 1 2 3 4 
82. I like to discuss even trivial problems to 1 2 3 4 
reassure myself that I am making sensible 
decisions. 
83. There have been times when I've been unable 1 2 3 4 
to stop crying even though I've tried to stop 
84. It is important to me to have somebody that 1 2 .3 4 
will listen to my problems 
85. I'm never unhappy 1 2 3 4 
86. I feel better when I have talked to my friends 1 2 3 4 
about my problems. 
87. If something can go wrong for me, it will 1 2 3 4 
88. In the past I have found a problem easier to 1 2 3 4 
solve if I have talked it over with somebody 
89. I don't expect life to hold any major problems 1 2 3 4 
forme 
so. 1 get annoyed easily 1 2 3 4 
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strongly strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
91.1 pay attention to the smaller problems, but 1234 
just hope that major problems will go away 
92. People should go to see their doctor regularly 1 
for health check-ups 
93. Eating healthily is a luxury, not a necessity 1 
94. I am worried about whether I am regarded as a 1 
success or a failure 
95. When I feel upset about something I feel the 1 
need to talk to somebody about it. 
96. I like to talk problems over to 'get them off my 1 
chest' 
97. I feel self-conscious 1 
98. In situations where others get very upset I can 1 
usually be relaxed 
99. I'm displeased with myself 1 
100. My body reacts very strongly to emotional 1 
situations 
101. I'm worried about what other people think 1 
about me 
102. I feel inferior to others at this moment 1 
los. Some people need somebody to confide in but 1 
I prefer to solve my own problems 
104. I feel concerned about the impression I am 1 
making 
105. I hardly ever expect things to go my way 1 
106. I'm always optimistic about my future 1 
107. I think the negative health effects of smoking 1 
are exaggerated 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire. 
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Appendix B 
Locations of initial questionnaire distribution 
The CWL 107 item scale was administered to the following groups: 
9 Adults in Hull 
" Members of staff of the University of Hull 
a Under- and postgraduate students from the University of Hull 
" Students from Hull College Summer School and other Adult education Centres 
" Open University Students attending summer schools at Stirling and Sussex 
Universities, or attending regular tutorial meetings with their supervisor. 
9 Members of staff of the University of Worcester. 
" Adults in Bristol and London. 
Appendix C 
Final CWL 57 item questionnaire, arranged by scale 
Item 
No. 
Factor Item 
008 1 I pray that things will just change 
024r 1 I feel that I am a worthwhile person 
030 1 I wish life was more predictable 
034r 1 However bad things are, I feel they will work out positively in the 
end. 
035r 1 I look on the bright side of life 
039 1 I feel overpowered and at the mercy of the situation 
040 1 I become miserable or depressed 
041 1 I feel that I am lonely and isolated 
045 1 I criticise or blame myself 
057 1 In uncertain times, I usually expect the best 
075 1 I rarely count on good things happening to me 
087 1 If something can go wrong for me, it will 
089r 1 I don't expect life to hold any major problems for me 
099 1 I'm displeased with myself 
105 1 I hardly ever expect things to go my way 
106r 1 I'm always optimistic about my future 
002 2 When I face a new problem I seek advice from someone who knows 
how to deal with it 
013 2 When something upsets me I prefer to talk to someone about it than 
to bottle it up 
082 2 I like to discuss even trivial problems to reassure myself that I am 
making sensible decisions. 
084 2 It is important to me to have somebody that will listen to my 
problems 
086 2 1 feel better when I have talked to my friends about my problems. 
Item Factor Item 
No. 
088 2 In the Hast I have found a problem easier to solve if I have talked it 
over with somebody 
095 2 When I feel upset about something I feel the need to talk to 
somebody about it. 
096 2 1 like to talk problems over to 'get them off my chest' 
103r 2 Some people need somebody to confide in but I prefer to solve my 
own problems 
001 3 I keep things to myself and don't let others know how bad things are 
010 3 When someone upsets me, I try to hide my feelings 
014 3 If I receive bad news in front of others I try to hide how I feel 
015 3 I pretend there's nothing the matter, even if people ask 
016r 3 If I get angry or upset I say how I feel 
017 3 I feel embarrassed about expressing my feelings 
018 3 I manage to remain outwardly calm, even though I may be churned 
up inside. 
054 3 I am reluctant to ask people for assistance 
080 4 I am worried about looking foolish 
094 4 I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or a failure 
097 4 I feel self-conscious 
101 4 I'm worried about what other people think about me 
104 4 I feel concerned about the impression I am making 
043 5 1 take my frustration out on the people closest to me 
044 5 I become irritable or angry 
064 5 I have a very short fuse when things don't go as planned 
070r 5 I don't get annoyed even at times when everybody around me seems 
to 
071r 5 Very few things in life can make me angry 
090 5 I get annoyed easily 
020 6 Even under a lot of pressure I remain calm 
023 6 I cope well with any problems that occur 
032 6 1 am able to react quickly when something unexpected happens 
Item Factor 
No. 
Item 
050 6I feel completely clear-headed about the problem 
098 6 In situations where others get very upset I can usually be relaxed 
Appendix D 
Excluded CWL 107 items arranged by scale of origin 
For the exact wording of items, please refer to Appendix A 
Coping Styles Questionnaire (CSQ; Roger, Jarvis & Najarian, 1993) 
Detachment coping: Items 42,46,47,48,49,51 
Avoidance Coping: Items 3,4,6,7,52 
Interpersonal Trust Questionnaire (ITQ; Forbes & Roger, 1999). 
Emotional Social Support: 78 
Instrumental Social Support (generated by the author): 33,58 
Mental Toughness (Clough & Earle, 2000): 21,22,25,26,28,31,36,37,38 
State Self esteem Scale (SSES; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) 
Social Self Esteem: 102 
Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ; Gross & John, 1995) 
Impulse Strength and Positive Expressivity scales: 59,61,67,72,73,79,83,100 
Emotional Reactivity (generated by the author): 62,63,69,76,77 
Emotion Control Questionnaire (ECQ; Roger & Nesshover, 1986) 
Emotional Inhibition: 5,11,12 
Social Desirability (generated by the author): 66,85 
Denial-like coping (generated by the author): 60,65,74,81,91,92,93,107 
A 
The items that were excluded originated from all the scales that were used for the 
construction of CWL. Items excluded seem to be dealing mostly with particular 
behaviours, such as item 60 from Denial-like scale, `It's important to get enough 
exercise'; items describing the `detachment' concept such as `I think or talk about the 
problem as if id not belong to me'. Overall they seemed to be general, task or problem 
oriented that didn't fit the factor structure as developed. 
